Firm-Level Risk and Systemic Risk Analysis in the Insurance Sector during the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: CDS VS. Non-CDS-Based Risk Indictors by Gao, Hui
        
University of Bath
PHD
Firm-Level Risk and Systemic Risk Analysis in the Insurance Sector during the








Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 22. May. 2019
 1 
FIRM-LEVEL RISK AND SYSTEMIC RISK 
ANALYSIS IN THE INSURANCE SECTOR DURING 
THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS: CDS VS. 






A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
University of Bath 






Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rests with the author. A copy of 
this thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to 
recognise that its copyright tests with the author and that they must not copy it or use 
material from it except as permitted by law or with the consent of the author. 
 
 
This thesis may be made available for consultation with the University Library and may 








Although extensive literature has investigated the systemic relevance of the insurance sector 
during the financial crisis of 2007-2009, mixed results have been presented. This thesis 
considers firm-level risk assessments in contrast to systemic risk evaluations to examine 
whether insurers are riskier than banks and non-financial institutions (NFIs). The role of CDS 
data in capturing risks has been compared with that of non-CDS data as well in this research. 
By applying CDS and non-CDS data of worldwide banks, insurers and NFIs into the two 
groups of risk methodologies, this thesis shows that insurers contribute more to and are affected 
more by credit risk than the other two sectors. This study also finds that credit risk links among 
companies are stronger than other types of risk connections. What’ more, CDS provides earlier 
risk warning signals than non-CDS information. In addition, firm-level risk has relatively weak 
non-linear correlation with systemic risk, i.e. firm risk is not able to reflect some information 
that is only contained in systemic risk. Finally, the systemic vulnerability analysis of distress 
dependence matrix (DiDe SV) and SRISK, involving both equity and balance sheet information, 
are superior to any other risk measures adopted in this thesis in terms of its predictive ability 
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Since the subprime mortgage crisis, activities of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) have 
raised many concerns among practitioners, regulators and academics. By conducting non-core 
or banking activities, NBFIs have become intensively interrelated with banks and other 
institutions. Without appropriate regulations on them, nevertheless, NBFIs are associated with 
high potential risk. The 2007-2009 financial crash is characterised by NBFI collapses and 
systemic risk, which triggered extensive defaults of financial and non-financial institutions, 
and finally resulted in the turbulence of the global financial market. Systemic risk is another 
hot topic after the crisis, however there is still no consensus on its definition yet. This thesis 
follows Financial Stability Board (FSB) and defines systemic risk as “a risk of disruption to 
financial services that is caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system and has 
the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real economy.” Traditionally, 
systemic risk is believed to be associated with banks. However, the subprime mortgage crisis 
reveals that NBFIs are systemic relevant as well. Particularly, the insurance sector, classified 
as NBFIs, has attracted increasing attention from both academics and regulators as a result of 
the famous insurer failures in the last financial crash such as American International Group 
(AIG), Municipal Bond Insurance Association (MBIA) and the AMBAC Financial Group. 
In the 2007 financial meltdown, Credit Default Swap (CDS) market is considered to play 
an essential role in spreading risk. CDS transactions were most prevalent among NBFIs and its 
trading volume peaked in the historical high prior to the turbulence. However, the self-reflexive 
characteristics1 of CDS spreads, and the lack of transparency in the CDS market bred systemic 
risk. Considering the contributions of the CDS market to systemic risk, and the well-known 
failures of the CDS issuers in the subprime mortgage crisis, this thesis tries to exploit the role 
of CDS information in risk analyses. The popularity of the CDS transactions is attributed to the 
activities of some insurance companies, which were the main net sellers of CDS protections 
prior to the financial meltdown. (ECB, 2009) Particularly, AIG, which was highly leveraged 
with heavy holdings of the U.S. mortgage portfolios, collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) 
and collateralised loan obligations (CLOs), issued substantial CDS contracts that protect 
housing related assets. While the bubble in the subprime mortgage market burst, AIG was 
required to meet the cash collateral calls on its CDS trades. Further claims were triggered 
afterwards when AIG’s credit rating was downgraded. Consequently, AIG was bankrupt and 
                                                        
1 Elaborated in Section 2.4.3 
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led to the domino effect in the financial market.  
This section consists of the following subsections: Section 1.1 presents relevant evidences 
of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Section 1.2 specifies motivations and contributions of this 
thesis. Section 1.3 lists research questions. Section 1.4 summarises methodologies and data 
used in this research. Section 1.5 shows empirical findings and Section 1.6 demonstrates the 
structure of the thesis. 
1.1 Evidence of the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis 
The 2007-2009 financial crisis was triggered by the US subprime mortgage crisis at the 
beginning and finally led to global financial market collapse and worldwide economic 
downturn. During that time, we witnessed huge losses in investor confidence and securities 
values, which resulted in institution failures. GDP decline and unemployment rate rise 
simultaneously reached new peaks since the 1930s Great Depression.  Unprecedented 
expansions of fiscal and monetary policies, and substantial bailouts of financial institutions 
were carried out by multinational governments and central banks. Although originated in the 
US, the crisis quickly spread abroad, giving rise to the subsequent European Sovereign-Debt 
Crisis. 
It is well known that the 2007 financial meltdown was caused when the bubble burst in the 
subprime housing market in US. It is a process of the boom and bust cycle. Credit 
intermediation, especially through non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) and the off-balance 
sheet activities of banks that were not properly regulated, boosted the economic prosperity and 
financial efficiency. However, in the credit booming and the building up of asset bubbles, risk 
is transferred and expanded through the intensifying connections between market participants. 
As soon as one institution defaults, others will be affected considerably. Systemic event occurs 
due to the extensive defaults of financial institutions and the credit crunch in the financial 
system. The 2007-2009 financial crisis is a representative systemic crisis.  
Financial derivatives, especially Credit Default Swap (CDS) contracts, facilitated the risk 
amplification during the 2007 financial crash. The housing bubble prior to the crisis was funded 
from Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), with 
the latter one being the main reference asset that is insured by CDS contract. When the 
subprime mortgage market was collapsed, the relevant derivative markets particularly the CDS 
market was disrupted. CDS transactions achieved the historical high prior to the subprime 
mortgage crisis and were believed to be responsible for the occurrence of systemic risk. 
Considering as well the NBFI failures such as AIG, MBIA and AMBAC that were active in 
CDS trading, this thesis pays attention to the role and characteristics of CDS. 
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The remainder of Section 1.1 is structured as follows: Section 1.1.1 demonstrates activities 
of NBFIs during the 2007 financial crisis. Section 1.1.2 specifies activities of insurers during 
the 2007 distress. Section 1.1.3 reviews theories of systemic risk.  Section 1.1.4 illustrates CDS 
and CDS market. 
1.1.1 Non-Bank Financial Institutions in the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis 
All types of financial institutions have extensively strengthened their interconnections in the 
last two decades. They have blurred their business boundaries by moving to non-core activities, 
and thus link and compete with each other. For instance, Billio et al. (2011) state that banks 
and insurers supply funds to hedge funds but at the same time they conduct their own trading 
activities that compete directly with hedge funds. The Geneva Association (2010) also gives an 
example that insurers began to get involved in derivatives trading, credit default swap issuance, 
and investment management, which competed with banks, hedge funds and brokers/dealers. 
The most important business model change that contributed to the 2007 financial crisis would 
be NBFIs as credit intermediaries conducting bank-like financial activities.  
(1) Credit Intermediation 
Credit intermediation occurs when savers deposit their savings to banks, which then use the 
funds to provide credit to borrowers. On one hand, credit intermediation provides credit and 
liquidity to economy. Compared with direct lending between lenders and borrowers, credit 
intermediation reduces monitoring costs and diversifies portfolio investments.  (see Pozsar, 
Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky, 2010) On the other hand, however, banks are faced with credit 
risk and liquidity risk as they take short-term deposits and lend the funds in the form of long- 
term loans, also called maturity transformation. Credit risk refers to the risk of default in the 
loan lending, while the liquidity risk refers to the mismatch of the short-term funding and long-
term lending (see The Geneva Association, 2010). Therefore, most of the historical crises 
stemmed from banks that are then under rigorous supervision.  
(2) Structure of NBFIs Credit Intermediation 
Traditionally banks are credit intermediaries, however according to Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission (2010), NBFIs have become active in banking business due to the following 
reasons: (1) NBFIs was to meet the credit demand in market as a result of strict restrictions on 
banks; (2) banks started off-balance sheet activities through NBFIs due to capital regulations; 
(3) there was much less supervision on NBFIs from the regulators. Adrian and Shin (2010) 
have shown the home mortgage holdings between bank-based intermediation and market-based 
intermediation from 1980 to 2009 as shown in Error! Reference source not found.. In their 
work, bank-based holdings involve commercial banks, savings institutions, and credit unions. 
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Market-based holdings incorporate government-sponsored enterprise (GSE), GSE mortgage 
pools, private mortgage pools and asset-backed securities (ABS) issuers. In Error! Reference 
source not found., market-based holdings exceeded bank-based holdings from about 1990 and 
remained the domination until 2009. 
 
 Source: Adrian and Shin (2010) 
Figure 1 Market-Based and Bank-Based Holding of Home Mortgages, 1980 to 2009 
The figure shows the holding level of bank-based intermediation compared with that of the 
market-based intermediation from 1980 to 2009. Bank-based holdings consist of commercial 
banks, savings institutions, and credit unions. Market-based holdings include government-
sponsored enterprise (GSE), GSE mortgage pools, private mortgage pools and asset-backed 
securities (ABS) issuers. 
 
Adrian and Shin (2010) have summarised one possible chain of market-based financial 
intermediation as shown in Error! Reference source not found.: mortgage originators such 
as banks expand mortgage loans to subprime borrowers and sell the loans to a mortgage pool 
that is financed by issuing mortgage-backed securities (MBS). MBS is then classified into 
different tranches of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) by an asset-backed securities (ABS) 
issuer. A securities firm, such as an investment bank, is the potential holder of CDOs and 
finances its position from repurchase agreements (repos) with a commercial bank. Safer 
tranches of CDOs are insured by credit default swap (CDS) contracts, which are issued mainly 
by insurers. The commercial bank then obtains liquidity by issuing financial commercial paper 




Source: Adrian and Shin (2010) 
Figure 2 Intermediation Chain in a Market-Based Financial System 
The figure shows a possible intermediation chain in a market-based financial system, which 
starts with lending from ultimate creditors (households) and ends with credit flowing to 
ultimate debtors (households).  
 
(3) Risk of Credit Intermediation in NBFI System 
In addition to the risks of banks as credit intermediaries, which is mentioned in Section 2.1.1, 
NBFIs are associated with extra risks when get involved in credit intermediation. This is 
supported by Pozsar et al. (2012) who focus on the level of guarantees for credit intermediation 
in banking system and in NBFI system. They demonstrate that a third party could provide credit 
and liquidity guarantees to enhance credit intermediation. Particularly if credit intermediation 
is guaranteed by the public sector, it is called the official enhancement. Pozsar et al. (2012) 
have analysed the pre-crisis degree of official enhancements among depository institutions 
(including commercial banks) and NBFIs. They show that credit intermediation activities in 
depository institutions are more or less enhanced, however those activities of NBFIs are not 
enhanced at all. Credit intermediation activities of NBFIS include CDS issuance, securities 
lending and financial guarantees from insurers, and term ABS and bi-lateral repos from finance 
companies. This could explain the higher risk of credit intermediation in NBFI system than 
that in banking system. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2010) also asserts that bank-
like NBFIs are more prone to triggering financial instability than banks in that NBFIs employ 
high leverage, rely on short-term funding markets and have no access to explicit government 
supports2 for banks. There is also no regulatory framework governing and monitoring the 
activities of NBFIs involved in high-risk transactions.  
                                                        
2 Such as deposit insurance and the lender of last resort that reduce the liquidity risk of banks 
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(4) NBFI Failures in the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis 
This section demonstrates a list of events that represent a partial picture of the 2007 - 2009 
financial meltdown, with particular emphasis on NBFI activities. According to the staff report 
of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2010), NBFI failures in the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis experienced a few stages: 
Liquidity crisis of 2007 – Subprime mortgage lenders, obtaining funding from the securitisation 
market, were the first victims. Two hedge funds of Bear Stearns and two investment funds of 
BNP Paribas collapsed due to their considerable losses in housing related assets. Meanwhile, 
commercial paper market and money market were hit hard because of the disruptions of MBS 
and CDOs. Northern Rock, a British bank, failed to finance from money market, and 
consequently requested loan facility support from the Bank of England. 
The run on Bear Stearns in early 2008 – Financial guarantors who provide credit guarantees 
on subprime mortgage assets were faced with payment obligations and were downgraded since 
the collapse of the housing market. Following that, bondholders were in a panic to liquidate 
auction-rate securities (ARS), questioning the ability of financial guarantors to continue 
guaranteeing the municipal bonds they were holding. Bear Sterns went bankrupt in March 2008 
because of its numerous losses in mortgage-related investments and its failure to raise funds 
from repo market.  
The panic of 2008 – Lehman Brothers was disrupted due to its heavy holdings of housing-
related assets and failed in financing its debt via the frozen capital market such as repo market. 
The failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 was the final trigger of the crisis. 
1.1.2 Insurers in the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis 
As a subsector of NBFIs, insurance companies are believed to play a prominent role in posing 
a risk to financial market during the subprime mortgage crisis, especially considering the 
famous failures of American International Group (AIG), Municipal Bond Insurance 
Association (MBIA) and AMBAC Financial Group. A brief description of insurers’ activities 
and the crisis aftermaths on them are demonstrated in this section. 
The traditional main role of insurance companies is to provide protection by accepting 
risks from policyholders, from whom insurers collect premium payments (The Geneva 
Association (2010)). Although insurers assume risk, they manage it, diversify it, and transfer 
portion of it to reinsurers. Furthermore, insurance risk is idiosyncratic, unlike banking activities 
that are associated with credit risk and liquidity risk, which incline to relate to economic cycle. 
The premiums raised by insurance companies would be used to support capital market and 
finance economy. Since claims on the insurance payments usually won’t be triggered until long 
 18 
time after premiums have been taken, insurers are able to take long-run investment, which 
provides long-term capital to companies. Given the aforementioned features, insurance is one 
of the most important sectors in financial market. In 2008, the global premium volume in 
insurance was about USD 4.4 trillion, which accounts for 7.3 per cent of the worldwide GDP. 
Regarding the size of assets managed by insurers in 2008, it was USD 18.7 trillion that 
constitutes about 11 per cent of the worldwide total financial assets. However, like the case of 
all other NBFIs, the business areas of insurance companies have changed over the past years, 
extending towards non-traditional insurance and non-insurance activities as summarised by 
Muller et al. (2012) in Table 1.  
Table 1 Activities of Insurance Companies 
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CDS/CDO underwriting                                                                               
Capital market business                                                                            
Banking, including investment banking and hedge fund activities                                    
Third-party asset management                                                                       
Industrial activities 
Source: Muller et al. (2012) 
The Geneva Association (2010) has compared the cumulative amount of total capital raised 
and credit losses of banks with those of insurers during the 2007 financial crisis as illustrated 
in Error! Reference source not found.. According to Error! Reference source not found., 
gaps between banks and insurers indicated by the relative values of recapitalisation and credit 
losses that are computed as percentages of 2006 shareholders equity, are smaller than those 
                                                        
3 Asset Liability Management, a practice of managing the risks resulting from the mismatches of assets and liabilities. 
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signified by the absolute values of recapitalisation and credit losses. However no matter on 
absolute basis or relative basis, insurers had less capital raised and less credit losses than banks. 
Baluch et al. (2011) also note that although there has been an increase in correlation between 
stock returns of banking and insurance, banks performed much worse than insurers with greater 
losses in equity values during the crisis.  
 
 
Source: The Geneva Association (2010) 
Figure 3 Recapitalisation and Credit Losses in Banks and Insurers 
The figure shows the cumulative total capital raised and credit losses of banks and insurers in 
the crisis on both absolute and relative bases. Total capital raised refers to equity and preferred 
share capital raised from states and the capital markets, but not incorporates asset relief or 
lending by states. 
 
The crisis effects on insurance companies are summarised by The Geneva Association 
(2010) according to the type of insurers: 
Insurers with none or limited banking operations – Insurers with limited banking business are 
generally referred to “pure” insurance companies, which typically include life, non-life and 
composite insurers (e.g., Lincoln, Yamato Life, AEGON, The Hartford, etc.). These companies 
were only associated with limited losses during the financial collapse. They were affected due 
to exposures to financial instruments, connections with defaulted banks, liquidity problems, 
and the effects from the general economic recession. Generally, this type of insurers, especially 
life insurers, had less exposure than banks to structured products (e.g., CDS) because of their 
strict restrictions and regulations.  
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Bank/insurance conglomerates – Bank/insurance conglomerates such as BNP Paribas, HSBC 
and Credit Agricole with strong liquid holdings and low exposures to structured products 
remained unharmed from the 2007-2009 financial crash. However, some bank/insurance 
conglomerates such as ING suffered huge losses relative to the pure insurers. The failure of 
ING was mainly caused by its banking activities and its acquisition of a U.S. thrift. As a result 
of this acquisition, ING had to be under the regulations of the Office of Thrift Supervision 
(OTS) and thus more than half of its assets were required to transfer to mortgage-related 
investments. To meet the requirement, ING invested in abundant MBS, and incurred a huge 
loss in its portfolio holdings in 2008.  
Insurers with wholesale banking operations – A typical example of this type of insurer is the 
American International Group (AIG), which was declared bankrupt during the 2007 financial 
meltdown. The difficulties did not stem from its insurance business but from its Financial 
Products division (AIG FP). The AIG holding company was subject to the US office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS), as was AIG FP. However, AIG FP was domiciled in London. By using 
regulatory arbitrage, AIG FP operated outside of the control of both U.K. Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) and OTS. AIG FP was with high leveraged positions and was holding a large 
number of derivatives that involve mortgage-associated assets, CDOs and collateralised loan 
obligations (CLOs). Particularly, AIG FP guaranteed a high proportion of CDS contracts that 
provide guarantees on housing-related assets. After the downgrades of the subprime assets in 
2007, AIG was required to meet the cash collateral calls on its CDS contracts and in September 
2008, more cash collateral calls were demanded on AIG’s CDS contracts when AIG’s credit 
rating was downgraded. Faced with liquidity risk, AIG was bailed out by the U.S. Treasury 
eventually.  
Monoliners – Compared with traditional insurers, monoliners (e.g., AMBAC, MBIA, FSA) 
mainly focus on providing financial guarantees and take credit risk, through which they cut 
down the borrowing cost of U.S. municipalities. Potential risks existed because monoliners 
increasingly offered financial guarantees on CDS contracts backed by AAA rated CDO and 
MBS, which were all undiversified and highly leveraged portfolios (CDS backed by MBS calls 
for lower capital coverage than a municipal bond). However, financial guarantees associated 
with CDS are heavily dependent on credit ratings. When the subprime mortgage crisis was 
triggered, credit ratings of the related CDS contracts were downgraded as well as the ratings 
of the monoliners, which, in turn, affected their counterparties. Similarly, mark-to-market 
losses, confidence crisis and liquidity risk contributed to the collapses of monoliners such as 
AMBAC and MBIA during the financial crash.  
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To summarise, the aforementioned studies suggest that it is insurers’ non-core activities 
that are associated with systemic risk and financial crisis. AIG, MBIA and AMBAC collapsed 
during the subprime mortgage crisis in that they were more or less engaging in non-traditional 
business. According to The Geneva Association (2010), AIG itself represents 58 per cent of the 
recapitalisation in the insurance industry, and 36 per cent of the credit losses of insurers during 
the financial crash. They also note that although AIG was bailed out for its problems occurred 
in CDS underwriting, there is little damage on its traditional insurance businesses.  
1.1.3 Systemic Risk 
The 2007-2009 financial crisis is a systemic crisis with multi-sector disruptions and extensive 
financial losses, which led to worldwide economic recession. Since the financial meltdown, 
there is a surge in literature on systemic risk. This section follows Benoit et al. (2016) to review 
systemic risk from its definitions, its theories and models, and regulations on it. 
1.1.3.1 Defining Systemic Risk 
There is no widely accepted definition of systemic risk so far. De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) 
describe systemic risk as the risk with systemic events in the strong sense. Systemic events 
mainly comprise of shocks and propagation mechanisms, while strong sense in this definition 
refers to the situation where systemic events finally result in failure of one institution or one 
market, or failures of many institutions or many markets. International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) and Bank for International Settlements (BIS) define systemic 
risk as “a risk of disruption to financial services that is caused by an impairment of all or parts 
of the financial system and has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real 
economy.” The FSB recently developed metrics to identify systemically important institutions, 
mainly based on six pillars: size, interconnectedness, substitutability, complexity, leverage and 
liquidity risk, and large mismatches. This research focuses on the negative externalities of 
systemic risk following the definition suggested by IMF, FSB and BIS. 
1.1.3.2 Systemic Risk Models 
Following Benoit et al. (2016), this section demonstrates different categories of systemic risk 
models, which are grouped according to diverse economic mechanisms: systemic risk-taking 
mechanisms, contagion mechanisms and amplification mechanisms. (see details in Benoit et 
al. 2016) 
(1) Systemic Risk-Taking Mechanisms  
Systemic risk-taking mechanisms explain why financial institutions result in similar risk 
exposures, which leads to the amplification mechanisms, and why they are exposed to large 
risks, which causes them in default and poses threat to their counterparties via risk propagation.  
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Correlated investments 
If firms invest in correlated assets, they are inevitably to have the same risk exposures. Acharya 
(2009) proposes two mechanisms between companies: negative externality effect and positive 
externality effect. The negative externality effect (recessionary spillover) occurs when the 
failure of an individual bank leads to a decline in the aggregate supply of deposits and therefore 
a decrease in aggregate investment in the economy. The following rise in the market-clearing 
rate for deposits will squeeze other banks’ profits. The positive externality effect (strategic 
benefit) results in expansions of the on-going banks due to the transfer of depositors from the 
failed banks to them, or results in strategic gains for the surviving banks because of the 
acquisition of the failed banks. Acharya (2009) asserts that negative externality effect is greater 
than the positive externality effect based on his robust estimations, and he suggest that banks 
would prefer to invest in more correlated asset portfolios, as banks find it optimal to be more 
likely to survive or fail together. In the same domain, Farhi and Tirole (2012) note that 
government interventions are usually associated with a fixed cost, therefore bailouts are 
optimal only when there are extensive failures in the market, which encourages banks to engage 
in correlated risk exposures.   
Liquidity risk 
Benoit et al. (2016) have used the free-rider problem to explain why all banks incline to take 
illiquid assets. Specifically, when there is a shock to the system, banks with illiquid asset 
investments could obtain liquidity from other banks in the interbank market. Consequently, no 
banks would like to be the liquidity providers. They all invest heavily in illiquid assets to pursue 
higher profits, expecting to rely on others for liquidity support, however this exposes the 
banking sector to liquidity risk. In addition, maturity mismatch of assets and liabilitiesI
lending in long term by using short-term financingIcontributes to liquidity risk in banking as 
well. The reason why short-term financing is popular among banks is explained in 
Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013). They demonstrate the concept of maturity rat race, where 
borrowers tend to issue new debt with shorter maturity as this could dilute the claims of other 
creditors. Subsequently, all creditors prefer short maturity contracts. 
Tail risk 
Acharya et al. (2010) propose that large, complex financial institutions (LCFIs) were heavily 
leveraged by manufacturing tail risks, which were systemic relevant and contributed to the 
2007-2009 financial meltdown. They also explain that increasingly intensive competitions, 
government guarantees without appropriate charges and lax regulations altogether encourage 
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LCFIs to engage in shadow banking activities such as securitisation. Gennaioli et al. (2013) 
note that securitisation and diversification in shadow banking system function well in the 
economy under rational expectations, however these activities will contribute to systemic risks 
if investors neglect tail risks. Gennaioli et al. (2013) further suggest that policy makers should 
control the leverage level in banking instead of focusing on capital requirements.  
Leverage cycles and bubbles 
According to Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the condition of 
borrowers’ balance sheets play an important role in the dynamics of the economy. Their models 
suggest that borrowers with higher asset values in economic upturns could borrow more and 
invest more than in the downturns when asset prices collapse, which amplifies business cycle. 
Focusing on banks’ value-at-risk (VaR), Adrian and Shin (2014) show that firms invest more 
in expansion periods when VaR is lower, and deleverage in recessions when VaR rises, which 
results in procyclical leverage. In terms of bubbles, Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012) have 
reviewed literature on financial bubbles, and they suggest further research on their origin and 
how bubbles burst. Allen and Gale (2000) attribute causes of bubbles to agency problems 
between borrowers and banks. Undertaking risky investments by financing from banks, 
investors tend to bid up asset prices in that they can shift risks to banks by filing for 
bankruptcies when face huge losses, which breeds bubbles.  
(2) Contagion Mechanisms 
Contagion refers to the spread of losses of one financial institution to others through financial 
interconnectedness. The types of bilateral connections and their potential risks are summarised 
below. 
Balance sheet contagion and networks 
Balance sheet contagion refers to risk propagation that is through balance sheet effects. 
According to Kiyotaki and Moore (2002), indirect balance sheet contagion is trough banks’ 
similar assets holdings that are collaterals for securing bank loans, whilst direct balance sheet 
contagion is through the direct borrowing and lending connections between firms. Focusing on 
the interbank market particularly, Allen and Gale (2000b) show that risk-sharing via claims in 
interbank market is able to prevent default of an individual bank given that there is sufficient 
liquidity in the market. However, it would result in widespread failures if demand for liquidity 
from the economy exceeds supply. They further advocate that crisis propagations are different 
due to various forms of linkages between banks. A complete interbank market network where 
firms all directly connect to each other perform better, in terms of alleviating financial distress, 
than incomplete one where some financial institutions are indirectly connected. Eisenberg and 
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Noe (2001) have developed a model measuring interbank claims that are associated with 
“cyclical interdependence”. In a fully connected networks, Leitner (2005) asserts that banks 
linking with each other would result in contagion risk, however this would also encourage 
“private sector bailouts”, where banks provide liquidity to troubled banks to prevent contagion. 
Recently, Gofman (2017) has performed an analysis in the real world by assessing the 
efficiency and stability of the constructed networks in the U.S. interbank market.  
Payment and clearing infrastructures 
Interbank payments occur due to the operations of banks’ customers. Freixas and Parigi (1998) 
have investigated the trade-off between gross and net payment systems, facilitating the choice 
of an appropriate payment system if given a particular scenario. This is based on the analysis 
that gross payment system would not cause contagion risk but occupies liquidity, whereas net 
payment system exposes banks to contagion risks but allow banks to keep liquidity4. (Adams 
et al. 2010) Central counterparty (CCP) is associated with potential counterparty risks, and thus 
many studies have researched on it. Duffie and Zhu (2011) have suggested that in order to 
mitigate counterparty risk, the number of CCPs should be cut to a single one. According to 
Heath et al. (2016), CCP provides stability in the market if it is well managed. They claim that 
according to international standards, a large and systemically important CCP would hold 
adequate prefunded financial reserves to cover the exposures of the defaults of its largest two 
participants in “extreme but plausible” market conditions. Even in a range of extreme scenarios 
where one or multiple participants failed in “beyond plausible” market conditions, or more than 
two of the participants defaulted, a CCP would distribute the unfunded losses through the 
system so as to limit the stress transmission. In the same domain, Markose et al. (2017) extends 
Heath et al. (2016)’s work by considering the European Market Infrastructure Regulation 
(EMIR) skin-in-the-game requirements for CCPs. They suggest employing digital maps for 
obligations of G-SIFs at reasonably regular intervals.  
Informational contagion 
Another form of contagion comes from information externalities. In Chen (1999), depositors 
that are uninformed of a bank’s asset values will run on this bank depending on the information 
of other banks failures by assuming that returns of banks are correlated. Consequently, a few 
bankruptcies consequently result in widespread bank runs. Focusing on the connection between 
price informativeness and liquidity, Cespa and Foucault (2014) propose that liquidity losses in 
one asset would dry up liquidity of correlated assets, ending up with a widespread liquidity 
                                                        
4 Galbiati et al. (2010) propose a network formation game for payment systems as a function of liquidity costs. 
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crisis. 
(3) Amplification Mechanisms 
Amplification mechanisms explore how individual and small group failures finally turn out to 
be a systemic one, particularly when it is a simultaneous effect.  
Liquidity-driven crises 
Amplification could be well explained by the inherent self-strengthening feature of liquidity 
crises. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) have examined how potential asset buyers determine the 
liquidation values of assets. In their analysis, when a negative shock hits the industry, all firms 
in the industry need to liquidate their positions and are not able to buy assets from their peers. 
This results in asset sales to outsiders at lower prices, which amplifies the downturn. By relating 
market liquidity to funding liquidity of traders, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) propose two 
liquidity spirals: a “margin spiral” describes an adverse feedback loop where margin rises when 
market becomes illiquid; a “loss spiral” refers to losses on one asset leading to asset sales, 
which further depresses market prices. Both effects would result in asset market collapse and 
liquidity crisis. 
Market freezes 
Market freezes are extreme examples of liquidity dry-ups. Disruptions of interbank markets 
and repo markets in financial crises have generated many studies on them. As early as discussed 
in Flannery (1996), the lender of last resort is suggested to avoid adverse selection in the 
interbank market. This is because private creditors cannot obtain and/or estimate the 
information of banks so that the solvent, but illiquid banks may fail to approach funding. 
Specifically in repo market where collateral is needed, Gorton and Ordoñez (2014) show that 
agents will not assess the quality of collateral in normal times as no information emerges or it 
is costly to get access to the information. Correspondingly, market fragility is building up 
during market booms. Agents, however, will start to learn about the quality of collateral when 
a shock occurs. The resulted confidence loss will trigger the freezes of short-term debt markets 
such as repo market, which increases the likelihood of crises. Focusing on the complexity of 
the financial networks, Caballero and Simsek (2013) show that since connections and spillovers 
lead to collective failures in distress periods, banks decline to lend to each other when they 
know little about their counterparty risk in the complex counterparty system. 
Coordination failures and runs 
Coordination failures in creditors of financial institutions lead financial firms to be vulnerable 
by nature, which explains why small shocks could develop to aggregate risk. Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983) have shown that bank deposit contracts are more efficient than exchange 
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markets in terms of providing liquidity and risk sharing. However, this advantage also leaves 
banks subject to runs. There are multiple equilibria with various confidence levels in banking: 
when the confidence levels of depositors in banks are relatively high, the equilibrium is that 
maturity transformation in banking works well; when confidence levels are low, depositors will 
be panic and run on banks. Martin et al. (2014) have explored whether and to what extent will 
the fragility in short-term lending market especially in repo market give rise to financial 
institution runs. They find that the possibility of repo runs due to market-wide changes in 
expectations relies on market microstructures.  
1.1.3.3 Regulations 
There are updating regulatory rules and tools targeting on the aforementioned systemic risk 
models, which will be reviewed in this section. (see details in the survey of Benoit et al. 2016) 
Basel III requires banks to hold at least 8.5% Tier 1 capital ratioITier 1 capital/risk-
weighted assetsIto target solvency risk. 2.5% of risk-weighted assets are the lower thresholds 
as the “conservation buffer”, below which dividend distributions of banks are forbidden. Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2014b) has also imposed a non-risk-based 3% limit of 
leverage ratioITier 1 capital/total assetsI on banks. The pillar of leverage was removed from 
Basel II but reintroduced in Basel III in response to the 2007-2009 financial crash. The main 
differences between Tier 1 capital ratio and leverage ratio is that the former considers risk-
weighted assets (RWA), while the latter focuses on total assets. RWA is introduced to base 
capital requirements on risk categories of bank assets, which prevent banks from huge capital 
losses when a particular type of asset is considerably written down.  
Sectoral capital requirements and caps on loan-to-value ratios are the macro-prudential 
tools on correlated investments. Specifically, sectoral capital requirements deter banks to lend 
into particular sectors by imposing higher capital ratios, while caps on loan-to-value ratios 
focus on mortgage loans.  
For liquidity risk, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013) has proposed liquidity 
coverage ratio that impose banks to maintain enough High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) to 
cover their short term liabilities (within 30 days). HQLA are assets that are easily and quickly 
to be liquidated. There are three categories of HQLA: Level 1, Level 2A and Level 2B. Level 
1 refers to highly liquid assets with no haircut. Level 2A include GSE (government sponsored 
enterprise)-guaranteed assets that receive 15 per cent haircut. Level 2B assets are subject to 50 
per cent hair cut and include common equity and corporate debt securities. Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (2014a) on the other hand, directly eases the general liquidity risk by 
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restricting the upper level of short-term debt.  
Stress tests are performed to deal with tail risks. Targeting on leverage cycles, Basel III 
has proposed countercyclical capital buffers, which would alleviate the procyclicality caused 
by the Basel capital requirements that are loose in prosperity and tight in distress. Academics 
have recommended some reforms on risk-taking as well. Acharya et al. (2013) suggest that 
regulators should impose a “tax” on financial institutions according to their expected losses 
conditional on a systemic crisis. Questioning the private money creation, which causes negative 
externality where excess short-term debt issued from banks, Stein (2012) suggests open-market 
operations to monitor those externality. In Bianchi and Mendoza (2013), a “macro-prudential 
debt tax” as an optimal policy is suggested to impose on financial institutions if there is a high 
expected probability of crisis. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014a) finally acknowledges and inserts 
contagion as risk to control, however it is still vague on how to measure contagion. Academics 
have proposed alternative regulatory reforms to tackle contagion. Some of them suggest that 
capital requirements should be depending on the systemic relevance of a company rather than 
the firm-level risk of the company. (Allen & Gale 2007; Alter et al. 2015) Instead of supervising 
bilateral linkages, Rochet (2010) propose to transfer interbank trades to central counterparty 
(CCP) system and enforce regulations on CCP. Financial Stability Board (2015) suggests that 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives should be traded in exchanges and through CCPs.  
Deposit insurance has also been improved to prevent runs on financial institutions. For 
example, the value of it has been increased in the euro area since the Cyprus bailout in 2013. 
Due to the fragility of interbank markets, European Central Bank (ECB) has considerably 
replaced the role of the interbank market as the lender of the last resort for banks during the 
financial crisis. In U.S., Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) is implemented to inject capital 
into the market in 2008 to prevent substantial bank failures. However, some academics point 
out the disadvantage of government rescue as in Allen et al. (2017), which claim that 
government guarantees distort the market and result in bank failures. To respond to the 2007-
2009 financial crisis and the questions from the public regarding government reliefs, Dodd-
Frank Act was passed in 2010, aiming to stop bailouts and protect the taxpayers. Other popular 
recent regulations would be to publicly release stress test results such as the Supervisory 
Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) led by the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the disclosures of 
bank risks from the European Banking Authority (EBA). 
1.1.4 CDS Market in the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis 
Credit default swap (CDS) transactions were prevalent prior to the subprime mortgage crisis 
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among the NBFIs and were believed to be responsible for the occurrence of systemic risk. AIG, 
MBIA and AMBAC that were in distress during the financial meltdown were all associated 
with CDS. 
A single-name credit default swap acts as an insurance product specified over a period, 
with its payoff triggered on the condition of credit events of the underlying instrumenta 
reference asset or a reference entity. Specifically, a protection buyer purchases CDS from a 
protection seller by paying a periodic premiumalso called CDS spread. This contract allows 
the protection buyer to transfer the default risk of the reference entity to the protection seller. 
With all else being equal, the higher the CDS spread, the higher the credit risk of the underlying 
assets. When default of an asset or bankruptcy of an underlying entity occurs, the protection 
seller will have to pay compensation to the protection buyer. Schich (2009) summarises two 
types of CDS: covered CDS refers to the situation where the protection buyer is holding the 
reference assets being insured by CDS. As for naked CDS, the credit protection buyer does not 
own the reference obligation. Therefore, covered CDS is more like an insurance contract 




Source: Turner (2009) 
Figure 4 OTC Derivative Trading Volume by Type 
 
As shown in Error! Reference source not found., Turner (2009) reports that the over the 
counter (OTC) derivative trading volume had experienced a rapid growth in the past decades 
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particularly from 2006 to 2008, with its gross nominal value as $60 trillion in 2007 since its 
generation in the mid 1990s. Markose et al. (2012) note that CDS became popular when “Credit 
Risk Transfer” (CRT) scheme of Basel II, the Joint Agencies Rule 66 Federal Regulations 
56914 and 59622 allowed banks to use CDS or financial guarantees to transfer credit risks of 
their underlying exposures5 to an AAA protection provider6. ECB (2009) has compared the 
CDS buyers and CDS sellers by sector as shown in Error! Reference source not found., 
which shows that insurers and monolines were the major issuers and banks were the net buyers 
in December 2006. In this way, the credit risk pressure on banks was alleviated and their capital 
requirements were reduced accordingly, however risks were transferred to NBFIs, especially 
insurers given their active operations in CDS trading.  
 
Source: ECB (2009) 
Figure 5 CDS Bought and Sold by Sector in December 2006 
 
Markose et al. (2012) assert that CDS premiums have inherited weakness of self-reflexive 
characteristics that has been shown to contribute to systemic risk. CDS spreads not only reflect 
the credit risk status of the reference entity, but also in turn accelerate default event in that the 
rise of CDS spreads will result in credit rating downgrades, cost of capital increases and stock 
market devaluations (Markose et al. 2012). In 
, Markose et al. (2012) show that CDS contracts are also sold to a third party (D), who 
                                                        
5 Such as MBS on the balance sheets of banks 
6 Such as AIG, hedge funds and monolines 
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does not hold the underlying assets of the reference entity. This is the so-called naked CDS. In 
this case, D is motivated to short the reference entity to trigger the default event and thus obtains 
the payment from the CDS contract (Bear Raid). Even if an investor, such as the protection 
buyer B, owns the reference assets and buys CDS for protection, i.e. the covered CDS, he or 
she will prefer a default event to occur in order to benefit from the payments on CDS. This is 
the so-called empty creditor phenomenon. (see Bolton and Oehmke, 2011) The strategy of 
“offsets” used by CDS participants to manage liquidity requirements will lead to potential 
systemic risk when the chains of CDS obligations increase and merge. Specifically, in Figure 
6, B lends to the reference entity A and buys CDS contracts from protection seller C to protect 
the underlying assets that B holds. When CDS spreads increase, B may adopt the offsets 
strategy by selling CDS to a third party D to benefit from the difference between the premium 
paid to C and received from D. This is an open chain that leaves B’s obligations net to zero, 
while D will obtain the final payments of the CDS contracts if default is triggered. In the case 
of a closed chain, i.e., C sells to B, B sells to D and D sells to C, the aggregate net CDS 
payments for all parties are zero if all of B, C and D are solvent when a default event occurs. 
However, if one of the parties faces liquidity risk or goes bankrupt, then every player in this 
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Figure 6 Credit Default Swap Structure 
The figure illustrates the structure of credit default swap. Solid arrow denotes the direction of 
CDS sale. Recovery rate is the ratio of the reference asset value at default to its face value. 
 
As mentioned earlier, CDS sellers protect CDS buyers against the credit risk of underlying 
assets or underlying entities through CDS contracts, thus counterparty risk is inevitable during 
the transactions. Duffie et al. (2010) conclude that counterparty risk could develop to systemic 
risk as follows: (1) the failure of one financial institution with enormous derivatives portfolio 
could lead to huge losses in this firm’s derivatives transactions, which poses threat to its 
counterparties; (2) in order to avoid the potential losses, counterparties would reduce their 
exposures to the problematic financial institution, which in turn exacerbates the failure of the 
troubled financial institution; (3) a “fire sale” with one market participant failing initially could 
contribute to huge price fluctuations when counterparties attempt to change their positions with 
this problematic financial institution, or when every market player tries to exchange risky assets 
to safe ones. In this scenario, the fire sale leads to massive losses for most market participants, 
even if they are not direct counterparties to the distressed financial institution. 
Considering the aftermath of the disruption in the CDS market, the failures of CDS issuers 
during the financial crisis of 2007-2009, and the relationship between counterparty risk and 
systemic risk, this thesis exploits the role of CDS information in capturing risks.  
1.2 Motivations and Contributions 
1.2.1 Motivations 
Existing studies of the systemic relevance in the insurance sector have produced some mixed 
findings. Most of the papers conclude that insures are relevant to systemic risk to some extent, 
but they are less important than banks (Baluch et al., 2011; Billio et al., 2011; Girardi and Ergün, 
2013; Chen et al., 2014), or they are affected by others rather than acting as the risk contributors 
(Berdin and Sottocornola, 2015). Previous research also suggests that it is the non-core business 
instead of the traditional insurance activities of the insurers that contribute to systemic risk 
(Cummins and Weiss, 2014; The Geneva Association, 2010), or only some types of insurers 
are systemic relevant (The Geneva Association, 2010; Chen et al. 2013). By applying analyses 
into multiple markets, Bernal, Gnabo and Guilmin (2014) conclude that insurers contribute the 
most to systemic risk in U.S., and are the least risky sector in the Eurozone. The contradicting 
conclusions between Bernal et al. (2014) and other studies regarding sector risk rankings in the 
U.S. market motivated this research to further investigate the risk contributions of the insurance 
sector through a multi-method systemic risk analysis. Last but not least, Baluch et al. (2011) 
recommend that one should not concentrate on which industry is more important as systemic 
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risk contributors, but on the strength of the connections between the sectors. In order to shed a 
light on this issue, this thesis quantifies the linkages beween pairwise sectors in an innovative 
way, which is through the sector connectedness analysis in Section 5. 
Academics have also compared systemic risk estimations using both CDS and other data. 
It is accepted that CDS is better than equity returns or bond spread in terms of capturing default 
(Huang et al., 2011); CDS spreads reflect counterparty risk and measure the joint default risk 
of pairwise banks (Giglio, 2014); CDS data mirrors the underlying value of financial 
institution’s debt that might be under government guarantees (Acharya et al., 2017). However, 
there is currently no research using manifold leading systemic risk methodologies together with 
firm-level risk measures to investigate the role of the data type in risk evaluations.  
A few previous papers have reviewed and compared various competing systemic metrics. 
Bisias et al. (2012) and Benoit et al. (2016) have investigated multiple systemic risk measures 
by concentrating on distinct perspectives. Both of them suggest the soundest risk measure 
should encompass multi-directional information and have practical functions to facilitate 
regulators or other users. However, these two studies haven’t recommended any one or a few 
risk metrics to be superior. Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013), and Arsov et al. (2013) have 
tested and identified the most effective systemic risk analytics. Nevertheless, they suggest 
different best-performed risk indicators and both have not considered a new advanced systemic 
risk metricISRISK, which is included in my thesis.  
1.2.2 Contributions 
Different from previous studies, this thesis includes firm-level risk analysis in addition to 
systemic risk estimations to explore sector risk ranking among banks, insurers, and non-
financial institutions (NFIs). Firm-level risk and systemic risk together are to produce multi-
facets risk profiles of companies. 
This thesis is the first one that has performed all of the most frequently cited7 market-based 
systemic risk measures and the most widely accepted firm-level risk measures aiming to 
achieve more convincing outcomes.  
This study has improved the existing research on comparing the role of CDS data and non-
CDS data in risk estimations by expanding the comparison samples: In addition to systemic 
risk measures that are originally constructed on CDS data, the research has also applied CDS 
data to methodologies that are initially designed for equity returns (∆"#()$, Granger causality 
tests, and impulse response function (IRF)) to enhance comparability.  
                                                        
7 The most cited papers regarding the systemic risk measures are presented in Figure 1 of Benoit et al. (2016) 
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This study proposes IRF as a risk indicator to measure systemic risk. 
Previous research rarely performs statistical significance tests on systemic risk 
methodologies. This study fills the gap by applying Wilcoxon signed-rank test (significance 
test) and Conover-Iman test (dominance test) on all risk measures in the thesis. 
This thesis distinguishes the two dimensions of systemic riskIsystemic importance and 
systemic vulnerabilityIof a company through a pairwise analysis. This risk classification is 
usually neglected by previous literature. 
1.3 Research Questions 
The thesis tries to shed a light on: (1) whether insurers are riskier than banks and NFIs in terms 
of both firm-level risk and systemic risk; (2) whether CDS data is better than non-CDS data in 
capturing the subprime mortgage crisis through a multi-method risk analysis; (3) how firm-
level risk measures correlate to systemic risk measures; (4) whether the risk methodologies 
applied in this thesis have the predictive power of the 2007-2009 financial distress and which 
risk metric is superior to others. 
1.4 Methodologies and Data 
This research applies institutions’ firm-level risk assessments as well as systemic risk 
evaluations to obtain relatively comprehensive risk analysis of the banks, insurers and NFIs in 
the sample. Firm-level risk measures include volatility, VaR, expected shortfall, beta, CDS 
spread, and Z-Score (Mare et al. 2016). These firm-level risk measures are meant to capture 
the instability of a firm from different aspects and are using diverse data sources. However, 
firm-level risk approaches only capture the riskiness of the institution itself that is affected from 
the exogenous shocks. They have no considerations of the connections between companies, or 
the negative externalities of one or a few failures on other institutions in the system, i.e., the 
endogenous risk. Therefore, micro-prudential regulations based on firm-level risk metrics 
failed in the 2007-2009 financial meltdown. Since then, regulators realised the necessity for 
appropriate macro-prudential policies established on systemic risk indicators, which attempt to 
regulate market participants at a macro level. Academics have also proposed multiple systemic 
risk methodologies to detect systemically important financial institutions on which the macro-
prudential regulations can impose more strict policies. Systemic risk measures adopted in this 
study are ∆"#()$ (Adrian and Brunnermeier 2016), ∆"#$%&' (CDS-based ∆"#()$), equity-
based Granger-causality tests (Billio et al. 2012), CDS-based Granger-causality tests, equity-
based impulse response functions (IRF), CDS-based IRF, Distress Dependence Matrix (DiDe) 
(Segoviano and Goodhart, 2009) and SRISK (Brownlees and Engle, 2016).  
In this thesis, both firm-level and systemic methodologies are applied into the same dataset, 
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96 listed international companies that comprise 32 banks, 32 insurers and 32 NFIs to evaluate 
the risk contributions of the insurance sector. Moreover, both CDS data and non-CDS data are 
applied into the risk analyses to explore whether CDS-based risk methods perform better than 
non-CDS-based risk methods. In firm-level risk assessments, volatility, VaR, expected shortfall 
and beta employ equity data, CDS spread is the premium of the 5-year CDS contract, and Z-
Score is based on balance sheet data. With regard to systemic risk metrics, CDS spreads are 
the inputs in ∆"#$%&', CDS-based Granger causality, CDS-based IRF, and DiDe. Non-CDS 
data are required in ∆"#()$, equity-based Granger causality, equity-based IRF, and SRISK.  
1.5 Empirical Findings 
Empirical Results from sector connectedness analysis reveal that banks and insurers are 
strongly connected with each other, but both of them have relatively weak connections with 
NFIs (consistent with Billio et al. (2011)). Furthermore, systemic risk analysis in this thesis 
disclose that banks are the main risk triggers that contribute risk to other companies, while 
insurance companies are the key risk receivers that are affected most by other companies. This 
is in line with Baluch et al. (2011), Billio et al. (2011); Girardi and Ergün (2013), Chen et al. 
(2014), and Berdin and Sottocornola (2015). There are also some findings different from 
exiting research: firm-level risk results (systemic risk results) suggest that insurers have higher 
credit risk than other sectors (insurers contribute more credit risk to others), while banks have 
higher overall risk as indicated by equity-based risk measures (banks contribute more equity-
based risk to the system).  
CDS-based and non-CDS based risk indicators produce dissimilar risk rankings among 
banks and insurers, which suggests that multiple data types should be included altogether in 
risk analysis to produce a multi-facet risk profile of a company. What’s more, structural break 
tests on both firm-level risk assessments and systemic risk assessments reveal that the CDS-
based risk measures switches to higher values at earlier stage than the non-CDS-based risk 
indicators. This denotes that credit risk is able to signal early warnings of crisis. 
Rank correlations between firm-level risk indicators and systemic risk indicators show that 
firm-level risk measures are weakly correlated with systemic risk measures, indicating that 
firm-level risk is not able reflect some information that are only contained in systemic risk. In 
addition, firm-level risk has shown higher correlation with a company’s systemic vulnerability 
than with the company’s systemic importance. This implies that the firm-level risk of a 
company roughly represents the risk magnitude of this company as a risk receiver rather than 
a risk contributor. 
The empirical results from cross-sectional regressions demonstrate that DiDeSV, LRMES 
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and SRISK are superior to firm-level risk measures and other systemic risk measures in terms 
of their ability to predict crisis. 
1.6 Outline of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. 
Section 2 reviews studies that are investigating on the research questions in this thesis. 
Firstly, it reviews literature on existing CDS-based and non-CDS-based systemic risk measures. 
It then reviews the systemic relevance in insurance, following which is the literature review on 
the comparison between firm-level risk and systemic risk. The comparison and empirical 
validation of systemic risk metrics are presented as well. 
Section 3 demonstrates the empirical firm-level risk assessment. The firm-level risk 
measures are applied to 96 global companies from 2005 Q1 to 2014 Q4 to provide company 
risk as well as sector risk rankings. Statistical significance tests have been applied to all risk 
estimations. The results differences in the risk estimations using diverse data inputs are 
compared, and the structural break tests are performed to examine the time points when risk 
metrics transfer from a stable mode to a volatile mode. 
Section 4 performs the empirical systemic risk assessment. This section is based on the 
same dataset as Section 4, with sample period from 2005 Q1 to 2014 Q4 (2005 to 2014 for 
Granger-causality tests and IRF), and it includes three analyses: industry connectedness 
analysis is to quantify the connection intensity between sectors; systemic importance and 
systemic vulnerability analysis are to capture the two dimensions of systemic risk; sector risk 
ranking compares the systemic relevance of insurance companies with that of banks and NFIs. 
Statistical significance tests have been applied to all systemic risk evaluations. The 
performance of the CDS data in systemic risk evaluations is explored in contrast to that of the 
non-CDS data. Structural break tests are carried out as well in this section to investigate which 
risk methodology based on what type of data is able to provide earlier risk warnings. 
Section 5 presents the rank correlation between firm-level risk methods and systemic risk 
methods. This section also tests the ability of all the risk measures to predict the subprime 
mortgage crisis, i.e. regress the realised equity returns (CDS returns) during the period from 
2007 Q3 to 2008 Q4, on the values of the risk methodologies during the period of 2006 Q1 to 
2007Q2. 
Chapter 6 summaries the solutions to the research questions and points out the limitation 





This section reviews literature on CDS-based and non-CDS-based systemic risk assessments 
in Section 2.1, systemic relevance in the insurance sector in Section 2.2, the comparison 
between firm-level risk and systemic risk in Section 2.3, and empirical validation and 
comparison of systemic risk methodologies in Section 2.4. 
2.1 Reviews on Systemic Risk Assessment 
Following Benoit et al. (2016), systemic risk theories reviewed in Chapter 1 are categorised by 
the source of systemic risk. The risk source types include systemic risk-taking, contagion, and 
ampliction. Since systemic risk methodologies focusing on one source may require specific 
unpublic information, these methodologies are not easilied to be widely applied. Market-based 
risk measures, however, overcome this issue by using public data that reflects general risk 
condition of a company that is decided by the market, instead of relying on unaccessible private 
information to capture a particular source of risk (Benoit et al. 2016). Given this, this thesis 
focuses on market-based systemic risk measures. Particularly, CDS-based and Non-CDS-based 
systemic risk measures are reviewed in this section as this thesis aims to compare the results 
of CDS-based and non-CDS based risk estimations. 
2.1.1 CDS-Based Systemic Risk Assessment 
By comparing CDS data and equity data, Jorion and Zhang (2007) have assessed how intra-
industry information is transferred among companies following credit events8. They have 
propose two types of default correlations: “contagion effect”9 and “competitive effect”10. 
Jorion and Zhang (2007) have employed a standard event study method to assess the market 
reactions of industry rivals around credit events, and they find that contagion effects are better 
captured in the CDS market than in the stock market.  
In contrast to Jorion and Zhang (2007), Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) adopt copula 
approach instead of correlation method to measure the non-linear dependencies across banks. 
Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) have proposed Distress Dependence Matrix (DiDe) to estimate 
the consitional probability of default (PoD) of a company. Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) 
have compared three ways to estimate PoD: (1) the structural approach (SA); (2) derive from 
CDS spreads; (3) compute from out-of-the-money (OOM) option prices. They note that SA has 
its problem of parameter choices and it doesn’t produce consistent results. OOM also has the 
                                                        
8 Chapter 11 bankruptcies, Chapter 7 bankruptcies and jump event 
9 Exists when distress across companies is due to common economic factors, counterparty risk, and updating of beliefs. 
10 Occurs when customers reduce or avoid trading with the troubled firm and turn to its competitors. 
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problem of inconsistent estimates and it lacks data for implementation. Although CDS spreads 
present disadvantages such as overstatement of a bank’s “fundamental” risk when the particular 
CDS market is illiquid or when there is generalized risk aversion in the market, these are 
usually short-term issues and usually signal a correct direction of distress in the long run. 
Consequently, Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) decide to use CDS spread to obtain POD. The 
banking stability measures proposed by Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) has advantages as 
follows: (i) can be implemented from a limited dataset; (ii) embed both linear and non-linear 
distress dependencies among banks; and (iii) allow the changes of inter-dependence structures 
at specific time points. However, since CDS data is employed in their methodology, results 
using the Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) may also be inaccurate when CDS stata is illiquid. 
Similar to Segoviano and Goodhart (2009), Oh and Patton (2016) also uses copula models 
measuring dynamic high-dimensional distributions following the ideas of high-dimensional 
dynamic conditional correlation (Engle 2002) and time-varying distributions (Creal et al. 2013). 
Different from Segoviano and Goodhart (2009), however, Oh and Patton (2016) have 
combined copula models that reflect conditional dependence structure, with models of 
univariate distributions. By appling time-varying copula models to CDS spreads of 100 U.S. 
firms from 2006 to 2012, Oh and Patton (2016) find that although probability of default for 
individual firm substantially declined after peaked in the 2007-2009 financial meltdown, the 
joint probability of default, which represents systemic risk, has remained high and is much 
higher now than the pre-crisis period. 
Similar to the idea of marginal expected shortfall (MES) (Acharya et al., 2011), which will 
be discussed in the next section, Distress Insurance Premium (DIP) is proposed by Huang et al. 
(2011) that exploit CDS data instead of equity data. Huang et al. (2011) define their risk 
measure as the insurance premium to protect against the distressed losses in a banking system. 
Huang et al. (2011) suggest that systemic risk in banking system is driven by the default risk 
premium at the beginning and by the liquidity risk premium later. They also find that a bank’s 
contribution to systemic risk is approximately linear with its default probability, but nonlinear 
with its size and asset correlations with other institutions.  
Instead of using only bond or CDS data separately, Giglio (2014) measures systemic risk 
by combining bond prices and CDS spread. He contends that CDS spreads reflect counterparty 
risk and measure the joint default risk of pairwise banks, while bond prices mirror the 
individual default probabilities. Using linear programming, Giglio (2014) constructs tightest 
upper and lower bounds on the joint probability of default of multiple banks given the 
individual and pairwise default probabilities to capture systemic risk. Giglio’s methodology is 
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an improvement in measuring the joint probability of systemic distress in that there are no 
assumptions on return distributions, whereas Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) and Huang et al. 
(2011) assume multivariate normality of returns in their papers. Unlike the indications from 
other systemic risk measures, Giglio (2014)  finds that his methodology does not signal higher 
default probabilities during the early stage of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, and he claims that 
the combination of CDS data and bond data capture the timing of the build-up of systemic risk. 
However, there are also disadvantages in Giglio’s approach: unobserved liquidity process in 
bond market may lead to inaccurate estimations of individual default probabilities; mean values 
of the CDS data across counterparties of each bank are used instead of counterparty-specific 
values; bounds are computed using risk-neutral probabilities of distress instead of objective 
probabilities. 
Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) have also compared market-based systemic risk 
measures by using various data sources–interbank rates, stock prices and CDS spread. Different 
from other literature, Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) have compared a series of risk 
measures using the following methods: (1) correlation of the risk methodologies with an index 
of systemic risk events and policy actions, (2) Granger-causality tests, and (3) Gonzalo and 
Granger (GG) metric. They agree with aforementioned research that that CDS-based measures 
perform better than the approaches employing interbank rates or stock prices, implying that 
CDS market provides more accurate signals of potential financial crisis than other markets. 
Considering the features of CDS data, Acharya et al. (2017) employ CDS data in marginal 
expected shortfall (MES)11 in addition to equity returns. They suggest that CDS data might be 
superior to equity data to evaluate market value losses of the firm’s assets. They find that MES 
based on equity and CDS are both able to predict the distressed financial institutions in the 
financial crisis.  
In sum, it is widely believed that CDS is better than any other types of information to 
capture default and counterparty risk (Huang et al. (2011), Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013), 
Giglio (2014)), and that contagion effects are better captured in the CDS market than in the 
stock market (Jorion and Zhang (2007)). Following this thesis includes CDS data in addition 
to equity data in systemic risk evaluations 
2.1.2 Non-CDS-Based Systemic Risk Assessment 
The most influential non-CDS-based measures are marginal expected shortfall (MES) and 
systemic expected shortfall (SES) from Acharya et al. (2017), SRISK from Acharya et al. (2012) 
                                                        
11 Details will be discussed in next section 
 39 
and Brownlees and Engle (2016), and ∆"#()$ from Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016). Some 
other frequently cited measures will be summarised as well. 
Acharya et al. (2017) propose marginal expected shortfall (MES) that quantifies the equity 
loss of a firm in the tail of the market’s loss distribution. Systemic expected shortfall (SES), by 
taking into account both a company’s MES and leverage, measures the institution’s capital loss 
when the financial system is undercapitalized. Acharya et al. (2017) conclude that MES has 
the ability to predict the crisis, however, firm-level risk such as expected shortfall, volatility 
and beta have less explanatory power. Finally, they suggest that a system tax, stress tests or 
recapitalisation of the troubled financial institutions will be effective tools for macro-prudential 
regulation. Comparing with DIP (Huang et al. (2011)), which also captures each bank’s 
expected loss conditional on the system being in distress, MES defines the extreme condition 
as the tail of the percentile distribution rather than a given threshold of portfolio loss in DIP. 
Furthermore, in MES, the probabilities in the tail event are normalized to sum to 1, while they 
are not normalized in DIP. Finally, the most crucial difference is that DIP uses CDS data, 
whereas MES is based on equity return data.  
Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2016) have extended MES to SRISK by 
considering leverage and size of financial firms. SRISK estimates the expected capital shortfall 
of a financial institution conditional on a substantial market decline. Brownlees and Engle 
(2016) have applied SRISK to the top US financial institutions in the subprime mortgage crisis, 
and it is able to identify troubled firms as early as 2005 Q1. Aggregate SRISK, the sum of the 
positive values in SRISK and the representative of the total capital losses in the whole system, 
could recognise all the crises stages. Brownlees and Engle (2016) have verified that SRISK has 
the ability to predict the capital injections of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The 
advantage of SRISK is that it merges market and balance sheet information. Moreover, 
compared with SES, SRISK has no structural assumptions and does not require a realisation of 
the systemic crisis for evaluation.  
SES and SRISK are both grounded on MES, however, MES only measures risks of firms 
affected by the market turbulence, without considering the role of financial institutions as risk 
triggers. ∆"#()$, another leading systemic risk metric proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2016), takes this into account. It estimates the difference in the value at risk (VaR) of the entire 
system conditional on a company being in extreme event relative to its median state. They find 
that ∆"#()$ could be significantly explained by institutions’ systemic relevant characteristics 
such as leverage, maturity mismatch, sizes and asset values. In addition, a forward-∆"#()$ 
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has the ability to predict the realised ∆"#()$ in the 2007-2009 financial meltdown. However, ∆"#()$ has its drawbacks as well. Acharya et al. (2012) and Acharya et al. (2017) point it out 
that since ∆"#()$  is the system’s VaR conditional on the default of each company, the 
conditions are not constant cross-sectionally. ∆"#()$ therefore, might demonstrates that the 
systemic risk levels of two firms are equal if these two institutions have the same return 
correlation with the market even if they actually have distinct return volatilities. 
In addition to these most popular methodologies, another most cited study is from Billio 
et al. (2012) who employ principal-components analysis and Granger-causality tests to assess 
the inter-linkages between equity returns of banks, broker-dealers, insurers and hedge funds. 
Although Billio et al. (2012) is using market data for Granger-causality tests, which should 
capture general systemic risk of a company, their work focuses on the contagion (the second 
economic mechanisms for systemic risk models in Chapter 1) by performing company 
connecteness analysis. They show that their econometric network measures could recognise 
the crisis periods and have the out-of-sample forecasting power. Their findings regarding the 
risk connectedness among the four sectors will be discussed in Section 2.2. 
An alternative acknowledged systemic risk approach comes from Diebold and Yilmaz 
(2009), who also base their methodology on vector autoregressive (VAR) models to estimate 
the connections between asset returns/asset volatilities of companies. They focus on variance 
decompositions, which divide the forecast error variances of each variable into a few parts that 
are attributed to different shock sources. They propose a Spillover Index as the ratio of the cross 
variance shares (spillovers) to the total forecast error variance. By using equity index returns 
in the spillover analysis from the early 1992 to 2007, Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) conclude that 
return spillovers have shown an rising trend with no spikes, while volatility spillovers have 
experienced no trend but spikes. 
2.1.3 Summary 
Quite a few market-based systemic risk measures have been proposed so far as discussed above, 
however, this thesis has employed∆"#()$  (Adrian and Brunnermeier 2016)Granger-
causality tests (Billio et al. 2012), Distress Dependence Matrix(DiDe) (Segoviano and 
Goodhart 2009) and SRISK (Acharya et al. 2012, Brownlees and Engle 2012). The reasons of 
the selection are listed as below. 
First, this thesis only focuses on the most accepted and highly cited12  market-based 
systemic risk measures. Apart from the risk methodologies this thesis adopts, Systemic 
                                                        
12 The highly cited market-based systemic risk measures are summarised in the Figure 1 of Benoit et al. (2016) 
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expected shortfall (SES) (Acharya et al. 2017) and Distress Insurance Premium (DIP) (Huang 
et al. 2011) are also popular market-based systemic risk measures. This thesis does not include 
SES because SRISK is similar to and relatively more advanced than SES. DIP is not chosen 
because it has a similar idea to MES, which is the basis of SRISK, therefore this thesis only 
focuses on SRISK.  
Second, network analysis for CoVaR/CoRisk/Granger causality are available but not 
adopted in this thesis in that this study focuses on statistical risk measures, therefore structural 
risk methodologies (network analysis) is exclused.  
In addition to existing systemic risk measures in the previous studies, this thesis extends 
Granger-causality tests and proposes impulse response function (IRF) to evaluate systemic risk 
by capturing impulses and responses of pairwise companies. 
This thesis would like to compare results of systemic risk measures using CDS and non-
CDS data, therefore CDS data is also substituted into equity-based systemic risk measures. 
Following this, risk indicators in this thesis include: ∆"#$%&'  (CDS-based ∆"#()$ ), ∆"#()$ , CDS-based Granger-causality tests, Equity-based Granger-causality tests, CDS-
based IRF, Equity-based IRF, DiDe, LRMES (long run maginal expected shortfall)13 and 
SRISK. 
2.2 Reviews on Systemic Relevance in Insurance 
While most research on systemic risk is associated with the banking sector, there has been a 
growing number of studies focusing on the systemic relevance of insurance companies, a 
subsector of NBFIs, during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.  
The Geneva Association (2010) has categorised insurance companies into four types14: 
insurers with limited banking activities, bank-insurance conglomerates, insurers with 
wholesale banking operations, and monoliners/financial guarantee. They conclude that only 
the latter two types were the systemic risk triggers. The Geneva Association (2010) suggests 
that it is not the insurer itself but its activities that matter. Specifically, they have analysed the 
main operations of insurers based on FSB’s systemic relevance criteria 15 –size, 
interconnectedness, substitutability, complexity, leverage, liquidity risk, and large mismatches–
as well as the criterion of time suggested by International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS). Insurers’ activities that are investigated include investment management, liability 
origination, risk transfer and capital management. The Geneva Association (2010) finds that 
                                                        
13 LRMES is the basis of SRISK, and this thesis carries out analysis on it as well. 
14 See Section 1.1.2 
15 Criteria for identifying systemically relevant institutions 
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only two non-core activities of insurance companies are potentially relevant to systemic risk: 
derivatives trading such as CDS trading on non-core balance sheets; poor management of short-
term funding raised from commercial paper or securities lending. Based on these analyses, they 
further suggest regulatory measures to mitigate potential systemic risk to supplement Solvency 
II.  
 Baluch et al. (2011) have summarised historic insurance crises, and have analysed the role 
of insurance companies in the subprime mortgage crisis. They claim that although insurers are 
less associated with systemic risk than banks, their systemic relevance has grown in recent 
years due to their increasing connections with banks and rising non-core activities. Accoding 
to them, insurers have increasingly moved to capital markets and alternative risk transfer 
mechanisms to mitigate risks on their balance sheets, which resulted in larger exposures to the 
banking sector. Furthermore, links between insurers and banks are intensified also due to 
insurers' significant holdings in banks. Baluch et al. (2011) conclude that insurers are exposed 
to systemic contagion via banks, and banks are susceptible to insurance companies as well due 
to counterparty risk in the CDS market. They suggest that one should not focus on which sector 
contributes more to systemic risk, but on the strength of the systemic connection between the 
two sectors. 
Note that the studies of The Geneva Association (2010) and Baluch et al. (2011) are 
published and sponsored by the insurance industry. Given this, Cummins and Weiss (2014), as 
an independent third party, have researched on the systemic risk contributions of insurers. By 
applying the FSB and IAIS criteria to the U.S. insurance sector, they have obtained similar 
conclusions that some non-core business of the insurance companies may cause systemic risk. 
They put particular emphasis on reinsurance , a way of risk management where an insurer 
purchases insurance from one or more other insurers direcltly or through a broker. They suggest 
that both life and nonlife insurers are vulnerable to reinsurance crises.  
The aforementioned research has provided in-depth qualitative analyses, however none of 
them has quantified systemic risk of insurance companies. In order to measure systemic risk in 
insurance, Billio et al. (2012) propose Granger-causality networks to assess the connectedness 
in four sectors–banks, insurers, brokers/dealers and hedge fund. They conclude that all four 
sectors have become highly interrelated over the past decade. While banks played a much more 
important role in transmitting shocks than other financial institutions, Billio et al. (2012) note 
that the connectedness between banking and insurance sectors is more significant than that 
between other pairs of sectors. This result, together with Baluch et al. (2012), motivate my 
thesis to highlight the intensity of the inter-links between sectors, especially between banks and 
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insurers.  
Another quantitative analysis of systemic relevance in insurance comes from F. Chen et al. 
(2013). They focus on credit risk insurers (CRIs), which are insurers that supply financial 
guaranty and write CDS. They have employed two interconnected measures on systemic risk 
based on equity returns: BANKBETA and marginal expected shortfall (MES). BANKBETA is 
to divide the covariance of a company’s stock return and the banking sector’s value-weighted 
average return by the variance of the banking sector’s value-weighted average return, i.e., 123(56,5789:69;)=>?(5789:69;) , where @A	 denotes return for firm i and @CDEFAEG  the value-weighted average 
daily returns of the banking sector. As for MES, proposed by Acharya et al.(2017), it evaluates 
the worst performance days of individual institutions conditional on the market shortfall. F. 
Chen et al. (2013) summarise that CRIs are more associated with systemic risk relative to 
traditional insurers in the 2007-2009 financial crash.  
Similar to Billio et al. (2011), H. Chen et al. (2014) performed linear and nonlinear 
Granger-causality tests to assess the interconnectedness between the insurance and the banking 
sector. The difference is that H. Chen et al. (2014) have applied both CDS data and equity data 
into the U.S. market. They find that there is significant bidirectional causality between insurers 
and banks. Banks, however, cause greater and longer influence on insurers than vice versa after 
controlling for conditional heteroskedasticity. H. Chen et al. (2014) suggest that their results 
are attributed to data sources, CDS and equity data, rather than the methodologies they use to 
examine systemic risk.  
Bernal, Gnabo, and Guilmin (2014) have examined the contributions of three financial 
sectors–banking, insurers and other financial services industries–to systemic risk by using ∆"#()$ and Kolmogotov–Smirnov test. Their conclusions vary depending on the markets to 
which the financial institutions belong. Bernal et al. (2014) note that in the Eurozone, other 
financial services sector contributes the most to systemic risk, with banks being the next highest 
contributors and insurers the last. In contrast, the insurance industry is the top systemically 
risky sector in U.S., with the banking industry as the least risky one. Berdin and Sottocornola 
(2015) have also employed ∆"#()$ to evaluate the systemic relevance in European insurers. 
Two other equity return-based measures, linear Granger-causality test and marginal expected 
shortfall (MES) were employed in addition to ∆"#()$. They also conclude that insurance 
companies are systemically relevant, but they are not the main risk contributors relative to the 
banking sector. They propose that diversification and size could be the driver of systemic risk. 
However, they have confined their analysis to Europe only. 
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Although more aforementioned literature has shown the subdominant role of insurers in 
contributing to systemic risk, Bernal et al. (2014) proposes an opposite view that systemic risk 
of the insurance industry is higher than that of the banking sector in the US. The mixed results 
motivate this thesis to further investigate whether insurers are more systemic relevant than 
banks and NFIs by using multiple leading systemic risk measures. In addition, this thesis has 
also compared the firm-level risk of banks, insurers and NFIs by employing the most widely 
accepted firm-level risk measures, the results of which together with systemic risk outcomes 
produce a more comprehensive risk profile of insurance companies. What’s more, as mentioned 
in Section 3.1, sector risk analyses using CDS data that reflects credit risk, are compared with 
those using non-CDS data. Finally, inspired by Baluch et al. (2011), this thesis quantifies the 
connections between sectors through a pairwise analysis.  
2.3 The Comparison between Firm-Level Risk and Systemic Risk 
Since the last financial crash, regulations were suggested to transfer their attentions from 
microprudential to macroprudential policies. This section reviews the relationship between 
firm-level risk and systemic risk. The reviewed papers have proposed their findings by focusing 
on one common factor that influences both individual and systemic dimensions of risk: 
Acharya (2009) proposes an aggregate risk-shifting incentive where banks incline to hold 
correlated assets, which leads to systemic risk. He points out that regulations based only on 
bank’s individual risk might exacerbate systemic risk and recommends regulating financial 
institutions by combining both correlated risks and firm-specific risks. His study implies the 
inequality of a bank’s individual risk and its systemic relevance as a part of the financial system 
as a whole.  
Similar to Acharya (2009), Wagner (2010) also focuses on risk-taking behaviours and 
proposes ‘diversification’ as the cause of the trade-off between firm-level risk and systemic 
risk. He confirms diversification as an appropriate strategy to remove idiosyncratic risk by 
spreading risks across financial institutions, however he also believes it could contribute to 
systemic crises when firms implement homogeneous risk-takings through diversification. 
Wagner (2010) therefore suggests lower degree of diversification as optimal, and the regulators 
should impose high capital requirements on banks associated with more diversified portfolios. 
Nevertheless, his research has not achieved the ideal level of diversification. Wagner (2010) 
also notes that the rationale coming from diversification could be extended to financial 
integration that also facilitates the building of systemic failures. 
Different from the previous two studies, López-Espinosa et al. (2013) concentrates on firm 
characteristics effects rather than risk-taking behaviour effects on individual solvency risk and 
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systemic risk. They evaluate systemic risk using∆"#()$, and estimate firm solvency risk by 
credit default swap spread and the KMV-Merton probability of default. Applying their studies 
on global financial institutions from 2001 to 2010, López-Espinosa et al. (2013) find that 
unstable funding sources result in increases of both institution-level risk and the spillover risk, 
while the trading activities and the liquidity management strategy have opposite effects onn 
individual risk and systemic risk. López-Espinosa et al. (2013) agree with Acharya (2009), and 
advocate regulating aggregate risk in addition to company’s solvency risk. 
Emphasising on the connections between bank competition and bank risks, Leroy and 
Lucotte (2017) differentiated risk types by using Z-score and distance-to-default to represent 
individual risk, and SRISK to capture systemic risk. Researching on the European listed banks 
from 2004 to 2013, Leroy and Lucotte (2017) find that competition stimulates banks to 
undertake more individual risks, while there is a negative relationship between competition and 
systemic risk. Strong competition contributes to financial stability as it avoids the high degree 
of correlated risk-takings. Leroy and Lucotte (2017) therefore suggest a sound competition 
policy to balance the two categories of banking fragility. 
In sum, the existing studies has compared firm-level risk and systemic risk from diverse 
angles, but they all suggest that regulators should consider both of the two categories of risk in 
supervising financial institutions. This is one of the reasons that this thesis includes firm-level 
risk measures in addition to systemic risk measures for sector risk analysis and data type 
comparisons in risk estimations.  
2.4 Comparison between Systemic Risk Measures and Empirical Validation of Them 
Bisias et al. (2012) conduct a survey on 31 quantitative systemic risk methodologies. They 
have compared and summarised all 31 metrics from the aspect of supervisory scope, event-
/decision-time horizon, and research method. Supervisory taxonomy classifies systemic 
analytics into two main categoriesmicro-prudential and macro-prudential. Event-/decision-
time horizon groups the systemic risk methodologies as ex ante measures, contemporaneous 
measures and ex post measures. Research taxonomy categories all the 31 methods based on the 
origin of systemic events they captureliquidity, leverage, losses and linkages, the four L’s of 
financial crisis. According to this criterion, there are probability-distribution measures, 
contingent claims and default measures, illiquidity measures, network analysis measures and 
macroeconomic measures. In addition, Bisias et al. (2012) have described inputs, outputs and 
data requirements in details for each of the 31 systemic risk measures in appendices. Their 
survey is aiming to facilitate experimentation and innovation in systemic risk analytics, and 
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they suggest that an appropriate risk measure the regulator chooses should capture systemic 
risk from diverse perspectives due to the complexity of the financial system. 
Benoit et al.(2016) have reviewed a broad range of literature on systemic risk to explore 
relationships between theories, empirical measures and regulatory reforms. During the survey 
on systemic risk, they group systemic risk approaches into two main approachesone looks at 
distinct sources of systemic risk and the other one uses market data to generate global measures. 
They focus on matching sources of systemic risk, existing regulation, econometric modelling 
tools and assessments of these tools. Benoit et al. (2016) propose that a more structural model 
that translates risk indicators to clear policy objectives and effective supervisory tools will be 
helpful for regulators. They also suggest that future systemic risk metrics should encompass 
multi-sources of information, including both public and non-public data, and should provide a 
straightforward systemic risk tax or capital surcharge on systemic important financial 
institutions (SIFI) for supervisory purpose.  
Arsov et al. (2013) have investigated the ability of 11 systemic risk measures16 to provide 
early warning signals of crisis by researching on financial institutions in both US and euro area. 
They have constructed a coincident indicator of stress – systemic financial stress index (SFS) 
to represent actual stressful events. SFS is computed as the percentage of the amount of the 
financial institutions that are undergoing large negative abnormal returns. Extreme SFS is a 
binary variable that takes value of 1 if SFS is greater than or equal to 0.25, and zero otherwise. 
In order to learn the performance of the 11 risk indicators in signaling stress, Arsov et al. (2013) 
have employed three methods: (1) Granger causality tests17, (2) predicting extreme events18, 
and (3) Quandt-Andrews break point (QABP) test. They find that different systemic risk 
metrics work well in distinct tests, and conclude that academics or regulators should select the 
risk indicator that is consistent with their specific purpose. Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) 
have compared the performance of a series of market-based systemic risk measures based on 
three criteria: (1) correlation of the measures with an index of systemic risk events and policy 
actions, (2) Granger-causality tests, and (3) Gonzalo and Granger (GG) metric. Their study is 
reviewed in more details in Section 3.1.1. 
Bisias et al. (2012) and Benoit et al. (2016) haven’t suggested any one or a few risk metrics 
                                                        
16 The 11 systemic risk measures include yield curve slope, time-varying conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR), rolling CoVaR, 
joint probability of distress (JPoD), Credit Suisse Fear Barometer, distance to default, Diebold-Yimaz, VIX, LIBOR-overnight 
indexed swap (OIS) spread, systemic liquidity risk indicator (SLRI) and systemic contingent claims approach (CCA). 
17 This is to test whether the 11 systemic risk indicators Granger cause the SFS at diverse lag-lengths. 
18 This is to use logit regressions to check whether 11 systemic risk indicators are able to predict extreme events, i.e., the 
extreme SFS. 
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to be better than others, while Arsov et al. (2013) and Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) have 
concluded distinct best-performed risk indicators. This thesis tests the predictive power of all 
the most cited risk measures for the subprime mortgage crisis and comes up with the superior 
risk methodology based on its forecasting performance. Except Benoit et al. (2016), all other 
studies have not investigated a leading systemic risk methodSRISK, which will be analysed 
in this research. In addition, this thesis also clearly differentiates and includes systemic 





Recall that most of the existing studies attribute less systemic relevance to insurers. However, 
given that high individual instability of a company may result in low systemic relevance of the 
firm, this section evaluates firm-level risks of banks, insurers and NFIs in addition to systemic 
risk assessments in Section 4 to provide a manifold risk comparison between sectors.  
The firm-level risk measures adopted in this chapter include volatility, Value at risk (VaR), 
expected shortfall (ES), beta, CDS spread, and Z-Score. These firm-level risk measures are 
selected because of the following reasons: First, volatility, VaR, and ES are included because 
they are most widely accepted firm-level risk measures and are selected and discussed in detail 
in Danielsson (2011). Second, firm-level risk measures are chosen to be comparable with 
systemic risk measures in Chapter 4. Specifically, VaR is chosen to be related to ∆CoVaR, and 
beta is selected because it is linked to SRISK (Benoit et al. 2013). Third, this thesis would like 
to compare results of risk measures using different types of data, thus CDS spread and the well-
known accounting data-based Z-Score are added to examine how their results distinct from 
those of equity-based risk measures (volatility, VaR, ES, beta). Below are the summarised 
advantages and disadvantages of the selected firm-level risk measures. 
Volatility 
Volatility, computed as the standard deviation of returns, is the most widely applied measure 
of risk. It denotes the uncertainty about the movement scope of an asset’s value. A higher (lower) 
volatility means that the value of an asset fluctuates (does not fluctuate) considerably, which 
represents a higher (lower) risk. Despite the popularity of volatility in risk analysis, conclusions 
based on variance are only valid when returns follow normal distribution. An example to 
demonstrate this would be that same values of mean and standard deviation could be acquired 
from distinct distributions. Therefore, volatility may give the same magnitude to the risk levels 
of two assets that are actually associated with totally different risk levels. 
 VaR 
Being independent of the underlying distribution, Value-at-Risk (VaR) overcomes the 
shortcoming of volatility as demonstrated above. VaR (L) is defined as a loss threshold such 
that the probability of losses over a given time period equaling or exceeding this loss level is L. Particularly, a firm or an asset with a 5% one-month VaR of 3.5% means that there is 5% 
possibility that the value of the firm or the asset will fall by 3.5% during the one-month time. 
The majority of financial institutions and regulators assess risk using VaR or methodologies 
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based on VaR. However, there are disadvantages associated with it: VaR is only a quantile that 
captures the minimum sufferable losses on the return distribution, and it cannot reflect the 
shape of tail distribution; VaR is easy to manipulate by employing trading strategies. (A bank 
could increase downside risk so as to lower its VaR by the use of put options. See Example 2 
in page 1290 from Daníelsson (2002)) 
Expected Shortfall  
Expected shortfall (ES), also known as tail VaR or conditional VaR, is a risk measure that 
addresses the issues of VaR by capturing tail distribution. ES refers to the expected loss when 
losses exceed VaR. ES is superior to VaR as it provides information of the tail shape of 
distribution. Considering this, Basel III has replaced VaR by ES for risk management purpose 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2013b). However, ES also has its problems. 
Adopting Monte Carlo simulation methods, Yamai and Yoshiba (2005) find that the estimation 
error, measured by relative standard deviation19, of ES is higher than that of VaR if the 
underlying loss distribution is fat-tailed. According to Yamai and Yoshiba (2002),  backtesting 
of ES compares the estimated ES with the mean value of realised losses exceeding VaR, 
however realised losses beyond VaR are infrequent, so it is difficult to obtain an accurate 
average value. They therefore conclude that ES is difficult to be applied into backtesting 
method.  
Beta 
Beta is a firm-level risk measure to assess whether a company or an investment is more or less 
sensitive to the market as a whole. The higher the beta, the higher sensitivity of an asset to the 
variability of the market movements. On one hand, beta quantifies systematic risk, which is not 
considered in other firm-level risk measures. Besides, beta is simple and easy to use. On the 
other hand, however, beta is based on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), which has 
drawbacks in its inputs and assumptions. The CAPM assumes investors can borrow and lend 
at a risk-free rate, which is unrealistic in the real market. Risk-free rate and return on market 
are approximate inputs in the model, which resulted in questionable results. 
CDS spread 
CDS spread is a periotic payment that a CDS buyer makes in exchange of the protection against 
the default risk of an underlying asset or underlying entity from the CDS sellers. CDS spread 
thus represents the credit risk of reference assets or reference entities in a liquid market, and it 
is expressed as a percentage of the notional value of the CDS contract. CDS spread is the best 
                                                        
19 The standard deviation is divided by the average. 
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in terms of measuring credit risk: CDS spread is superior to the spread between corporate and 
Treasury bond yields, which will be affected by the choice of the benchmark risk-free rate and 
encompasses other information rather than credit risk (Jorion and Zhang 2007; Blanco, 
Brennan and Marsh 2005; Forte and Peña 2009 and Norden and Wagner 2008); CDS spread is 
more accurate than equity price to quantify credit risk in that a rise in leverage increases credit 
risk and CDS spread, but may create a wealth transfer to shareholders, which leads to a rise in 
stock price (Jorion and Zhang, 2007). Giglio (2014) notes that the reason CDS price is better 
than bond price to measure credit risk is that CDS not only reflects the probability of joint 
default of bond issuer, but also that of the protection seller. In spite of all the advantages CDS 
data has, there is criticism on it as well: the liquidity of CDS market will affect credit risk 
estimations (Segoviano and Goodhart 2009). 
Z-Score 
Apart from the standard risk measures using equity and CDS data, Z-Score that employs 
balance sheet data, is considered as well. Z-Score is first grounded by Roy (1952), extended 
later by Boyd and Graham (1986), and finally represented by Hannan and Hanweck (1988) and 
Boyd and Runkle (1993). It measures the number of standard deviations by which the decline 
of returns will deplete equity and trigger a default. Different from some financial ratios that are 
focusing on specific risks, such as current ratio that indicates liquidity risk, Z-Score is a more 
comprehensive accounting ratio that is broadly accepted to evaluate the overall bank solvency. 
The higher the Z-Score, the healthier the financial institution is. The traditional calculation 
assumes ROA is normally distributed, in reality however, financial time series like returns are 
usually nonstationary, which results in inaccurate estimation results. 
The remainder of this section is structured as follows: Section 3.1 demonstrates 
methodology and data; Section 3.2 presents results and discussions of sector risk ranking; 
Section 3.3 illustrates rank correlations across the firm-level risk measures and across time; 
Section 3.4 demonstrates results and discussions of structural break tests; Section 3.5 shows 
the results of firm risk ranking; Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.1 Methodology and Data 
3.1.1 Methodology 
This section demonstrates the empirical estimations of firm-level risk measures adopted in this 
thesis. 
Volatility 
Volatility of the sampled institutions is obtained from a Generalised AutoRegressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) (1,1) model as shown below. GARCH(1,1) is chosen 
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because it is simple and best fits financial time series. 
                                           @AM = OA + QAMRAM,												RAM~T(0,1)                                         (1) 
                                      			QAMW = XA + LA(QAMYZRAMYZ)W + [ZQAMYZW                                       (2) 
where @AM denotes the equity return of firm i at time t, QAM the standard deviation, OA the expected 
return, and XA, LA, [Z the parameters. Daily return has been obtained from equity prices, and 
daily volatility of each sample company is achieved from Eq.1. and Eq.2. Following this, 
quarterly results are acquired by taking the average values of daily volatility.  
VaR 
According to the aforementioned definition, VaR is expressed as: 
                                                      \@(@AM ≤ −()$AM(L)) 	= L                                              (3) 
 
Where ()$AM refers to the value of risk of firm i at time t, and L is 0.05. This thesis employs 
quantile estimation on daily equity price to obtain quarterly values of VaR for each sample 
company. 
Expected Shortfall  
ES is defined as the expected loss when losses exceed VaR:  
                                                                   _ A`M = −_MYZ(@AM|@AM ≤ −()$AM(L))                             (4) 
Following Eq.3 and Eq.4, quarterly VaR is computed first, and quarterly ES is obtained by 
taking the average of all returns that are no greater than the quarterly VaR.  
Beta 
Beta is computed according to Eq.5: 
                                                                                    [AM = 123(56b,5cb)=D5(5cb)                                                 (5) 
where @dM denotes the market return. "#e(@AM, @dM) and ()@(@dM) are obtained from Dynamic 
Conditional Correlation (DCC) model (Engle 2002): denote RAM = @AM/QAM and RdM = @dM/QdM 
the volatility adjusted returns for @AM and @dM respectively. The DCC correlations are thus: 
                                    "#@ g RAMRdMh 	= 	$M = i 1 jAMjAM 1 k = l%)m(nAM)YZ/WnAMl%)m(nAM)YZ/W         (6) 
where nAM is the pseudo correlation matrix and its dynamics are specified as: 
                                     nAM = (1 − L − [) A` 	+ L g RAMYZRdMYZh g RAMYZRdMYZho + [nAMYZ                   (7) 
where A` is the unconditional correlation matrix of RAM and RdM. In this thesis, the daily variance 
of company returns, and the covariance of company and market returns are achieved from Eq.6. 
Following this, quarterly variances and covariances are obtained using the mean values of daily 
ones. Finally, values of beta are the results from Eq.5. 
CDS spread 
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CDS spread is the daily data of 5-year CDS contracts retrieved from Datastream. 5-year 
maturity is chosen because it is the most liquid type of contract. 
Z-Score 
Z-Score is defined as the inequality below: 
                                                        \@($pq ≤ −_q) ≤ rW                                                (8) 
                                                         r ≡ t>uv(?w>)x(?w>)                                                                 (9) 
where ROA denotes the return on asset, O($pq) and Q($pq) the mean and standard deviation 
of ROA respectively, EA the total equity over asset, and Z the Z-Score. Eq.8 and Eq.9 assume 
that ROA is normally distributed, however ROAs are normally nonstationary, so this thesis 
follows the Algorithm 1 in Mare et al. (2016) to estimate Z-Score by considering nonstationary 
ROA. Specifically, the first step is to fit a trend line y	(z) = ) + {z to ROA realisations for 
each rolling time window. Compute the central value of each trend line and detrend ROA 
realisations by restoring the differences between ROA realisations and the corresponding 
central values of certain trend lines (line 5 in Table 2). Then estimate |̅ using the mean value 
of the central values of the trend lines and the detrended ROA realisations (line7,8,9 in Table 
2). The forecasted average ROA values in time t is f(t), and |̅y(~) is ROA standard deviation 
when |̅y(~) is big enough, otherwise ROA standard deviation will be obtained from the bias 
















Table 2 Z-Score Computation for Nonstationary ROA 
Algorithm: computing rF 
Data: denote @ an array of ROA realisations; ~ the period to estimate the Z-Score; EA 
equity over asset at time ~; k the time window (in periods) used for trend estimation, 
an odd number greater than one.  
Result: Ä the estimated Z-Score at period ~ 
1 Å	 = 	~	 − '	 − 1; l	 = 	 {}; Ñ	 = 	 {}; '	 = 	1; 
2 for % ≤ Å + 1 do 
3    fit a trend line y	(z) = ) + {z to the time series @A, … , @AuFYZ; 
4    Ñ = Ñ⋃{y(% + (' − 1)/2)}; 
5    l = l⋃{@Au(FYZ)/W − y(% + (' − 1)/2)}; 
6 end 
7 â = âä)Å(Ñ); 
8 & = &~)Ål)@l	läe%)~%#Å	(l); 
9 |̅ = 	 (1 + 1/(4(n + 1)))s/m;  
10 if ||̅y(~)| ≤ R then 
11   standard deviation forecast very close to zero, i.e., smaller than R; 
12   &̅ = &é̅(Å + 1)/√Å; 
13   Ä = −(_q + y(~))/&̅; 
14 else 
15   Ä = −(_q + y(~))/(|̅y(~)); 
16 end 
 
By comparing the sector risk analyses of the firm-level risk measures using various data, the 
first hypothesis that this section attempts to test is as below. 
    H3.1: Sector risk ranking varies depending upon the particular data type that a firm-level 
risk is based on. 
    Considering that Standard & Poor’s employs CDS as early risk warning signals of outliers 
that may require imperative review, this section tests the second hypothesis below by 
comparing the results of CDS spread with those of other data-based risk measures, as well as 
by testing structural breaks of the firm-level risk measures. 
    H3.2: CDS spread provides early risk signals than equity-based and accounting-based firm-
level risk metrics. 
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3.1.2 Data 
All data in this thesis – equity prices, CDS spread, market values, book value of assets, book 
value of equity, book value of debt, are retrieved from Datastream. Among them, equity prices, 
CDS spread, and market values are daily data ranging from 3/1/2005 to 31/12/2014, while book 
value of assets, book value of equity, and book value of debt are quarterly data from Q1 2005 
and Q4 2014. 2005 is the earliest time to be included in a pre-crisis analysis in that CDS data 
is only available since 2005. In addition, this thesis focuses on risk level changes between the 
pre-crisis period and crisis period, therefore the post-crisis period in this thesis do not include 
the latest years and ends in 2014. Companies are classified according to Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes: 6000-6199 (banks), and 6300 to 6499 (insurers). Non-financial 
institutions are selected from the non-financial compositions of S&P 500 by market value. Due 
to the limitation of CDS data, and in order to achieve an equal company number within each 
industry, sample size in this thesis is 96, with 32 banks, 32 insurers, and 32 non-financial 
institutions. In each industry, companies are selected depending on whether they have valid 
CDS data, on top of which only the largest companies (measured by market value) are included. 
Data requirements for the firm-level risk measures employed in this thesis are listed in Table 3, 
where _q = êëD5Mí5ìî	ï22F	tñëAMîêëD5Mí5ìî	ó2MDì	>òòíM  and $pq = êëD5Mí5ìî	?íMë5EêëD5Mí5ìî	ó2MDì	>òòíM	. 
Table 3 Data Requirements of Firm-Level Risk Measures 
Firm-level risk measures Data Data type Frequency Sample 
Volatility Equity return Market Daily 3/1/2005–31/12/2014 
VaR Equity return Market Daily 3/1/2005–31/12/2014 
Expected Shortfall Equity return Market Daily 3/1/2005–31/12/2014 
Beta Equity return,  
market return 
Market Daily 3/1/2005–31/12/2014 
CDS spread CDS spread Market Daily 3/1/2005–31/12/2014 
Z-Score EA, ROA Accounting Quarterly 2005 Q1 – 2014 Q4 
Source: Datastream 
 
    Both the aforementioned firm-level risk measures and the systemic risk measures in 
Section 4 are applied to banks, insurers and non-financial institutions (NFIs) across regions 
including U.S., Europe and Asia. Due to the limitation of CDS data, sample size is confined to 
96 companies with each industry comprising 32 firms. However, all the companies in each 
sector are selected from the S&P 500 index components in a descending order by market 
capitalisation, and thus they are the largest ones on which CDS contracts are written in a 
specific industry. The list of the 96 companies is presented in Appendix 1. If a company has 
subsidiaries, only the holding company is selected, assuming that the risk level of a parent 
corporation affects and represents the instability of its subsidiaries. 
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    Appendices from Appendix 2 to Appendix 5 have described the statistics of CDS spread 
and equity returns by company and by sector respectively. Sample period spans from 3rd 
January 2005 to 31st December 2014, thus there are 2608 CDS observations and 2607 equity 
returns for each institution. In Appendix 2, firms with maximum CDS values exceeding 1000 
are in bold: AIG, Legal & General, Lincoln National, MBIA, MGIC, Metlife, Morgan Stanley, 
Old Mutual, Radian Group and The Hartford. On the other hand, companies are highlighted 
with minimum equity returns lower than -0.39 in Appendix 4: AIG, Aviva, CNA Financial, 
Citigroup, Lincoln National, Lloyds Banking Group, MBIA, MGIC, RBS and The Hartford. 
Appendix 3 shows that the insurance sector is the riskiest sector with the highest CDS spreads 
in terms of mean, standard deviation and maximum values. In Appendix 5, the banking industry 
is associated with the largest losses with the lowest mean and minimum value of equity returns, 
while the equity returns of insurance companies are volatile the most indicated by standard 
deviation. Appendix 6 and Appendix 7 have presented the statistical descriptions of equity over 
asset (EA) and return on asset (ROA). Since EA and ROA are computed from balance sheet 
data, they are on quarterly basis with sample period ranging from 2005 Q1 to 2014 Q4, i.e. 40 
observations. In terms of mean values in Appendix 6 and Appendix 7, both EA and ROA of 
NFIs are higher than those numbers of insurers and banks.  
3.2 Sector Risk Ranking 
Before ranking risk levels among banks, insurers, and NFIs using Conover-Iman tests, this 
section has done multiple statistical significance tests to examine whether results from the firm-
level risk estimations are statistically different from zero and whether the selected firm-level 
risk measures are statistically different from each other. 
3.2.1 One-Sample Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test 
This thesis employs the one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test to assess whether the risk results 
are significantly different from zero. The one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test is chosen 
because it is a non-parametric alternative to one-sample t test, and it does not require data to 
follow a normal distribution. Specifically, the one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test is 
implemented on each of the 96 company time series for each of the firm-level risk measure. 
The null hypothesis is that the tested data come from a distribution whose median is zero. 
Appendix 8 has shown the one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test results for firm-level risk 
measures.  
3.2.2 Kruskal-Wallis Test 
This section checks whether firm-level risk results from one risk measure are statistically 
different from another. This thesis adopts the Kruskal-Wallis test, a non-parametric method that 
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does not assume normal distribution of data, to test whether samples originate from the same 
distribution. Besides, since there are more than two firm-level risk measures to compare (6 in 
total), Kruskal-Wallis test is the most appropriate method to compare two or more independent 
samples. 
Since firm-level risk results are panel data with 40 quarters and 96 companies, this section 
first performs one Kruskal-Wallis test on the 6 firm-level risk measures by using the time series 
data of the first company. Then this has been repeated for all the remaining 95 companies in 
the sample. That is to say, there are 96 test results based on each of the sample company. The 
null hypothesis of the test is that all samples come from the same distribution, while the 
alternative hypothesis is that not all samples are from the same distribution. 
Appendix 9 shows the comparison results from the Kruskal-Wallis for firm-level risk 
measures. As can be seen from the Appendix 9, all Kruskal-Wallis tests have shown that at least 
one firm-level risk measure is different from at least one other risk measure.  
3.2.3 Conover-Iman Test for Sector Risk Ranking 
The Kruskal-Wallis test only shows whether samples are different from each other, it does not 
identify which particular sample dominate which another sample. Therefore, a post hoc test is 
necessary following the Kruskal-Wallis test. Conover-Iman test is employed in this thesis as 
the post hoc test as it is a non-parametric test with no assumptions on normal distributions of 
the sample data, and it is a more powerful test than others by testing differences in both the 
location parameters (medians) and the scale parameters (statistical dispersion) of the 
populations.  
The Conover-Iman test generates the Conover-Iman t statistic of the rank differences to 
assess the statistical dominance among multiple pairwise comparisons following a Kruskal-
Wallis test on multiple samples. In this thesis, it is a comparison among risks of three sectors – 
banks, insurers and non-financial institutions (NFIs), and these sector comparisons are 
implemented on each distinct period – pre-crisis (2005 Q1 to 2007 Q2), crisis (2007 Q3 to 2009 
Q2) and post-crisis period (2009 Q3 to 2014 Q4). For each 40×96 matrix (40 quarters and 96 
companies) resulted from each firm-level risk measure, sector risk levels are acquired by taking 
the mean value across companies. After this, all sector risk values are separated into three time 
periods – the pre-crisis period (2005 Q1 to 2007 Q2, 8 quarterly data), the crisis period (2007 
Q3 to 2009 Q2, 10 quarterly data) and the post-crisis period (2009 Q3 to 2014 Q4, 22 quarterly 
data). For each of these periods, sector risk is compared by using the Conover-Iman test. The 
null hypothesis is that there is an equal probability that a randomly selected risk value from 
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one sector is greater than the random selected risk value from the other sector. The alternative 
hypothesis is then that the risk of one sector statistically dominate the other one. 
Appendices from Appendix 10 to Appendix 15 have shown the results of the Kruskal-
Wallis rank sum test and the Conover-Iman test that compares sector risk for each firm-level 
risk measure by time. Take “Insurers - Banks” as an example, it means the rank difference 
between insurers and banks (i.e. insurers minus banks). A positive (negative) t statistic means 
that insurers are riskier (less risky) than banks20 and adjusted P values in brackets is for 
inferring statistical significance. As can be seen from the appendices, the results on volatility, 
VaR, ES, and beta have shown that both insurers and banks are significantly riskier than NFIs 
during the crisis time and the post-crisis time. One result in beta different from the other three 
measures is that the two pairs of Insurers - NFIs, and Banks - NFIs are also significant in the 
pre-crisis time. Test results on CDS spread generally show that insurers are associated with 
higher credit risk than banks and NFIs throughout the whole sample periods. As for Z-Score, 
all three pairwise comparisons (Insurers – Banks, Insurers – NFIs, Banks – NFIs) are 
significant in all periods. 
3.2.4 Conover-Iman Test for Time Periods Risk Comparison 
This thesis has also compared risk among three time periods – pre-crisis (2005 Q1 to 2007 Q2), 
crisis (2007 Q3 to 2009 Q2) and post-crisis period (2009 Q3 to 2014 Q4). For one resulted 
40×96 matrix (40 quarters and 96 companies), the risk level of one company in a particular 
period is achieved by taking the mean value across the relevant quarterly values of this 
company. These risk values for each time period are grouped by sectors. For each sector, risk 
rankings of three time periods are performed by the Conover-Iman test. The null hypothesis for 
each pairwise comparison is that there is an equal chance that a randomly selected risk value 
from one risk period is higher than the random selected risk value from another time period. 
The alternative hypothesis is then that the risk of one time period significantly dominate the 
other one. 
Appendices from Appendix 16 to Appendix 21 have shown the outcome of the Kruskal-
Wallis rank sum test and the Conover-Iman test that compare risk among the pre-crisis period, 
crisis period, and post-crisis period by sector. The pair of “Crisis – Pre-crisis” represents the 
risk rank difference between the crisis period and the pre-crisis period (i.e. crisis minus pre-
crisis). A positive (negative) t statistic suggests that risk in the crisis period is higher (lower) 
                                                        
20 It is opposite relationship for Z-Score: a positive (negative) t statistic means that insurers are less risky (riskier) than 
banks. 
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than that of the pre-crisis period21. Adjusted P values are in brackets is. According to these 
appendices, all firm-level risk measures for all three sectors have generally achieved an 
agreement that the crisis period is riskier than the pre-crisis period. Except beta and CDS spread, 
basically all other risk measures suggest that the crisis period is associated with greater risk 
than the post-crisis period. These findings are consistent with the evidence from the subprime 
mortgage crisis. 
3.3 Rank Correlations across the Firm-Level Risk Measures and across Time 
3.3.1 Rank Correlations across the Firm-Level Risk Measures 
Following Brownlees and Engle (2016), this thesis employs Spearman’s ρ, the rank correlation 
method, to measure the non-linear correlation of the firm-level risk results across risk measures 
and across time. 
Since the firm-level risk results are in panel patterns, rank correlation across risk measures 
in this research is performed on both time series and cross-sectional data. Rank correlation 
using time series data is to obtain quarterly data for one risk measure by taking average across 
companies for each quarter, and correlate one risk measure’s quarterly time series with those 
from one other risk method. Rank correlation using cross-sectional data is to take average 
across quarters for each company and correlate the cross-sectional data of each risk measure 
with that of each of the other risk methodology. 
Appendix 22 and Appendix 23 present the results of rank correlations across the firm-level 
risk measures using time series and cross-sectional data respectively. It has shown that all 
pairwise firm-level risk measures are significantly correlated, with positive correlations among 
volatility, VaR, ES, beta and CDS, while negative correlations between Z-Score and each of 
the other risk method. This is because Z-Score is the only risk measure that is negatively 
associated with risk levels, whilst values of other methods increase as risk rises. More 
specifically, on one hand, volatility, VaR and ES are strongly correlated, with their figures of 
Spearman’s ρ no lower than 0.97. On the other hand, pairs involving beta or CDS indicate 
slightly lower correlation values, with Z-Score presenting the lowest level of association with 
others. Given the aforementioned observations and considering that volatility, VaR and ES are 
computed from equity returns, beta involves both company and market returns, CDS is the 5-
year CDS spread, and Z-Score is built on accounting data, this may suggest that risk results are 
affected by the underlying data that a particular risk method is based on. 
                                                        
21 It is opposite relationship for Z-Score: a positive (negative) t statistic means that risk of the crisis period is lower (higher) 
than that of the pre-crisis period. 
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3.3.2 Rank Correlations across Time by Firm-Level Risk Measures 
Rank correlation across time is to correlate risk levels among pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis 
period for each of the firm-level risk measure. Pre-crisis period ranges from 2005 Q1 to 2007 
Q2, crisis period includes quarters from 2007 Q3 to 2009 Q2, and post-crisis period spans from 
2009 Q3 to 2014 Q4. 
Appendix 24 exhibits the outcomes of rank correlations across time for each of the firm-
level risk measure. According to Appendix, all Spearman’s correlations are statistically 
significant. Speaking of volatility, VaR, ES and beta, all of which are based on equity data, the 
highest correlation is between crisis and post-crisis (with Spearman’s correlations no smaller 
than 0.775). Pre-crisis is slightly more correlated with post-crisis than with crisis. This may 
suggest that the subprime mortgage crisis has a prolonged effect on the post-crisis period, and 
the pre-crisis period is a relatively tranquil period. In terms of CDS, the pair of crisis and post-
crisis also shows the highest value of Spearman’s correlation than the other two pairs. However, 
different from the equity-based risk measures, CDS indicates that pre-crisis correlates more 
with crisis than with post-crisis. As for Z-Score, all three pairwise periods present small 
differences in levels of rank correlations. 
3.4 Structural Break Tests 
Through the Conover-Iman test, this thesis has ranked risk magnitude among banks, insurers 
and NFIs. After this, this section would like to investigate risk change timing among the three 
sectors by comparing the dates of their risk turning points using structural break tests. 
Meanwhile, the structural break test aims to identify which data type provides earlier risk signal.  
Following Arsov et al. (2013), autoregressive regressions and Quandt-Andrews break 
point (QABP) tests are performed to examine an unknown structural break point of each firm-
level  risk metric by sector. A break date obtained from one test is the time point when the risk 
of a firm, indicated by one risk measure, transformed from being in a peaceful mode to a 
volatile status. For each risk method, frequencies of all significant break dates obtained from 
the 96 tests are grouped by sector, as demonstrated in Error! Reference source not found..  
According to Error! Reference source not found., companies in each firm-level risk 
methodology have shown various break points, which implies that a shock may affect market 
participants at different levels. If the break date with the highest frequency (the highest bar in 
the plot) represents the turning point of one metric, as can be seen from Error! Reference 
source not found., the turning points are 2008 Q3 for volatility, 2009 Q1 for VaR, 2008 Q3 for 
expected shortfall, 2009 Q1 for beta, 2011 Q4 for CDS spread, and 2008 Q3 and 2008 Q4 for 
Z-Score. According to the sector composition of the highest bar in each of the six sub-plots, 
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more banks experienced a structural change than insurers and NFIs. Comparing the dates of 
the highest bars in the six sub-plots, volatility and expected shortfall provide roughly earlier 
risk signals than other risk metrics. However, if focus on the earliest significant break quarter 
(the first bar) for each of the six risk evaluations, the turning points are 2007 Q4 for volatility, 
2008 Q3 for VaR, 2008 Q3 for expected shortfall, 2008 Q3 for beta, 2007 Q4 for CDS spread 
and 2008 Q3 for Z-Score. In terms of the sector composition of the first bar in each of the six 
sub-plots, roughly more insurers22 transformed their risk modes relative to the other two sectors. 
Comparing the earliest significant turning dates of the six risk measures, volatility and CDS 
spread altered their risk status in the same earlier quarter, while all others moved to volatile 
modes later when Lehman Brother filed bankruptcy. Although volatility and CDS spread have 
shown the same earliest break point in 2007 Q4, the number of companies that changed 
structures in this quarter is higher indicated by CDS than by volatility. In other words, CDS 
delivers relatively earlier signals than equity- and accounting-based risk indicators. 
 
Figure 7 Frequencies of All Significant Break Points for Each of the Firm-Level Risk Measures 
The figure presents the frequencies of all significant structural break dates, grouped by industry, for every firm-
level risk method–volatility, VaR, expected shortfall, beta, CDS spread and Z-Score. Break points for each risk 
method are obtained by the autoregressive regressions of the 96 firms in the sample and the Quandt-Andrews 
break point (QABP) tests on the regressions. 
 
                                                        
22 Exceptions: same number of insurers changed risk mode to that of banks (VaR), to that of NFIs (Beta), and more banks 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.5 Company Risk Ranking 
Risk levels of the sampled institutions are ranked in a descending order according to the firm-
level risk estimations. Appedices from Appendix 25 to Appendix 30 have listed the risk ranked 
companies23 indicated by each of the six firm-level risk metrics respectively from 2007 Q3 to 
2009 Q2, the crisis period. 
In Table 25, volatility recognises MBIA and AIG, both of which collapsed during the 
subprime mortgage crisis, as riskiest companies with higher degree of return variations. In 2008 
Q4 and 2009 Q1, The Hartford and Citigroup come in the first place respectively. Both of them 
experienced higher average equity losses compared with other firms as shown in Appendix 4. 
Moreover, Radian Group and MGIC (Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation) are another 
two companies that have the most volatile equity returns in most of the selected quarters. 
Associated with mortgage insurance, Radian Group and MGIC were hit hard in the subprime 
mortgage crisis, which also leads to the discard of the merger between them in August 2007. 
The top three risky companies presented in Appendices from Appendix 26 to Appendix 29 have 
a large overlap with those ranked by volatility. Details are presented as below.  
In Appendix 26, VaR, computed as the 95th percentile, has shown the higher risk levels of 
MBIA, AIG, Radian Group, MGIC, and The Hartford, which are the same companies as 
suggested by volatility. On top of this, VaR also identifies two additional financial institutions 
in 2009 Q1 and 2009 Q2 – Lloyds Banking Group and KBC Bank, both of which received 
funding from the TARP in the U.S., and bailouts from the UK government and Belgian 
government respectively as well.  
Expected shortfall in Appendix 27, unsurprisingly, has shown company risk rankings 
consistent to VaR. However, there are two differences in the ranking results between VaR and 
expected shortfall. In contrast to VaR, expected shortfall shows that MBIA rather than Radian 
Group is the riskiest firm in 2008 Q2, and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) instead of Lloyds 
Banking Group is at the first place in 2009 Q1. This implies that the tail of the return 
distribution for MBIA/RBS is associated with more negative returns than that for Radian 
Group/Lloyds Banking Group, which although has a lower sufferable loss measured by the 95th 
quantile of its return distribution. Apart from the same aforementioned firms highlighted by 
volatility, VaR and expected shortfall, Appendix 28, listing companies ranked by beta, adds 
Morgan Stanley as the second risky firm in 2008 Q4. Take Morgan Stanley as an example, its 
higher risk indicated by beta means that the equity return changes of Morgan Stanley are more 
                                                        
23 Only the top 20 of the rank list are shown in the appendices 
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sensitive to market return movements, i.e., it is with higher systematic risk. Morgan Stanley is 
said to raise the most capital, $107.3 billion, from the Fed during the crisis relative to other 
banks. 
In Appendix 29, MBIA, Radian Group and AIG are more frequently ranked as top three 
risky institutions indicated by CDS spread. MBIA and Radian Group were providing 
substantial credit enhancement through financial guarantees on mortgage-backed securities, 
and AIG was one of the major CDS issuers prior to the financial crash. All of them were thus 
heavily exposed to credit risk and were hit hard in the subprime mortgage crisis. In Appendix 
30, however, Z-Score using accounting data has listed distinct risky firms from other 
measures with more NFIs ranked in higher positions. This may be attributed to the nature of 
Z-Score that captures the general fundamental solvency of a firm rather than any specific risk 
sources associated with particular shocks. For example, CDS reflects credit risk, while 
volatility, VaR and expected shortfall measures equity risk, and beta represents systematic 
risk.  
3.6 Conclusions 
The empirical results from the Conover-Iman test reveal that risk levels of banks and insurers, 
resulted from the equity-based risk measures (volatility, VaR, ES, beta), were roughly equal. 
And both of them were riskier than NFIs during the crisis and post-crisis periods. By contrast, 
credit risk (CDS spread) of insurers was greater than banks during the pre-crisis and post-crisis 
periods, and greater than NFIs throughout the sample periods. Furthermore, Z-Score, built on 
accounting data, agree with the equity-based risk indicators that banks and insurers are risker 
than NFIs, but it also indicates that insurers are riskier than banks. That is to say, risk ranking 
among banks, insurers, and NFIs depends on the data type a risk method employs, implying 
that multiple risk measures to capture diverse directions of risk should be considered in sector 
risk analysis. This is consistent with the hypothesis H3.1. 
The empirical results from the rank correlation complements the Conover-Iman test by 
showing that data type of a risk method plays an essential role in estimating risk. This comes 
from the observations that firm-level risk methods using the same data source correlate more 
with each other, while risk indicators employing distinct data present lower level of correlation.  
Outcomes resulted from structural break tests indicate that, generally, risk of insurance 
companies soared before that of the other two sectors. What’s more, CDS provides slightly 
earlier warning signals of risk changes than other information-based metrics, which is 





This section focuses on market-based systemic risk measures, therefore the most accepted and 
highly cited market-based systemic risk measures are included+ ∆"#()$  (Adrian and 
Brunnermeier 2016)Granger-causality tests (Billio et al. 2012), Distress Dependence 
Matrix(DiDe) (Segoviano and Goodhart 2009) and SRISK (Acharya et al. 2012, Brownlees 
and Engle 2012). Systemic expected shortfall (SES) (Acharya et al. 2017) and Distress 
Insurance Premium (DIP) (Huang et al. 2011) are also popular risk measures but not included 
in this chapter. SES is not chosen because SRISK is similar to and relatively more advanced 
than SES. DIP is not adopted because it has a similar idea to MES, which is the basis of SRISK, 
therefore this thesis only selects SRISK. Besides, this thesis focuses on statistical risk measures, 
therefore structural risk methodologies such as network analysis is not included in this thesis. 
Last but not least, this thesis is the first one to extend Granger-causality tests to impulse 
response function (IRF) to evaluate systemic risk by capturing impulses and responses of 
pairwise companies. 
Since this thesis would like to compare results of systemic risk measures using CDS and 
non-CDS data used in, CDS data is applied into equity-based systemic risk methodologies for 
comparison. Following this, risk methodologies in this chapter include: ∆"#$%&' (CDS-based ∆"#()$), ∆"#()$, CDS-based Granger-causality tests, Equity-based Granger-causality tests, 
CDS-based IRF, Equity-based IRF, DiDe, LRMES and SRISK. 
The remainder of Section 4 is organised as: Section 4.1 demonstrates methodology; 
Section 4.2 shows results and conclusions of sector connectedness analysis; Section 4.3 
discusses the results of sector risk ranking; Section 4.4 performs rank correlations across the 
systemic risk measures and across time; Section 4.5 presents results of structural break tests; 
Section 4.6 lists firm risk ranking; Section 4.7 concludes. 
4.1 Methodology and Data 
4.1.1 Methodology ∆"#()$ 
According to Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), ∆"#()$ is defined as the difference of ()$ 
of the financial system (or firm j) conditional on firm i in an extreme event and the ()$ of the 
financial system (or firm j) conditional on firm i in a median state. This thesis assesses ∆"#()$ 
between pairwise companies:  																														∆"#()$AM(L) = "#()$AMõ|56bú=D?6b(ù) − "#()$AMõ|56búûíüADE(56b)            (10) 
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Where "#()$AMõ|56bú=D?6b(ù) denotes the VaR of the firm j conditional on the event when the 
loss of firm i equals ()$AM(L) . In addition to quantile regression, "#()$  could also be 
obtained by Multivariate †q$"° model (e.g., Girardi and Tolga Ergün, 2013). This thesis 
chooses the Multivariate †q$"° model because it could reflect the time-varying evolution of 
systemic risk contributions.  
Consider a bivariate GARCH process for the vector of demeaned returns for firm i and 
firm j: @Mo = (@õM	@AM) 																																																																															@M = °MZ/WeM                                                     (11) 
where @Mo = (@õM	@AM). The vector eM′ = (RõM	£AM) are the associated standardised innovations and 
are assumed to be i.i.d., with the first moments as _(eM) = 0 and  _(eMeM′) = §W , where §W is 
a two-by-two identity matrix. °M denotes the variance-covariance matrix: 																																																	°M = • QõMW jAMQAMQõMjAMQAMQõM QAMW ¶                                             (12) 
where QAM and QõM denote the conditional standard deviation of firm i and the firm j, and jAM 
denotes the conditional correlation between the firm i and firm j. Given Eq.11 and Eq.12, 
Benoit et al. (2013) have shown that ∆"#()$ of firm i is proportional to its ()$ and the 
proportionality coefficient is related to the conditional correlations between firm i and firm j 
and their volatilities : 																																													∆"#()$AM(L) = ßAM[()$AM(L) − ()$AM(0.5)]                       (13) 
where ßAM = QAMQõMjAM QAMW⁄ .  
By using Multivariate †q$"° model, this thesis first obtains the covariance between the 
daily equity returns of firm i and firm j, and the variance of firm i to obtain the daily ßAM . 
Quarterly ßAM   is computed by taking average of its daily values. Quarterly ()$AM(L)  and 
quarterly ()$AM(0.5) are achieved by using quantile estimation on the daily equity returns of 
firm i within a corresponding quarter, with L = 0.05 representing the extreme event and 0.5 
indicating median state. 
Since this thesis would like to compare the results from risk methodologies using different 
data, this chapter also applies CDS spread into ∆"#()$, which becomes ∆"#$%&'. Daily CDS 
return is first computed from the CDS data, then both CDS returns of firm i and firm j are 
applied into the Multivariate †q$"°  model.  Following this, the same calculations for ∆"#()$ (equity returns) as demonstrated above is implemented as well for ∆"#$%&' (CDS 
spread). 
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Granger-causality tests and Impulse Response Function 
This research follows Billio et al. (2012) and denote @AM and @õM the equity return of firm i and 
firm j respectively. Assume @AM and @õM are two stationary time series and have zero means. 
The mathematical formulation of Granger-causality test is based on linear regressions of @AMuZ 
and @õMuZon @AM and @õM, which could be expressed as:  																																																						@AMuZ = )A@AM 	+ 	{Aõ@õM 	+ 	äAMuZ                                         (14) 																																																								@õMuZ = )õ@õM 	+ 	{õA@AM 	+ 	äõMuZ                                          (15)	
where äAMuZ  and äõMuZ  are two white noise processes and they are uncorrelated, while )A, )õ, {Aõ, {õA  are coefficients of the regressions.  ≠  is said to Granger-cause %  when {Aõ  is 
significantly different from zero, and %  Granger-causes ≠  when {õA  is significantly different 
from zero. Both significant granger-causal relationships imply that ≠ (%) encompass information 
to predict % (≠) beyond the information contained in past values of % (≠) alone, which means that 
there is a feedback connection between the two financial institutions. This thesis runs the 
Vector Autoregression (VAR) model and Granger-causality test on daily equity returns for 
each of the annual time period from 2005 to 2014. Follows Billio et al. (2012), this thesis adopts 
GARCH model to control for heteroskedasticity.  
Subsequently, this thesis extends the Granger-causality test to impulse response function 
(IRF). For the pair of y%@âA-y%@âõ, IRF measures when there is a one standard deviation shock 
to y%@âõ, what are the maximum value (magnitude, y-axis of the IRF plot) and duration (x-
axis of the IRF plot) of the response from y%@âA  to the impulse. The maximum value and 
duration for a pair of sectors are the averages of the maximum values and lasting periods for 
pairwise companies. Higher peak values or longer lasting periods indicate greater systemic risk 
effects. Given the two dimensions of the IRF results, IRF analysis is thus categorised into two 
groups: IRF maximum value analysis and IRF lasting period analysis. For IRF maximum value 
analysis (IRF lasting period analysis), maximum values (lasting periods) resulted from IRFs of 
pairwise companies for each year are collected. In this research, the Granger-causality tests 
have been done using the data of daily CDS spread in addition to daily equity returns in order 
to investigate how data types affect risk estimations. Since CDS data is less liquid in some 
quarters of 2005 and 2006, Granger-causality test and IRF analyses using CDS data are invalid 
when running regressions for these quarters, therefore, IRF analyses are on annual basis. 
Distress Dependence Matrix  
Distress dependence matrix (DiDe) is a matrix presenting conditional probabilities of distress 
(PoD) between pairwise companies. Therefore, an analysis on pairwise default dependence 
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between companies in the system is necessary. Following Segoviano and Goodhart (2009), 
for pairwise analysis, suppose there are company X and company Y in the portfolio, whose 
logarithmic returns are the random variables x and y respectively. The Consistent Information 
Multivariate Density Optimizing (CIMDO)-objective function to recover the pairwise density 
is expressed as: C[p, q] = ∬±(Ñ, z) ln g≥(¥,î)ñ(¥,î)h lÑlz,µℎä@ä	∑(Ñ, z))Ål	±(Ñ, z) ∈ ℝW    (16) 
where q(x,y) is the prior joint density of x and y in theory, and p(x,y) is the posterior 
multivariate distribution, i.e., CIMDO-density, which updates with empirical information. The 
prior distribution q accords with the economic intuition that “default is triggered by a drop in 
the firm’s asset value below a threshold value”, and it is consistent with theoretical models 
such as the Merton model. However, q is not able to capture the empirically observed PoDs of 
banks. To solve this problem, Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) propose the CIMDO-approach 
to recover the posterior distribution p that incorporates empirical information. In this thesis, 
the prior distribution q is obtained from the Bivariate Normal Copula Function (BNCF) as 
shown below: C(u, v; ρ) = ∫ ∫ ZWΩæZYø¿ äÑ± g− ò¿YWøòMuM¿W(ZYø¿) h¡¬√(3)Yƒ¡¬√(ë)Yƒ l&l~        (17) 
where u and v are the marginal distribution of x and y. ρ is the coefficient matrix (2×2). Φ is 
the standard normal distribution function, while ΦYZ represents the inverse function of Φ. The 
posterior distribution p is then recovered through an optimisation process which makes the 
prior distribution q update with empirically estimated PoDs via a set of constraints. These 
constraints are as shown below:   ∬±(Ñ, z)é∆¥«»,ƒ)lÑlz = \#…M¥ ,			∬±(Ñ, z)é∆¥« ,ƒ)lzlÑ = \#…Mî      (18) 
where PoDÕŒ and PoDÕœ are the empirical PoDs of x and y estimated from CDS spread at time 
t24, and χ∆Œ—“ ,ƒ), χ∆Œ—”,ƒ) are indicating functions that are associated with the thresholds of the 
default x’Œ  and x’œ . Additionally, the conditions that p(x, y) 	≥ 	0  and ∬p(x, y)dxdy = 1 
should apply to guarantee that p(x, y) is an effective density. By adding all of these constraints 
to the CIMDO-objective function (Eq.16), Eq.19 is obtained: 
                                                        
24 PoD ≅	 1⁄¤ZY5í‹23í5î	5DMí, where recovery rate is approximated to be 40% 
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›[±, ∑] = ∬±(Ñ, z) ﬁÅ ± (Ñ, z)lÑlz −∬±(Ñ, z) ﬁÅ ∑ (Ñ, z)lÑlz +ﬂZg∬±(Ñ, z)é[¥«»,ƒ)lÑlz −\#…M¥h + ﬂW g∬±(Ñ, z)é[¥« ,ƒ) lzlÑ − \#…Mîh +O[∬±(Ñ, z)lÑlz − 1]               (19) 
where λZ , λW  denote the Lagrange multipliers of the “consistency constraints”, and µ  the 
Lagrange multiplier of the “probability additivity constraint”. The optimization procedure is 
performed using the calculus of variations, and its optimal solution is expressed as: 
   ±(Ñ, z) = ∑(Ñ, z)äÑ± ‚− g1 + O + „ﬂZé[¥«»,ƒ)‰ + „ﬂWé[¥« ,ƒ)‰hÂ      (20) 
Following this, the PoD of company X conditional on company Y that is in distress could be 
achieved as below:  \(Ê|Á) = \ËÑ ≥ Ñü¥Èz ≥ ÑüîÍ = Î(¥Ï¥«»,îÏ¥« )Î(îÏ¥« )                 (21) 
where \(Ñ ≥ Ñü¥, z ≥ Ñüî) is the probability that both X and Y are in distress, and it is obtained 
by taking the integral of Eq.20 \(z ≥ Ñüî) indicates the probability of default of company Y, 
and it is PoDÕœ. 
Table 4 presents the DiDe of a system consists of companies X, Y and Z. A pairwise 
conditional PoD in the matrix refers to the PoD of the company listed in the row, given that the 
company listed in the column is in default.   
Table 4 Distress Dependence Matrix 
 X Y Z 
X 1 P(X|Y) P(X|Z) 
Y P(Y|X) 1 P(Y|Z) 
Z P(Z|X)) P(Z|Y) 1 
Source: Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) 
SRISK 
SRISK is developed by Acharya et al. (2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2016). It estimates the 
expected capital shortfall of a financial institution conditional on a substantial market decline. 
The firm with the greatest capital shortfall is believed to contribute the most to systemic risk 
and crisis in the financial market. Following Acharya et al. (2012), this thesis defines SRISK 
as: `$§`ÌAM = â)Ñ[0; '(…AM + (1 − ›$Ó_ A`M)ÔAM) − (1 − ›$Ó_ A`M)ÔAM]   (22) 
where k denotes the prudential capital ratio (following Brownlees and Engle (2016), k = 8% in 
this thesis), …AM the book value of debt, ÔAM the market value of equity. Denote ›AM the leverage 
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of the firm i, with ›AM 	= 	 (…AM +ÔAM)/ÔAM, SRISK is the linear combination of a firm’s size, 
leverage and its interconnections with the rest of the system through LRMES: `$§`ÌAM = â)Ñ[0;	['›AM − 1 + (1 − ')›$Ó_ A`M]ÔAM]         (23) ›$Ó_ A`M in Eq.22 and Eq 23 is the long run marginal expected shortfall that measures the 
expected equity return of a financial institution conditional on the systemic event, and it 
isexpressed as:	
                                          ›$Ó_ A`M = −_M($AMuZ:MuÒ|$dMuZ:MuÒ < ")                               (24) 
where $AMuZ:MuÒ  ($dMuZ:MuÒ ) is the multi-period arithmetic equity return of firm i (market) 
between period t+1and t+h. This thesis follows Brownlees and Engle (2012) and Brownlees 
and Engle (2016) to estimate LRMES predictions by Monte-Carlo simulations. The estimation 
is to simulate a random sample of the h-period (following Brownlees and Engle (2016), h = 6 
months in this thesis) company and market returns conditional on information available at time 
t. The LRMES at time t is the average of the Monte-Carlo simulations of h-period company 
returns when market return is lower than C: 
                                              ›$Ó_ A`M = −∑ ?6bÙ√:bÙıˆ ˜{?cbÙ√:bÙıˆ ¯1}˘ˆ˙ √∑ ˜{?cbÙ√:bÙıˆ ¯1}˘ˆ˙ √                                   (25) 
Follows Brownlees and Engle (2016), C = 40% in this thesis. S, the number of simulations 
is 10,000. I is the indicator function. In order to be consistent with results of other risk measure, 
LRMES is obtained for each quarter in the sample, and is then substituted into Eq.23 to obtain 
quarterly SRISK. 
After the initial estimations are made from each of the systemic risk measure, this chapter 
also makes following processing for results analysis: 
(1) Sector Connectedness Analysis 
Pairwise analyses in this thesis include risk measures of ∆"#$%&', ∆"#()$, CDS-based and 
equity-based Granger-causality tests, CDS-based and equity-based IRF, and DiDe. The result 
for one quarter from each of the pairwise systemic risk measure is displayed in a 96×96 
matrix25. Sample periods are from 2005 Q1 to 2014 Q4 (annual for Granger causality and IRF 
from 2005 to 201426), thus there are 40 matrices (each matrix is 96×96) in total resulted from 
each risk methodology (10 matrices resulted from Granger-causality test and IRF). LRMES 
                                                        
25 96 is the sample size of the institutions included in this research. Pairwise methodologies measure the risk dependence 
between companies as each of them regressing on or conditional on each of the 96 firms, which generates outcomes of 
96×96 matrices. 
26 Since the CDS variations for some firms are limited in the early quarters of the sample, annual regressions are 
implemented for Granger causality tests and IRF analyses. 
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and SRISK are not pairwise analysis, and they are formatted in 40×96 matrices (40 quarters 
and 96 companies) as shown in Eq.28. Ó)~@%Ñ˚¸,˚¸ = 
 ˝ "#â±)ÅzZ − "#â±)ÅzZ ⋯ "#â±)ÅzZ − "#â±)Åz˚¸⋮ "#â±)ÅzA − "#â±)Åzõ ⋮"#â±)Åz˚¸ − "#â±)ÅzZ ⋯ "#â±)Åz˚¸ − "#â±)Åz˚¸! (26) 
 




⎧ 	' − ', % ∈ [1,32]		≠ ∈ [1,32]						' − §, % ∈ [1,32]		≠ ∈ [33,64]						' − T, % ∈ [1,32]		≠ ∈ [65,96]		§ − ', % ∈ [33,64]		≠ ∈ [1,32]					§ − §, % ∈ [33,64]		≠ ∈ [33,64]					§ − T, % ∈ [33,64]		≠ ∈ [65,96]T − ', % ∈ [65,96]		≠ ∈ [1,32]	T − §, % ∈ [65,96]		≠ ∈ [33,64]			T − T, % ∈ [65,96]		≠ ∈ [65,96]
                     (27) 
 
The sector connectedness analysis is focusing on 9 pairwise sectors as shown in Eq.27. B, 
I and N denote banks, insurers and NFIs respectively. Values of the pairwise sectors are 
computed by averaging the values of pairwise institutions. One exception is that in Granger-
causality tests, the sum number of the significant Granger-causal relationships of pairwise firms 
denotes the connection magnitude between pairwise sectors. In the matrix as shown in Eq. 26, "#â±)Åzõ is the risk contributor to "#â±)ÅzA, while "#â±)ÅzA is the risk receiver. That is 
to say, the column mean of a company represents the systemic importance of this company, 
while the row mean of a firm signifies the firm’s systemic vulnerability. Accordingly, a sector 
pair such as B-I means that insurers contribute risk to banks, and banks are affected by the 
insurance sector.  
(2) Systemic Importance and Systemic Vulnerability 
As mentioned above, column mean value and row mean value of one quarter’s result (96x96 
matrix) from a pairwise systemic risk methodology are computed to reflect systemic 
importance and systemic vulnerability of the 96 companies respectively. Systemic importance 
of a company represents how much risk this company contributes to others, while systemic 
vulnerability of a company indicates to what extent this company is affected by others. The 
outputs from these mean calculations for one systemic risk measure are two vectors: one vector 
with size of 96 represents the companies’ systemic importance (column mean) for one quarter, 
and the other vector with size of 96 indicates companies’ systemic vulnerability (row mean) 
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for one quarter. This is repeated for all 40 quarters27 of one systemic risk methodology, which 
resulted in a 40×96 matrix as shown in Eq.28. The same is applied to all pairwise systemic risk 
measures. IRF produces maximum value as well as lasting period in each impulse response 
plot, thus column mean values and row mean values are computed for both maximum value 
matrices and lasting period matrices. Since LRMES and SRISK are not pairwise-based risk 
indicators, their results are directly in 40×96 matrices. 
 ˝ "#â±)ÅzZ,êZ ⋯ "#â±)Åz˚¸,êZ⋮ ⋱ ⋮"#â±)ÅzZ,ê+, ⋯ "#â±)Åz˚¸,ê+,!                                  (28)                                            
 
Given the classification of systemic importance and systemic vulnerability, and 
considering the aim of this thesis to compare the effects of data type on systemic risk 
evaluations, systemic risk results in the following sections include: 
(1) ∆"#$%&' systemic importance 
(2) ∆"#()$ systemic importance 
(3) CDS-based Granger-causality test systemic importance 
(4) Equity-based Granger-causality test systemic importance 
 (5) CDS-based IRF maximum values systemic importance  
(6) Equity-based IRF maximum values systemic importance  
 (7) CDS-based IRF lasting periods systemic importance 
(8) Equity-based IRF lasting periods systemic importance 
 (9) DiDe systemic importance 
(10) ∆"#$%&' systemic vulnerability 
(11) ∆"#()$ systemic vulnerability 
(12) CDS-based Granger-causality test systemic vulnerability 
(13) Equity-based Granger-causality test systemic vulnerability 
(14) CDS-based IRF maximum values systemic vulnerability  
(15) Equity-based IRF maximum values systemic vulnerability 
(16) CDS-based IRF lasting periods systemic vulnerability 
(17) Equity-based IRF lasting periods systemic vulnerability 
(18) DiDe systemic vulnerability 
(19) LRMES  
                                                        
27 10 years for Granger-causality tests and IRF, which resulted in 10×96 matrices 
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(20) SRISK 
(3) Sector Risk Ranking 
Sector risk ranking will be resulted from statistical tests that make pairwise comparisons and 
risk rankings between sectors. This thesis employs the Conover-Iman test to estimate statistical 
dominance among multiple pairwise sector pairs (Eq.38) and among pairwise sectors (banks, 
insurers, NFIs). The Conover-Iman test is chosen because it is a non-parametric test without 
assuming normal distributions of the sample data. It is also a suitable test to make comparisons 
among multiple samples rather than comparing only two samples as what the Wilcoxon rank-
sum test does. 
As mentioned earlier, current literature has provided diversified findings on the systemic 
relevance of insurance companies relative to banks and other sectors. Some of them compare 
systemic risk levels of multiple sectors by focusing on connectedness between them, and some 
others emphasise the region effects on sector risk rankings. This section explores the role of 
data sources in risk evaluations and attempts to test the first hypothesis as below. 
H4.1: Insurers are more systemic relevant than banks and NFIs estimated by systemic risk 
metrics that are based on some certain types of data, while they are less systemic relevant than 
the other two sectors measured by risk indicators that are using other data. 
Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) conclude that CDS-based systemic risk measures 
outperform the methodologies based on equity prices and interbank interest rates. Following 
them, this section employs manifold leading systemic risk methodologies to compare the 
performance of CDS-based, equity-based, and balance sheet-based risk assessments in 
providing early risk warnings, and attempts to test the second hypothesis as below. 
H4.2: CDS-based systemic risk methods provide earlier risk warning signals than non-
CDS-based systemic risk methods. 
4.1.2 Data 
Data employed in this thesis has been described in Chapter 3. Table 5 displays data 
requirements of the systemic risk methodologies employed in this chapter. The descriptive 
statistics of CDS spread, equity returns are listed in Chapter 3. This section demonstrates the 







Table 5 Data Requirements of Systemic Risk Measures 
 Data Data type Frequency Sample ∆"#$%&' CDS spread Market Daily 3/1/2005–31/12/2014 ∆"#()$ Equity return Market Daily 3/1/2005–31/12/2014 
Granger causality CDS vs. equity  Market Daily 3/1/2005–31/12/2014 
IRF CDS vs. equity  Market Daily 3/1/2005–31/12/2014 
DiDe CDS spread Market Daily 3/1/2005–31/12/2014 








3/1/2005–31/12/2014,    
2005 Q1–2014 Q4 
Source: Datastream 
 
Table 6 and Table 7 show the descriptive statistics of leverage and market capitalisation 
respectively. In Table 6, banks are associated with higher leverage than insurers in terms of 
mean and data variation, however the insurance sector has a higher maximum figure than that 
of the banking sector. As can be seen from Table 7, non-financial institutions are the largest in 
terms of market capitalisation, followed by banks, and insurers are with the smallest size as 
shown in Table 20. 
Table 6 Descriptive Statistics of Leverage 
Sector   Mean   St.Dev.   Min   Max 
Banks 24.18309 24.28854 1.035461 248.682 
Insurers 13.14588 18.92014 1.30439 288.2429 
NFIs 1.610835 0.5950386 1.068364 7.184115 
Total 12.97993 20.02187 1.035461 288.2429 
The table presents mean values, standard deviations, minimum values and maximum values of leverage for each 
of the 3 sectors. Sample period ranges from 2005 Q1 to 2014 Q4, thus there are 40 observations for each company 
and 1280 (32×40) observations for each sector.  
Table 7 Descriptive Statistics of Market Capitalisation 
Sector   Mean  St.Dev.  Min  Max 
Banks 64041.63 51511.89 4675.244 276774.6 
Insurers 24641.03 28859.99 87.67 186295.9 
NFIs 115294 76494.52 18137.51 513307.4 
Total 67992.24 66998.49 87.67 513307.4 
The table presents mean values, standard deviations, minimum values and maximum values of market 
capitalisation for each of the 3 sectors. Sample period ranges from 2005 Q1 to 2014 Q4, thus there are 40 
observations for each company and 1280 (32×40) observations for each sector.  
 
4.2 Sector Connectedness Analysis 
4.2.1 Results of Sector Connectedness Analysis ∆"#$%&' vs. ∆"#()$ 
For the pair of §Ål-&~@zd - §Ål-&~@zE ( â ∈ [')Å'&, §Å&-@ä@&, T.§&], Å ∈[')Å'&, §Å&-@ä@&, T.§&] ), ∆"#$%&'  measures the difference between the credit risk of §Ål-&~@zd  conditional on §Ål-&~zE  in an extreme event and the credit risk of §Ål-&~@zd 
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conditional on §Ål-&~@zE  in a median state. Taking the pair of B-I as an example, it 
experiences its highest ∆"#$%&' value of 0.0856 in 2007 Q3. It means that on average the 
credit risk of banks, if affected by insurers that are in a distressed time, is 8.56% higher than if 
the insurers are in a tranquil time.	Similarly, ∆"#()$ is the difference between the ()$ of §Ål-&~@zd  conditional on §Ål-&~@zE  in an extreme event and the ()$  of §Ål-&~@zd 
conditional on §Ål-&~@zE in a normal state. Taking the pair of I-B as an example, it peaks in 
2008 Q4 with a value of 0.0472. It means that on average the risk of insurers if influenced by 
banks that are in a tail event, is 4.72% higher than if banks are in their normal states. The higher 
the ∆"#$%&'/∆"#()$, the higher the risk dependence is between sectors. 
Error! Reference source not found. compares the trends of the 9 pairs indicated by ∆"#$%&' and ∆"#()$. For ∆"#$%&', B-B dominates most of the sample period. This suggests 
that links between banks were the strongest compared with other pairs. Since 2007 Q3, I-B is 
the second highest in each of the spikes excluding in 2008 Q4 where I-I (0.0844) is greater than 
I-B (0.0738). High values of both I-B and I-I indicate that both banks and insurers substantially 
contributed risk to insurers since the crisis started. Except I-N, N-N, and I-I, which peak in 
2008 Q4, all other pairs peak in 2007 Q3. Each group of i-B, i-I and i-N (i=B, I, N) has the 
same trend respectively, meaning that each industry affected all the three sampled industries in 
a particular and identical pattern from 2005 Q1 to 2014 Q4. In terms of ∆"#()$, all 9 pairs 
have shown little difference in their patterns, with the same peaks in 2008 Q4 (all pairs except 
B-B and B-I) or in 2009 Q1 (B-B, B-I). In 2008 Q4, I-I (0.0519) is at the top, followed by B-
B (0.0499), and I-N (0.0498), while in 2009 Q1, B-B (0.0517) dominates others, with B-I 
(0.0467) and I-I (0.0461) being the second and the third respectively. That is to say, linkages 
within insurance, within banking, and between insurance and banking were relatively higher 
during the financial crash. 
Both ∆"#$%&' and ∆"#()$ have recognised historical shocks by showing spikes in the 
corresponding quarters: The collapses of BNP Paribas Hedge Funds and Bear Stearns Hedge 
Funds in 2007 Q3, Greek bailout in 2010 Q2, and US debt ceiling crisis in 2011 Q3 and 2013 
Q2. The differences between ∆"#$%&' and ∆"#()$ are that pairs indicated by ∆"#$%&' peak 
in 2007 Q3 or 2008 Q4 with some of them experiencing the second greatest values in 2008 Q3 
when Lehman Brothers announced bankruptcy and AIG acquired bailout, whereas pairs 
suggested by ∆"#()$ peak in 2008 Q4 or 2009 Q1. This would suggest that ∆"#$%&' (CDS-
based) is superior to ∆"#()$ (equity-based) in terms of providing slightly earlier risk warning 
signal. In addition, values of the 9 pairs presented by ∆"#$%&' are more dispersed than those 
 74 
presented by ∆"#()$ . Generally, both agree that three green lines (N-B, N-I, and N-N), 
representing systemic vulnerability of NFIs, are relatively at the lowest levels in the majority 
of the time. 
 
Figure 8 Industry Connectedness Estimated by ∆"#$%&' and ∆"#()$ 
              The figure compares the industry connectedness measured by ∆CoRisk with that estimated by ∆CoVaR. The 
values of the 9 pairwise sectors are computed by averaging the values of pairwise institutions. B, I, N represent 
banks, insurers and NFIs respectively. The sector on the left is the risk receiver, while the sector on the right is the 
risk contributor. 
 
Error! Reference source not found. compares the variations of the 9 pairs in terms their 
standard deviations evaluated by ∆"#$%&'  and ∆"#()$ . Sub-plots in Error! Reference 
source not found. have shown roughly similar trends to those in Error! Reference source not 
found.. With respect to ∆"#$%&', three pairs in each column of the figure, i.e. the systemic 
importance of each industry, have presented the same patterns of fluctuations. However, the 
patterns are distinct between columns. Specifically, the first column with banks being risk 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































N, N-N) have shown high volatility before 2007 Q3, which is not the case in the second column 
(B-I, I-I, N-I). The data variations shown in the column 3 of the figure are higher before 2006 
Q1 than in the crisis periods. This might be due to the liquidity problem of the CDS data in the 
early quarters especially for NFIs. Regarding ∆"#()$, values of all 9 pairs behave similarly. 
The 3rd row, which denotes the systemic vulnerability of NFIs, has shown the smallest data 
dispersion, which once again confirms that compared with banks and insurers, NFIs are more 


































Figure 9 Variations in the Industry Connectedness Estimated by ∆"#$%&' and ∆"#()$ 
The figure compares the standard deviations of the industry risk dependences measured by ∆"#$%&' with those 
estimated by ∆"#()$. The dispersions of the 9 pairwise sectors in the figure are obtained by computing the 
standard deviations of the pairwise sector values in Error! Reference source not found.. B, I, N represent banks, 
insurers and NFIs respectively. The sector on the left is the risk receiver, while the sector on the right is the risk 
contributor. 
 
CDS-based Granger-Causality tests vs. Equity-based Granger-Causality tests 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Granger causality using CDS data with that using equity data. The total number of the 
significant Granger-causal relationships among institutions represents the value of a 
corresponding pair of sectors. The greater the significant numbers, the stronger connections are 
between the industries. The first row in Error! Reference source not found. compares the 
significant connection numbers in each pair of sectors measured by CDS-based Granger-
causality tests with that estimated by equity-based Granger-causality tests. With regard to the 
results based on CDS spread, pairs peak in different years and there are greater gaps between 
each pairs since 2007, the beginning of the subprime mortgage crisis. From 2005 to 2007, I-I 
is at the top, followed by B-B, I-B and B-I with B-I being the second riskiest in 2007, which 
emphasises the systemic importance of insurers and the linkages between banks and insurance 
companies. After 2007, all pairs maintain higher values until 2012. As for the results based on 
equity data, pairs climb into their maximum values in 2008, instead of in 2007 that is shown in 
the CDS-based chart, which might signify the earlier risk-indicating feature of CDS data. After 
2008, sector connections start to stabilise. Generally, I-B, B-B and N-B occupy the higher 
positions, with I-I, B-I and N-I roughly coming as the second high groups, and B-N, I-N and 
N-N the lowest group. This is to say, banks significantly Granger caused the highest quantity 
of the companies in the sample, and insurers significantly Granger caused the second most 
companies. The second row in Error! Reference source not found. provides the accumulated 
significant Granger-casual relationships of each pair of sectors resulted from CDS-based and 
equity-based assessments. By contrast, the stacked values obtained from CDS data are greater 
and remain at high levels longer than those estimated from equity data for most of the sample 




Figure 10 Industry Connectedness Estimated by CDS-Based Granger-Causality Tests and Equity-
Based Granger-Causality Tests 
The figure compares the industry risk dependences measured by CDS-based Granger-causality tests with those 
estimated by equity-based Granger-causality tests. Sums of the significant Granger-causal relationships of the 
pairwise firms denote the magnitudes of the corresponding pairwise sectors. B, I, N represent banks, insurers and 
NFIs respectively. The sector on the left is the risk receiver, while the sector on the right is the risk contributor. 
 
CDS-based IRF vs. Equity-based IRF 
For the pair of §Ål-&~@zd - §Ål-&~@zE ( â ∈ [')Å'&, §Å&-@ä@&, T.§&], Å ∈[')Å'&, §Å&-@ä@&, T.§&]), impulse response function (IRF) measures when there is a one 
standard deviation shock to §Ål-&~@zE, what are the maximum value and duration of the 
response from §Ål-&~@zd  to the impulse. The maximum value and duration for a pair of 
sectors are the averages of the maximum values and lasting periods for pairwise institutions. 
Higher peak values and longer lasting periods indicate deeper risk transfers. For example in 
Error! Reference source not found., B-I resulted from the CDS-based IRF (equity-based IRF) 
has on average a maximum value of 0.5706 (0.4042) and a lasting period of 6.2410 (5.9007) 
in 2008. This means that a one standard deviation shock to the insurance sector, on average, 
causes a maximum increase of 0.5706 (0.4042) in banks, and this effect will sustain until after 























600 Significant Numbers (Equity)
Significant Numbers Stacked (CDS)



















Significant Numbers Stacked (Equity)










about 6.2410 (5.9007) periods. 
Error! Reference source not found. compares the impulse response analyses built on 
CDS spread and equity returns. The upper two sub-plots illustrate the maximum values of the 
pairwise sectors measured by CDS-based IRF and equity-based IRF respectively. In terms of 
the average maximum values based on CDS, all pairs peak in 2008 excluding I-B that reaches 
its top in 2010. In 2008, B-I, I-I and B-B are the highest three groups, signifying the systemic 
importance of insurance industry. Following 2008, pairs remain unstable with their maximum 
values of responses to shocks keeping at high levels. Since 2010, B-B, B-I, I-I and I-B dominate 
over other pairs, highlighting the connections between and within banks and insurers. 
Regarding the equity-based mean maximum values, pairs of sectors have captured the distress 
in 2008 and the US debt ceiling crisis in 2011 by showing spikes in these two years. B-B, B-I, 
and I-I lead other pairs for most of the years, which underlies the risk contributions of insurance 
companies and the links between the banking and insurance sectors. 
The lower two sub-plots in Error! Reference source not found. demonstrate the lasting 
periods of the pairwise sectors indicated by CDS-based IRF and equity-based IRF respectively. 
With regard to the CDS-based lasting periods, they sustain longer in 2005 and 2006 when the 
CDS-based maximum values in the top left sub-plot are at the bottom levels. This may be 
because that CDS spread is less liquid in 2005 and 2006. In 2007, when the financial meltdown 
is breeding, the lasting periods of I-I, I-B, B-B and B-I are longer than other pairs, which is 
consistent with the conclusion of the CDS-based maximum values that emphasises the 
connection between banks and insurers. The lasting periods stabilise after 2007. As for the 
equity-based lasting periods in the bottom right sub-plot, pairs reach relatively higher levels in 
2008 and 2011, which is consistent to what is shown in the sub-plot of the equity-based 




Figure 11 Industry Connectedness Estimated by CDS-Based IFR and Equity-Based IFR 
The figure compares the industry risk dependences measured by CDS-based IRF with those estimated by equity-
based IRF. IRF produces the maximum value and lasting period of the response of an industry to the impulse of a 
one standard deviation shock. The maximum values and lasting periods for the 9 pairwise sectors are analysed 
separately. B, I, N represent banks, insurers and NFIs respectively. The sector on the left is the risk receiver, while 
the sector on the right is the risk contributor. 
 
DiDe 
Error! Reference source not found. exhibits the industry connectedness evaluated by Distress 
Dependence Matrix (DiDe). For the pair of §Ål-&~@zd - §Ål-&~@zE  ( â ∈[{)Å'&, %Å&-@ä@&, T.§&], Å ∈ ')Å'&, §Å&-@ä@&, T.§&] ), DiDe denotes the probability of 
default (PoD) of §Ål-&~@zd conditional on §Ål-&~@zE that is in distress. The higher the figure, 
the higher the credit risk linkages are. For example, I-B peaks in 2009 Q1 with a value of 
0.2771, and it means that the PoD of insurers conditional on banks that are in extreme event is 
on average of 0.2771. 
In Error! Reference source not found., the system of red lines peak in 2009 Q1, the 
system of green lines achieve tops in 2008 Q4, and the system of blue lines reach their 
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maximums in 2011 Q4 with spikes in 2008 Q3 and 2009 Q1. The three colour systems in Error! 
Reference source not found. have also shown distinctive levels based on their colours: three 
lines in the red system dominate the majority of time; three lines in the blue system roughly 
come in the middle; three lines in the green system are mainly at the bottom. This ranks the 
systemic risk vulnerability of the industries as insurers > banks > NFIs. Within the three red 
lines, I-I leads most of the time since 2007 Q3, whereas within the three blue lines, B-B 
dominates the whole periods. 
 
Figure 12 Industry Connectedness Estimated by DiDe 
              The figure demonstrates the industry connectedness measured by DiDe. The values of the 9 pairwise sectors are 
computed by averaging the values of pairwise institutions. B, I, N represent banks, insurers and NFIs respectively. 
The sector on the left is the risk receiver, while the sector on the right is the risk contributor. 
 
Error! Reference source not found. discloses the variation, i.e. standard deviation, of the 
conditional PoD for each sector connections. The variations of the band areas are consistent 
with the patterns presented by the mean values in Error! Reference source not found.. The 
red areas in the second row have wider bands than the blue areas in the first row and the green 
areas in the last row. This reaffirms that insurance were the most susceptible industry, with 



















































































































































































Figure 13 Variations in the Industry Connectedness Estimated by DiDe 
The figure compares the standard deviations of the industry risk dependences measured by DiDe. The dispersions 
of the 9 pair of sectors in the figure are obtained by computing the standard deviations of the pairwise sector 
values in Error! Reference source not found.. B, I, N represent banks, insurers and NFIs respectively. The sector 
on the left is the risk receiver, while the sector on the right is the risk contributor. 
 
4.2.2 One-Sample Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test 
Before implementing the Conover-Iman test as the dominance test on systemic risk results to 
compare pairwise sector connectedness, this section first performs the one-sample Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test as the significance test. 
 Similar to Chapter 3, the one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test is implemented in this 
section to investigate whether the systemic risk results are significantly different from zero. 
The reason to select the one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test is explained in Chapter 3. The 
one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test is carried out on each of the time series of the 96 
companies for each of the systemic risk measure. The null hypothesis is that the data follow a 
distribution whose median is zero. Appendix 31 has shown the one-sample Wilcoxon signed-
rank test results for systemic risk measures. 
4.2.3 Kruskal-Wallis Test 
Kruskal-Wallis test is applied to investigate whether the systemic risk measures employed in 
this thesis are significantly different from each other. Similar to the firm-level risk analysis, 
this section adopts the Kruskal-Wallis test to examine whether distinct samples come from the 
same distribution. In addition, Kruskal-Wallis test is to compare two or more independent 






























































































































































































































































































































After obtained companies’ systemic importance and systemic vulnerability from the 
pairwise systemic risk methodologies, all 20 systemic results are presented in 40×96 matrices 
(40 quarters and 96 companies). Given that these outcomes are panel data, this section performs 
the Kruskal-Wallis test on time series: first perform one Kruskal-Wallis test on the 20 systemic 
risk measures by using the time series data of the first company. This is then repeated for all 
the other 95 companies. Eventually, there are 96 outputs resulted from Kruskal-Wallis tests on 
96 companies. The null hypothesis of the test is that all samples follow the same distribution, 
while the alternative hypothesis is that not all samples are the same. 
Appendix 32 presents the Kruskal-Wallis test results on systemic risk measures. Appendix 
33 displays the results of Kruskal-Wallis tests on both firm-level risk measures and systemic 
risk measures. All these three appendices indicate that at least one risk methodology in the 
comparison sample is significantly different from at least one other risk indicator. 
4.2.4 Conover-Iman Test on the Results of Sector Connectedness Analysis 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Kruskal-Wallis test is not able to recognise which specific 
sample dominates which another, so a post hoc test is required. The Conover-Iman test, which 
evaluates statistical dominance among multiple pairwise comparisons after a Kruskal-Wallis 
test, is adopted in this section as the post hoc test. The reason for this choice is explained in 
Chapter 3. 
This section has compared the connectedness strength of pairwise sectors. It is achieved 
by implementing Conover-Iman tests to compare the time series of the 9 sector pairs: B-B, B-
I, B-N, I-B, I-I, I-N, N-B, N-I, N-N, each of which has 40 quarterly data28. The values for these 
pairs are obtained from Eq.27.The connectedness strength rankings are performed for each of 
the three time periods – the pre-crisis period (2005 Q1 to 2007 Q2, 10 quarterly data), the crisis 
period (2007 Q3 to 2009 Q2, 8 quarterly data) and the post-crisis period (2009 Q3 to 2014 Q4, 
22 quarterly data) to identify ranking changes across crisis phases.29 The null hypothesis for 
each pairwise comparison is that there is equal possibility that a randomly selected risk level 
from one sector pair is greater than the random selected risk level from the other sector pair. 
The alternative hypothesis is that one sector pair’s risk statistically dominates the other one. 
Appendices from Appendix 34 to Appendix 38 have shown the results of the Kruskal-
Wallis rank sum test and the Conover-Iman test on pairwise sector connections by time for 
                                                        
28 10 annual data for pairs resulted from Granger-causality test and IRF  
29 The Conover-Iman test is applied to the whole sample (10 years) for Granger-causality tests and IRF. This is because there 
are 9 variables to compare, but the subsample of pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis period include less data than the number 
of variables. 
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∆"#$%&', ∆"#()$, CDS-based Granger-causality test, equity-based Granger-causality test, 
CDS-based IRF maximum values, equity-based IRF maximum values, CDS-based IRF lasting 
periods, equity-based IRF lasting periods and DiDe respectively. Given that results of IRF are 
at annual frequency, Conover-Iman tests on Granger-causality tests and IRF are implemented 
on the whole sample period (10 years in total) rather than on the each of the three crisis phases. 
The statistically significant rankings of pairwise sector connectedness in each appendix are 
generally consistent with what can be observed from the corresponding line plots30: Appendix 
and 34 Appendix 35 support the plot patterns in Figure 8(∆"#$%&' vs. ∆"#()$); Appendix 
36 confirms the line patterns in Figure 10(CDS-based Granger-causality test vs. equity-based 
Granger-causality test); Appendix 37 is consistent with Figure 11(CDS-based IRF maximum 
values vs. equity-based IRF maximum values vs. CDS-based IRF lasting periods vs. equity-
based IRF lasting periods); Appendix 38 is in accordance with Figure 12(DiDe).   
4.3 Sector Risk Ranking 
4.3.1 Sector Risk Comparison Results from SRISK 
Sector risk comparisons in this section will be resulted from Conover-Iman tests on systemic 
risk measures. Without using any statistical tests, Brownlees and Engle (2016) have compared 
risk levels among different sectors using aggregated SRISK. This section follows Brownlees 
and Engle (2016) to present results of aggregated SRISK by sector as well in addition to 
Conover-Iman tests in Section 4.3.2. 
According to Brownlees and Engle (2016), sector aggregated SRISK computed by 
summing the positive SRISK values of the companies within a particular industry is obtained 
to represent industry risk as well. As can be seen from Figure 14, aggregate SRISK by industry 
in the two sub-plots have disclosed that banks are associated with the greatest capital shortfalls 
than insurers and NFIs, with NFIs almost having zero contributions to the SRISK metric. Both 
banking and insurance sector peak in 2008 Q3 and have other large and small spikes in 2008 
Q1 (subprime mortgage crisis), 2010 Q2 (Greek bailout), and 2011 Q3 (US debt ceiling crisis). 
 
 
                                                        
30 Insignificant results may be due to the small sample size. Even if some results are insignificant, the signs of the 
coefficients are still consistent with what can be observed from the line plots. 
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Figure 14 Aggregate SRISK by Industry 
 
Figure 15 has decomposed SRISK by the average values of its input variables, market 
values, leverage, and LRMES, and compares these inputs with aggregate SRISK by industry. 
Market values suggest that NFIs in the sample have the largest size, while insurance is the 
smallest sector. Leverage, however, has disclosed that banks exceed insurers, and both of them 
have much higher leverage than NFIs. With regard to LRMES, the riskiness of banking and 
insurance approximately equals with banking being slightly higher in most of the time. Finally, 
aggregate SRISK reveal that the overall capital shortage of the banking industry is greater than 
insurers. Four sub-plots together imply that the although sector rankings in terms of aggregate 
SRISK is different from those of sizes, however the magnitudes of market values contribute to 
a large extent to the huge gap between the aggregate SRISK of banks and insurers. This is due 
to that LRMES, excluding the size effect, has roughly equated the riskiness of banks and 
insurance companies. Leverage has also affected the results of aggregate SRISK, especially 
affected the rankings of NFIs as the lowest sector although it has the largest size. 
 





















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 15 SRISK Decomposition 
 
4.3.2 Conover-Iman Test for Sector Risk Ranking 
Sector risk ranking is obtained by running the Conover-Iman test on the systemic risk levels of 
the three sectors – banks, insurers and NFIs. For each resulted 40×96 matrix (40 quarters and 
96 companies) from each systemic risk measure, sector risk levels are obtained by taking 
average across companies. Following this, all sector risk values are grouped into three time 
periods – the pre-crisis period (2005 Q1 to 2007 Q2, 8 quarterly data), the crisis period (2007 
Q3 to 2009 Q2, 10 quarterly data) and the post-crisis period (2009 Q3 to 2014 Q4, 22 quarterly 
data). For each of the three-time period, sector risk is ranked by the Conover-Iman test. The 
null hypothesis for each pairwise comparison is that there is 50 per cent probability that a 
randomly selected risk level from one sector is higher than the random selected risk level from 
the other sector. The alternative hypothesis is that one sector’s risk statistically dominates the 
other one.  
Appendices from Appendix 39 to Appendix 58 have shown the results of the Kruskal-
Wallis rank sum test and the Conover-Iman test on three sectors by time for each systemic risk 
measure respectively. Take “Insurers - NFIs” as an example, it means the rank difference 
between insurers and NFIs (i.e. insurers minus NFIs). If t statistic is positive (negative), it 





























































































































































































































































































































































According to appendices from Appendix to Appendix, ∆CoRisk Systemic Vulnerability, 
∆CoVaR Systemic Vulnerability, CDS-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic Importance, 
DiDe Systemic Vulnerability, LRMES and SRISK have shown that banks and insurers are 
significantly riskier than NFIs. This supports what happened during the subprime mortgage 
crisis. In terms of the risk ranking between banks and insurers, most systemic importance 
indicators (∆CoRisk Systemic Importance, Equity-based Granger-causality test Systemic 
Importance, CDS-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic Importance, DiDe Systemic 
Importance) suggest that insurers were less riskier than banks, while systemic vulnerability 
analyses (∆CoRisk Systemic Vulnerability, ∆CoVaR Systemic Vulnerability, DiDe Systemic 
Vulnerability) indicate that risk levels of insurers were great than or at least approximately 
equal to that of banks. This imply that banks were the main risk contributor in the 2007-2009 
financial meltdown, while insurers were affected the most during the crisis. 
4.3.3 Conover-Iman Test for Comparing Risk between Time Periods  
This thesis has also compared systemic risk among three time periods – pre-crisis (2005 Q1 to 
2007 Q2), crisis (2007 Q3 to 2009 Q2) and post-crisis period (2009 Q3 to 2014 Q4). 
Specifically, for each resulted 40×96 matrix (40 quarters and 96 companies) from each 
systemic risk measure, one company’s risk magnitude within each of the three time periods is 
obtained by taking average across the corresponding quarterly values of this company. 
Subsequently, these companies’ risk values for each time period are grouped by sectors. For 
each sector, risk levels of three time periods are ranked by the Conover-Iman test.  The null 
hypothesis for each pairwise comparison is that there is an equal chance that a randomly 
selected risk value from one risk period is higher than the random selected risk value from 
another time period. The alternative hypothesis is then that the risk of one time period 
significantly dominate the other one. 
Appendices from Appendix 59 to Appendix 78 have shown the outcome of the Kruskal-
Wallis rank sum test and the Conover-Iman test that compare systemic risk among the pre-
crisis period, crisis period, and post-crisis period by sector. The pair of “Crisis – Pre-crisis” 
represents the risk rank difference between the crisis period and the pre-crisis period (i.e. crisis 
minus pre-crisis). A positive (negative) t statistic suggests that risk in the crisis period is higher 
(lower) than that of the pre-crisis period. Adjusted P values are in brackets is. According to 
these appendices, Conover-Iman tests on all systemic risk measures except SRISK suggest that 
crisis period is significantly riskier than the pre-crisis period for all three sectors. These findings 
support the evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis. As can be seen from Appendix, tests 
results on SRISK are only significant for banks. This could be explained by Figure, which 
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illustrates that SRISK is comprised of market values, leverage and LRMES. According to 
Figure, the leverage of NFIs is close to zero, while market values of insurers are relatively 
small, therefore SRISK values of NFIs and insurers are much smaller than that of banks, 
resulting in only significant tests outcomes for banks.  In addition, most systemic risk measures 
generally indicate that the crisis period is also significantly risker than the post-crisis period. 
In terms of the comparison between the pre-crisis period and the post-crisis period, ∆CoRisk 
Systemic Importance, ∆CoRisk Systemic Vulnerability, CDS-based IRF Lasting Periods 
Systemic Importance, CDS-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic Vulnerability show that the 
pre-crisis period is associated with higher risk than the post-crisis period. All other systemic 
risk indicators, however, present the opposite ranking for these two periods. 
4.4 Rank Correlations across the Systemic Risk Measures and across Time 
4.4.1 Rank Correlations across the Systemic Risk Measures 
Following Brownlees and Engle (2016), this thesis employs Spearman’s ρ, the rank correlation 
method, to measure the non-linear correlation of the firm-level risk results across risk measures 
and across time. 
Rank correlation across systemic risk measures is carried out on cross-sectional data. 
Specifically, rank correlation using cross-sectional data is to take average across quarters for 
each company and correlate the cross-sectional data of each risk indicator with that of each of 
the other risk methodology. 
Appendix 79 presents the results of rank correlations across the systemic risk measures 
using cross-sectional data. The appendix has shown that most systemic risk indicators in this 
thesis are significantly positively correlated with others. There are negative spearman’s 
correlations as well. First, all negative numbers are relatively small, with their values greater 
than -0.44, and most of them are greater than -0.3. Second, negative correlations are basically 
between risk indicators that are based on different information or are measuring different 
dimensions of pairwise systemic risk. For example, some negative correlations are between 
CDS-based and equity-based risk measures, while other negative values are between systemic 
importance of a risk measure and systemic vulnerability of a risk measure. This implies that 
CDS and equity data provide slightly different signal in risk estimations. This makes sense as 
CDS particularly measures credit risk, while equity return represents general risk of a company. 
It also indicates that the systemic importance of a company is different from the systemic 
vulnerability of the company. 
4.4.2 Rank Correlations across Time 
Spearman’s rank correlation across time is to correlate systemic risk among distinct time 
 89 
periods: pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis period for each of the systemic risk measures. Pre-
crisis period includes quarters from 2005 Q1 to 2007 Q2, crisis period from 2007 Q3 to 2009 
Q2, and post-crisis period from 2009 Q3 to 2014 Q4. 
Appendix 80 demonstrates the resulted rank correlations across time for systemic risk 
measures. As can be seen from the Appendix, crisis period is significantly correlated with the 
post-crisis period at a relatively stronger level for all systemic risk measures only except 
CDSIRFPrd SI and CDSIRFPrd SV. This is consistent with the evidence during the subprime 
mortgage crisis, which had a long-prolonged effect on the post-crisis periods. In addition, most 
systemic risk measures in this thesis have also generally shown significant rank correlations 
between the pre-crisis and the crisis period, and between the pre-crisis period and post-crisis 
period. 
4.5 Structural Break Test 
Same to Section 3.4, autoregressive regressions and Quandt-Andrews break point (QABP) tests 
are carried out to detect the unknown turning points of all the systemic risk measures employed 
in this thesis. For pairwise risk analysis, structural break dates are tested for both systemic 
importance and systemic vulnerability of each of the 96 companies in the sample. A break point 
resulted from one test denotes the quarter when the systemic importance or systemic 
vulnerability of a firm, indicated by one metric, changed from being in a stable status to an 
unstable one in the sample priod. For each systemic risk method, frequencies of all significant 
break quarters are categorised by industry, as exhibited in Figure 16 and Figure 17.  
As mentioned in Section 3.4, diverse break points indicated by systemic risk measures, as 
shown in Figure 16 and Figure 17, suggest that a shock may affect companies in varied levels. 
Figure 16 illustrates the frequencies of a range of turning quarters for ∆CoRisk and ∆CoVaR, 
while Figure 17 demonstrates those for DiDe, LRMES and SRISK. If the break quarter with 
the highest frequency denotes the turning point of a particular measure, as can be seen in Figure 
16 and Figure 17, the changing quarters are 2009 Q1 for ∆CoRisk (systemic importance), 2008 
Q4 for ∆CoRisk (systemic vulnerability), 2008 Q3, 2009 Q1 and 2009 Q3 for ∆CoVaR 
(systemic importance), 2009 Q2 for ∆CoVaR (systemic importance), 2011 Q4 for DiDe 
(systemic importance), 2011 Q4 for DiDe (systemic vulnerablity), 2008 Q3 for LRMES and 
SRISK. According to the top-frequency bar in each of the four sub-plots, industry composition 
signifies that generally more banks contributed to risk mode change than insurers and NFIs. 
Comparison between risk metrics implies that ∆CoVaR (systemic importance), LRMES and 
SRISK provide earlier risk signals than others. However, if based on the earliest significant 
break quarter for each of the systemic risk analytics, the turning points are 2008 Q2 for 
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∆CoRisk (systemic importance), 2008 Q4 for ∆CoRisk (systemic vulnerability), 2008 Q3 for 
∆CoVaR (systemic importance), 2008 Q3 for ∆CoVaR (systemic importance), 2008 Q3 for 
DiDe (systemic importance), 2008 Q2 for DiDe (systemic vulnerablity), 2008 Q3 for LRMES 
and SRISK. In terms of the first bar of each of the six sub-plots, roughly more or equal number 
of insurers transformed their risk patterns, compared with other sectors. With regard to metric 
contrasts according to the first bars, ∆CoRisk (systemic importance) and DiDe (systemic 
vulnerablity) transformed their risk status in the same earliest quarter, while all others altered 
to volatile modes when or after Lehman Brother collapsed. This reveals that CDS-based 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 17 Break Points Frequencies for DiDe, LRMES and SRISK 
 
4.6 Company Risk Ranking 
For the aforementioned 40×96 matrix result of each risk methodology, the 96 companies for 
each quarter are ranked in a descending order. The higher the value of a company, the riskier 
it is, and the higher position it will be in the risk ranking list. Company risk ranking by the 
systemic risk methods are listed in the Appendices from Appendix 81 to Table Appendix 92 
respectively31. 
Appendix 81 and Appendix 82 are the company risk rankings resulted from ∆"#$%&', 
whereas the ∆"#()$ results are in Appendix 83 and Appendix 84. In Appendix 81, ∆"#$%&' 
identifies the systemic importance of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley in 2008 Q3. Both 
companies suffered substantially in the financial turmoil. Apart from these two, some others 
ranked as the first or the second places were recipients of the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP)32 as well: Shinhan Bank, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Credit Suisse and BNP Paribas. 
Particularly, BNP Paribas was driven to trouble in the very early stage of the distress due to the 
breakdown of its two hedge funds. With respect to systemic vulnerability in Appendix 82, ∆"#$%&' points out the high riskiness of AIG that is within top three in 2007 Q4, 2008 Q1, 
2009 Q2, and especially in 2008 Q4. Table 83 also highlights other greater risk companies 
throughout the periods such as Intesa Sanpaolo, American Express, Nordea Bank, Lincoln 
National, all of which were bailed out by TARP. Old Mutual was frequently ranked as number 
                                                        
31 Only the top 20 risky companies are presented 
32 The TARP program originally authorised a total amount of $700 billion for the rescue. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































one, which may be supported by the fact that Old Mutual had counterparty exposures to 
Lehman Brothers and it struggled with its US division during the financial crash. 
Appendix 83 and Appendix 84 have shown the systemic importance and systemic 
vulnerability of the high risky firms ranked by ∆"#()$. Appendix 83 ranks UBS AG the most 
risky one in 2008 Q3. UBS AG was hit hard and was required to seek outside capital from the 
governments in the subprime mortgage crisis. Some other TARP recipients are recognised as 
well such as: UniCredit, Bank of America, Intesa Sanpaolo, Lincoln National, Banco Santander, 
Metlife. Banco Santander is ranked at the second place in 2008 Q4 and in 2009 Q1, which 
might be due to its loss from the collapse of the Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme. Appendix 84 
identifies the most famous failures such as MBIA and AIG as top risky, and other troubled 
companies in the distress such as Radian Group, MGIC, Morgan Stanley, The Hartford, Lincoln 
National and Citigroup as the first or second risky companies from 2007 Q3 to 2009 Q2. 
Specifically, these financial institutions were associated with problematic activities and were 
in trouble in the financial crash: MBIA and Radian Group provided credit enhancement through 
financial guarantee; MGIC provided mortgage insurance; AIG offered credit protection; 
Morgan Stanley, The Hartford, Lincoln National and Citigroup suffered huge equity losses. 
Appendix 85 and Appendix 86 have displayed the systemic importance and systemic 
vulnerability of the top 20 risky firms ranked by IRF maximum values respectively. Specifically, 
in Appendix 85, the impulse (systemic importance) risk ranking using CDS data has shown the 
higher risk levels of Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs in 2008 and 2009. The response 
(systemic vulnerability) lists attribute the highest risk levels to RBS, Credit Agricole, Intesa 
Sanpaolo, Aegon N.V., all of which undergone relatively high losses and were bailed out in the 
crisis periods. In Appendix 86, equity-based IRF analyses recognise JPMorgan Chase & Co., 
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, The Hartford, and Bank of America as top systemically 
important, and Deutsche Bank, UBS AG, UniCredit, and JPMorgan Chase & Co. as most 
systemically fragile. All of these companies experienced massive losses and obtained bailouts. 
The ranking lists resulted from IRF lasting periods are demonstrated in Appendix 87 and 
Appendix 88. Both tables have listed the risk rankings in 2007, 2008 and 2009. The systemic 
importance rankings resulted from the CDS-based IRF, as shown in Table 27, has identified the 
higher risk levels of Radian Group, MGIC, JPMorgan Chase & Co. AIG and Aetna. In the 
subprime mortgage crisis, Aetna, a health insurance company, cut a large amount of jobs due 
to the effects of the recession. The systemic vulnerability lists have also shown the top values 
of Radian Group and Aetna. Equity-based IRF in Appendix 88 presents the highest systemic 
importance of MGIC and Capital One, and the highest systemic vulnerability of National 
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Australia and Shinhan Bank. Among these highlighted companies, Capital One suffered from 
its mortgage platforms and was recapitalised by the US Treasury; National Australia and 
Shinhan Bank were both the beneficiaries of TARP.   
Appendix 89 and Appendix 90 have displayed the firm rankings generated from DiDe. In 
Appendix 89, DiDe is able to identify the high systemic importance of the well-known troubled 
firms – BNP Paribas in 2008 Q3, Nordea Bank in 2007 Q4 and Deutsche Bank in 2009 Q1. 
Loews Corporation is frequently ranked at the first or the second place from 2007 Q3 to 2009 
Q2, which could be due to the huge losses in CNA Financial Corp., the subsidiary of Loews 
Corporation. In Table 30, Radian Group, MGIC, MBIA, AIG and Lincoln National once again 
were listed at the highest positions as systemically susceptible companies.  
Appendix 91 and Appendix 92 exhibit the risk ranking lists assessed by LRMES and 
SRISK respectively from 2007 Q3 to 2009 Q2. Based on the definitions of LRMES and SRISK, 
as presented in Section 5.2.2, LRMES and SRISK only capture the systemic vulnerability of 
companies. In Appendix 91, LRMES recognises Radian Group, MGIC, MBIA, Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS), AIG, Lincoln National, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, Capital One and The 
Hartford as firms with highest return losses, while SRISK in Appendix 92 identifies UBS AG, 
RBS (most frequently ranked as the most risky company by SRISK), Deutsche Bank, Barclays 
and BNP Paribas as the firms with the greatest capital losses. Back to the financial crash, RBS 
and Barclays were associated with enormous losses and received bailouts. Both measures could 
identify some troubled financial institutions in the 2007-2009 financial meltdown, however 
SRISK emphasises on larger companies relative to LRMES in that SRISK incorporates size as 
one of its inputs. 
4.7 Conclusions 
The empirical results from the pairwise sector connectedness plots indicate banks and insurers 
are strongly connected with each other, but both of them have relatively weak risk connection 
with NFIs. This is accordance with the evidence of the subprime mortgage crisis. On top of 
this, systemic risk measures, apart from ∆CoRisk and CDS-based Granger causality tests, 
signify that banks are the main risk triggers, while insurance companies are the major risk 
receivers. This is generally consistent with Baluch et al. (2011), Billio et al. (2011); Girardi and 
Ergün (2013), Chen et al. (2014), and Berdin and Sottocornola (2015). Different from the 
previous studies, analyses such as ∆CoRisk (CDS-based ∆CoVaR) and CDS-based Granger 
causality tests in this thesis suggest that insurers were more systemic important than banks 
during the pre-crisis and the crisis periods. This implies that insurers contribute more credit 
risk to others, while banks contribute other type of risk (as measured by equity data) to the 
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system. This suggests that insurance companies are associated with higher credit risk, which 
agrees with hypothesis H4.1. All these observations have been supported by the Conover-Iman 
tests, which rank risk levels among the 9 pairwise sectors. 
Sector risk rankings resulted from Conover-Iman tests have further confirmed the outcome 
of Conover-Iman tests on sector connectedness: banks are riskier than insurers as the risk 
contributors, whereas insurance companies are riskier than banks as the risk receivers; banks 
and insurers are riskier than NFIs. 
Results from rank correlation among systemic risk measures have shown that some CDS-
based and equity-based systemic risk measures have slightly negative correlation coefficients. 
This implies that when credit risk of a company is high, risk indicators using equity data may 
not be able to identify this company as risky. Therefore, as Bisias et al. (2012) and Benoit et al. 
(2016) suggested, multiple risk measures using diverse information should be considered to 
produce a better profile of company risk or sector risk. Besides, the systemic importance of a 
company is distinct from the systemic vulnerability of the company in that these two 
dimensions of systemic risk have shown slightly negative rank correlation for some risk 
measures. 
Structural break results exhibit that insurance companies switched to a higher risk mode 
earlier than the other two sectors. By contrast, a greater number of banks experience risk 
structural changes during the slightly later time period. In addition, CDS-based systemic risk 
methods provide somewhat earlier risk warning signals than other data-based measures, which 
is consistent with hypothesis H4.2. 
By comparing the firm-level risk analysis and systemic risk analysis, this thesis shows that 
firm-level risk measures have different sector risk ranking results from systemic risk measures. 
This agrees with Wagner (2010), López-Espinosa et al. (2013) and Leroy and Lucotte (2017), 
all of which have found different movements between firm level risk and systemic risk 
following a change in a common factor. Apart from this, this thesis finds that the results of the 
firm-level risk measure are consistent to that of systemic vulnerability estimations, whereas 
different from systemic importance estimations. This may be because pairwise systemic risk, 
by definition, captures and measures risk from both risk triggers and risk receivers, whereas 











Policymakers switched regulations from micro-prudential policies to macro-prudential policies 
since the subprime mortgage crisis in that micro-prudential supervisions based on firm-level 
risk management failed to mitigate systemic risk. Many previous studies suggest that an 
appropriate risk regulatory framework should monitor both aggregate risk and firm-level risk 
by exploring the relationship between firm-level risk and systemic risk. Wagner (2010) claims 
that there is a negative connection between firm-level risk and systemic risk through 
diversification where idiosyncratic risk is alleviated, while systemic risk is amplified when 
firms undertake homogeneous risks. López-Espinosa et al. (2013) find that volatile funding 
sources lead to rises of both institution-level risk and spillover risk, while trading activities and 
liquidity management strategies provide contrary effects on firm-level risk and systemic risk. 
Leroy and Lucotte (2017) suggest that intensive competition encourages banks to undertake 
more firm-level risks, whereas correlated risk-takings and thus systemic risks are reduced. 
Section 5.1 in this thesis discovers another one of the relation types between firm-level risk 
and systemic riskrank correlation. 
Extensive systemic risk measures have been proposed currently, however the question that 
which one or which few of them perform better is still under discussion. Conducting surveys 
on manifold systemic risk measures, Bisias et al. (2012) and Benoit et al., (2016) suggest that 
an ideal risk indicator should contain multi-aspects information and is able to be effective 
applied for practical purpose. Nevertheless, these two papers haven’t recommended any one of 
the risk metrics to be superior. Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) and Arsov et al. (2013) 
have concluded the best-performed systemic risk method, however, they suggest distinct risk 
measures and neither of them considered SRISK, one of the most popular methodology 
currently. To fill the gap, this thesis includes SRISK. Since more concerns are on whether it is 
able to forecast an impending fianncial cisis, Section 5.2 tests the validation of risk measures 
based on their predictive ability of the crisis. In addition, different from the previous studies, 
this section classifies the two facets of systemic risksystemic importance and systemic 
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vulnerabilityin the predictive tests to learn whether they have different implications.  
The remainder of this section is structured as: Section 5.1 demonstrates the methodology 
of non-linear correlations and of cross-sectional regressions to predict the subprime mortgage 
crisis; Section 5.2 presents results and discussions; and Section 5.3 concludes. 
5.1 Methodology  
This section would like to investigate how firm-level risk measures correlate with systemic risk 
measures in a non-linear pattern and how these two risk methodologies explain the cross-
sectional variation in equity performance and CDS performance during the crisis. 
In order to investigate how risk measures predict the subprime mortgage crisis, both firm-
level risk and systemic risk methodologies are evaluated in the periods prior to the subprime 
crisis, i.e., from 2006 Q1 to 2007 Q2 to explain the variation in realised equity and CDS returns 
during the crash, i.e., from 2007 Q3 to 2008 Q4. For the pairwise systemic risk methodologies, 
systemic importance and systemic vulnerability are considered separately as independent 
variables in the regressions. Minimum equity returns (MinEqtRet) are the realised equity 
returns, and maximum CDS returns (MaxCDSRet) are the realised CDS returns, both of which 
represent the realised systemic risk during the 2007 financial meltdown. The MinEqtRet 
(MaxCDSRet) is obtained by using the difference between the minimum stock price (maximum 
CDS spread) of a company during the crisis period from 2007 Q3 to 2008 Q4 and the equity 
price (CDS spread) of the firm at the end of 2007 Q2, divided by the company’s stock value 
(CDS spread) at the end of 2007 Q2. For firm-level risk approaches, the maximum values of 
volatility, VaR, ES, beta and CDS spread, and the minimum value of Z-Score prior to the 
financial turbulence are computed. Regarding the systemic risk measures, the highest values 
are required for all of them during the period from 2006 Q1 to 2007 Q2.  
In addition to maximum and minimum values, mean values of all dependent variables and 
independent variables are applied into the regressions for comparison purpose. Specifically, for 
the measurement of the actual systemic risk in the subprime crisis, mean equity returns 
(MeanEqtRet) and mean CDS returns (MeanCDSRet) are computed. The MeanEqtRet 
(MeanCDSRet) is attained by the difference between the average stock price (average CDS 
spread) of a company during the crisis period from 2007 Q3 to 2008 Q4 and the equity price 
(CDS spread) of the firm at the end of 2007 Q2, divided by the institution’s stock value (CDS 
spread) at the end of 2007 Q2. Given the popularity of CDS transactions prior to the 2007 
financial crisis and the collapse of the CDS market during the crash, 
5.1.1 Rank Correlations among Risk Measures 
Following Brownlees and Engle (2016), this section selects Spearman’s ρ (rank correlation) to 
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assess the non-linear correlation among all the risk indicators in this thesis (firm-level risk 
measures and systemic risk measures). This section attempts to test the following hypothesis. 
H5.1: Firm-level risk is correlated with systemic risk to a large extent. 
5.1.2 Risk Measures as Predictors of Equity Performance and CDS Performance during the Crisis 
Both Billio et al. (2012) and Acharya et al. (2017) use cross-sectional regression instead of 
panel regression for prediction analysis. What’s more, there is no previous literature using panel 
regression to analyse system risk measures as predictors of the crisis. So this section employs 
cross-sectional regression as well. Consistent with Billio et al. (2012), this thesis uses rank 
regression and has added leverage, market values, and illiquidity as control variables in the 
cross-sectional regressions as shown in Eq.29. Equity	PerformanceA = α+ [ZLeverageA + [WSizeA + [AIlliquidityA + [+Risk	MeasureAd + DA  CDS	PerformanceA = α+ [ZLeverageA + [WSizeA + [AIlliquidityA + [+Risk	MeasureAd + DA                                        (29) 
Where i represents data of company i, and m denotes the âMÒ risk methodology. Leverage is 
defined as ›AM 	= 	 (…AM +ÔAM)/ÔAM, where …AM is the book value of debt, ÔAM the market value 
of equity.The size of a company is its market capitalisation. Following Billio et al. (2012), 
illiquidity is measured as the first-order autocorrelation of equity returns.  
Section 6.3 attempts to test the following hypothesis. 
H5.2: CDS-based risk measures are better than non-CDS-based risk measures in terms of the 
ability to predict the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
5.2 Results and Discussions 
5.2.1 Descriptive StatisticsError! Reference source not found. 93 displays the statistical 
descriptions of MinEqtRet, MaxCDSRet, and all risk measures in their maximum and 
minimum values, whie Appendix 94 presents the statistics of MeanEqtRet, MeanCDSRet and 
all risk measures in their average levels.  
5.2.2 Results of Rank Correlations among Risk Measures 
Appendix 95 shows the Spearman’s correlation coefficients and their statistical significance 
among the minimum and maximum values of all the risk variables, while Appendix 96 presents 
the Spearman’s correlation and p values among the average levels of all the variables. 
According to Appendix 95 (Appendix 96), most risk measures are generally negatively related 
to the MinEqtRet (MeanEqtRet), and are positively related to MaxCDSRet(MeanCDSRet). 
This is because risk indicators are positively related to risk magnitudes, while a greater value 
of risk is suggested by lower actual equity returns/higher CDS returns. Z-Score is the only 
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indicator with lower values indicating higher risk, so it has a positive correlation with the 
MinEqtRet (MeanEqtRet), and a negative relationship with the MaxCDSRet (MeanCDSRet).  
In Appendix 95 and Appendix 96, firm-level risk measures have weak correlation (with 
most Spearman’s correlation coefficients lower than 0.4) with all systemic risk measures only 
except ∆CoVaRSV and LRMES. This denotes that firm-level risk is not able to capture some 
information reflected only in systemic risk. Size roughly has significant negative correlations 
with firm-level risk indicators and have significant negative (positive) correlations with the 
systemic vulnerability (systemic importance) dimension of a systemic risk measure. This 
means that the bigger the size of a company, the more risk the company contribute to others 
but the less the company is affected by other companies. This also indirectly implies that, in 
most cases, firm-level risk tends to positively correlate with the systemic vulnerability 
dimension of systemic risk. 
Except MinEqtRet (MeanEqtRet), Z-Score, and MaxMV (MeanMV), all variables should 
be positively correlated with each other in theory if the Spearman’s correlation are performed 
on the time series data of them. However, risk measures in this thesis has unbalanced sample 
sizes in their time series, therefore this study focuses analysis on cross-sectional data. This may 
be one of the reasons that some negative correlations are shown in the appendices. What’s more, 
these negative values may result from the issue of small sample size. 
5.2.3 Results of Cross-Sectional Regressions  
Table 8 and Table 9 are the regression analyses based on the max and min values of all the 
variables. In Table 8, the explained variable is MinEqtRet, the minimum equity returns during 
the period of 2007 Q3 and 2008 Q4. As can be seen from Table 8, Except CDSs, ∆"#$%&'SI, 
CDSIRFPrdSI, CDSIRFPrdSV, EqtIRFPrdSI, EqtIRFPrdSV, CDSGrangerSI, EqtGrangerSI 
and DiDeSI, all other risk measures could significantly explain the variation in the realized 
equity performance of the 96 institutions during the crash. The R-squared statistics suggest that 
beta (0.629), ∆"#()$ SI(0.608), ∆"#()$ SV(0.600), and LRMES(0.606) could explain 
relatively higher percentage of the variability in MinEqtRet than others.  
In Table 9, MaxCDSRet, the maximum CDS returns during the crisis, is the dependent 
variable. VaR, beta, CDSs, ∆CoRiskSV,	∆CoVaRSI, ∆CoVaRSV, DiDeSV, LRMES and SRISK 
are able to significantly predict the realized credit risk of the 96 companies in the sample during 
the crisis. According to R-squared statistics, CDSs (0.380), ∆"#()$ SI (0.395) and ∆"#()$SV(0.381) fit a relatively better regression line to explain the variations in the response 
variable. What’s more, both sector dummy and leverage have multicollinearity problem in the 
regression for SRISK, so both of these two variables are deleted in this particular regression. 
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In terms of the industry dummies, both tables have shown that most results of insurers are 
insignificant, while there are more cases where banks and NFIs are significant. Since banks are 
the “constant”, i.e., the reference category, the results indicate that banks and insurers have 
little differences in the cross-sectional prediction tests, whereas NFIs are distinct from the other 
two sectors. This makes sense as both banks and insurers are financial institutions that share 
some similar characteristics.  
Another finding is that Size in Table 8 is insignificant in all regressions where MinEqtRet 
is the dependent variable (this is consistent with Billio et al. (2012), while it is significant in 
Table 9 in most regressions with MaxCDSRet as the explained variable. This suggests that the 
size of a company will not decide the equity performance of this company, whereas it matters 


































Table 8 Rank Regressions with MinEqtRet, the Minimum Realised Equity Return during the Crisis, 
as the Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Size -0.0610 -0.0621 -0.0744 -0.0318 -0.0105 0.0610 0.0322 0.108 
 (0.114) (0.110) (0.113) (0.105) (0.122) (0.114) (0.115) (0.116) 
Illiquidity -0.384*** -0.402*** -0.388*** -0.422*** -0.386*** -0.403*** -0.379*** -0.368*** 
 (0.0742) (0.0736) (0.0725) (0.0732) (0.0792) (0.0795) (0.0787) (0.0762) 
Volatility -0.195***        
 (0.0737)        
VaR  -0.207***       
  (0.0724)       
ES   -0.224***      
   (0.0718)      
Beta    -0.351***     
    (0.0696)     
CDSs     -0.121    
     (0.0748)    
Z-Score      0.228**   
      (0.0892)   ∆"#$%&'SI       0.114  
       (0.0781)  ∆"#$%&'SV        -0.186** 
        (0.0750) 
Sector         
Insurers 7.312 7.535 6.197 6.429 12.14* 20.92*** 12.73** 6.572 
 (6.431) (6.300) (6.280) (5.679) (6.548) (7.489) (6.389) (6.370) 
NFIs 30.78*** 30.50*** 30.21*** 26.35*** 33.09*** 31.29*** 31.10*** 27.53*** 
 (4.936) (4.937) (4.929) (5.113) (5.170) (5.040) (5.011) (4.940) 
Constant 66.83*** 68.35*** 69.69*** 76.63*** 58.54*** 36.63*** 45.19*** 58.76*** 
 (10.08) (10.10) (10.04) (9.359) (10.71) (10.92) (9.425) (8.829) 
         
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 



































 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Size 0.0689 -0.00816 0.100 0.114 0.0523 0.0453 0.0752 0.112 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.117) (0.117) (0.115) (0.115) (0.108) (0.113) 
Illiquidity -0.422*** -0.420*** -0.402*** -0.396*** -0.376*** -0.360*** -0.378*** -0.422*** 
 (0.0728) (0.0721) (0.0754) (0.0818) (0.0812) (0.0810) (0.0781) (0.0827) ∆"#()$SI -0.349***        
 (0.0743)        ∆"#()$SV  -0.337***       
  (0.0786)       
CDSIRFMaxSI   -0.235***      
   (0.0823)      
CDSIRFMaxSV    -0.268***     
    (0.0944)     
CDSIRFPrdSI     0.000197    
     (0.0737)    
CDSIRFPrdSV      -0.0806   
      (0.0683)   
EqtIRFMaxSI       -0.172**  
       (0.0742)  
EqtIRFMaxSV        -0.214*** 
        (0.0778) 
Sector         
Insurers 7.014 5.192 10.76 11.51* 10.81 10.50 11.69* 9.293 
 (5.858) (5.991) (6.478) (6.410) (6.614) (6.595) (6.166) (5.901) 
NFIs 19.10*** 20.53*** 22.70*** 21.70*** 32.01*** 32.17*** 28.22*** 24.62*** 
 (5.453) (5.756) (5.682) (5.918) (5.171) (5.194) (5.492) (5.977) 
Constant 73.86*** 77.03*** 63.38*** 64.12*** 49.91*** 53.45*** 58.25*** 62.63*** 
 (8.445) (9.434) (8.740) (9.087) (9.577) (10.00) (8.764) (9.140) 
         
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 






































 (17)     (18)   (19)    (20) (21)  (22)  (23) (24) (25) (26) 
           
Size 0.0541 0.0508 0.0495 0.104 0.0671 0.103 0.136 -0.00936 -0.00395 -0.0276 
 (0.113) (0.114) (0.114) (0.107) (0.111) (0.112) (0.137) (0.105) (0.105) (0.109) 
Illiquidity -0.395*** -0.376*** -0.377*** -0.416*** -0.408*** -0.399*** -0.372*** -0.398*** -0.403*** -0.378*** 
 (0.0794) (0.0817) (0.0799) (0.0771) (0.0816) (0.0814) (0.0814) (0.0779) (0.0713) (0.0750) 
EqtIRFPrdSI 0.110          
 (0.0766)          
EqtIRFPrdSV  0.00866         
  (0.0754)         
CDSGrangerSI   0.0116        
   (0.0879)        
CDSGrangerSV    -0.296***       
    (0.0800)       
EqtGrangerSI     0.129      
     (0.0800)      
EqtGgrangerSV      -0.143**     
      (0.0697)     
DiDeSI       -0.135    
       (0.0841)    
DiDeSV        -0.305***   
        (0.0704)   
LRMES         -0.335***  
         (0.0757)  
SRISK          -0.427*** 
          (0.129) 
Sector           
Insurers 11.66* 10.72 10.79 13.27** 13.03** 13.09** 10.76* 14.43** 4.616 3.494 
 (6.535) (6.609) (6.643) (6.153) (6.410) (6.267) (6.447) (6.107) (5.833) (5.535) 
NFIs 32.76*** 32.03*** 32.30*** 24.24*** 34.68*** 32.61*** 29.09*** 27.99*** 21.98*** 11.34 
 (5.309) (5.126) (5.881) (5.088) (5.606) (5.123) (5.576) (4.745) (5.358) (8.533) 
Constant 44.91*** 49.62*** 49.43*** 65.52*** 42.84*** 54.57*** 53.20*** 68.90*** 75.59*** 83.91*** 
 (9.716) (9.594) (10.72) (8.713) (10.26) (9.256) (8.990) (8.800) (9.195) (11.07) 
           
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
R-squared 0.530 0.519 0.519 0.590 0.532 0.536 0.532 0.589 0.606 0.585 
This table displays the outcomes of the cross-sectional regressions of the realised minimum equity returns (MinEqtRet) during the period 
from 2007 Q3 to 2008 Q4, on the maximum or minimum values of the risk measures during the period of 2006 Q1 to 2007Q2. Leverage is 
defined as ›AM 	= 	 (…AM + ÔAM)/ÔAM, where …AM is the book value of debt, ÔAM the market value of equity. The size of a company is its market 
capitalisation. Illiquidity is measured as the first-order autocorrelation of equity returns. VaR is the 95th percentile. CDSs is the CDS spread. 
The suffix of “SI” of the systemic risk measures means the systemic importance of the firms. the suffix of “SV” of the systemic risk measures 
means the systemic vulnerability of the firms. “~IRFMax~” refers to the IRF results based on the maximum values of the impulse response 
plots. “~IRFPrd~”refers to the IRF results based on the lasting periods in the impulse response plots. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses, and they are to remedy the problem of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) has been 
performed to test multicollinearity. Control variables that have multicollinearity with other variables are removed one by one until no 



















Table 9 Rank Regressions with MaxCDSRet, the Maximum Realised CDS Return during the Crisis, 
as the Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Size 0.310** 0.366*** 0.330*** 0.307*** 0.101 0.268*** 0.282*** 0.199* 
 (0.127) (0.121) (0.124) (0.109) (0.112) (0.0989) (0.100) (0.101) 
Illiquidity 0.404*** 0.424*** 0.407*** 0.425*** 0.373*** 0.383*** 0.403*** 0.391*** 
 (0.0884) (0.0886) (0.0876) (0.0877) (0.0896) (0.0923) (0.0870) (0.0844) 
Volatility 0.0820        
 (0.102)        
VaR  0.188*       
  (0.104)       
ES   0.120      
   (0.104)      
Beta    0.188**     
    (0.0859)     
CDSs     -0.312***    
     (0.0969)    
Z-Score      0.142   
      (0.105)   ∆"#$%&'SI       -0.113  
       (0.117)  ∆"#$%&'SV        0.212** 
        (0.104) 
Sector         
Insurers 4.449 5.961 5.453 5.326 6.398 9.268 1.070 7.797 
 (6.244) (6.195) (6.274) (6.472) (6.635) (7.525) (6.377) (6.578) 
NFIs -19.50*** -18.64*** -19.05*** -16.98*** -17.25*** -20.47*** -19.11*** -14.93** 
 (6.076) (6.209) (6.075) (6.142) (6.377) (6.180) (6.031) (6.262) 
Constant 14.93 5.263 11.44 7.729 44.26*** 13.78 26.76*** 12.01 
 (12.13) (12.57) (12.15) (10.91) (9.696) (9.851) (9.126) (9.248) 
         
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 



































 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Size 0.247** 0.317*** 0.246** 0.260** 0.262** 0.272*** 0.248** 0.245** 
 (0.104) (0.110) (0.105) (0.102) (0.100) (0.0987) (0.103) (0.103) 
Illiquidity 0.444*** 0.440*** 0.409*** 0.401*** 0.402*** 0.378*** 0.401*** 0.414*** 
 (0.0844) (0.0858) (0.0904) (0.0897) (0.0895) (0.0912) (0.0885) (0.0934) ∆"#()$SI 0.330***        
 (0.0983)        ∆"#()$SV  0.303***       
  (0.0994)       
CDSIRFMaxSI   0.0779      
   (0.127)      
CDSIRFMaxSV    0.0109     
    (0.115)     
CDSIRFPrdSI     -0.0395    
     (0.0787)    
CDSIRFPrdSV      0.110   
      (0.0943)   
EqtIRFMaxSI       0.104  
       (0.0875)  
EqtIRFMaxSV        0.0631 
        (0.0998) 
         
Sector         
Insurers 6.566 8.039 2.990 2.945 2.865 3.399 2.444 3.421 
 (6.564) (6.447) (6.319) (6.263) (6.233) (6.316) (6.484) (6.381) 
NFIs -7.807 -9.678 -16.93* -19.60** -19.60*** -20.23*** -17.73*** -17.85** 
 (6.722) (6.599) (8.673) (7.647) (5.932) (6.041) (6.555) (7.203) 
Constant -0.578 -2.373 17.60 21.48* 23.77*** 17.26* 17.04* 18.32* 
 (11.12) (11.44) (11.44) (10.89) (8.579) (9.099) (9.208) (10.59) 
         
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 





































 (17) (18) (19) (20) (22) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 
Size 0.261** 0.285*** 0.248** 0.256** 0.281*** 0.285*** 0.217* 0.204** 0.302*** 0.168* 
 (0.101) (0.0941) (0.103) (0.103) (0.104) (0.106) (0.119) (0.0926) (0.108) (0.0995) 
Illiquidity 0.414*** 0.410*** 0.397*** 0.405*** 0.359*** 0.389*** 0.398*** 0.379*** 0.419*** 0.449*** 
 (0.0901) (0.0885) (0.0888) (0.0912) (0.0903) (0.0921) (0.0894) (0.0882) (0.0853) (0.0943) 
EqtIRFPrdSI  -0.0817          
 (0.0868)          
EqtIRFPrdSV  -0.138         
  (0.0918)         
CDSGrangerSI   0.0612        
   (0.108)        
CDSGrangerSV    0.0368       
    (0.113)       
EqtGrangerSI     0.166      
     (0.104)      
EqtGrangerSV      -0.0645     
      (0.0900)     
DiDeSI       0.0733    
       (0.100)    
DiDeSV        -
0.290*** 
  
        (0.0986)   
LRMES         0.237**  
         (0.0984)  
SRISK          0.210** 
          (0.103) 
Sector           
Insurers 2.342 4.467 2.826 2.668 5.828 4.002 3.002 6.412 7.352  
 (6.306) (6.122) (6.244) (6.334) (6.285) (6.231) (6.414) (5.975) (6.537)  
NFIs -20.58*** -20.27*** -18.48** -19.05*** -16.58** -19.75*** -18.44*** -23.84*** -12.93*  
 (6.041) (5.817) (7.290) (7.102) (6.613) (6.131) (6.542) (5.828) (6.559)  
Constant 25.79*** 26.74*** 19.50* 20.12* 12.95 24.16*** 20.28** 40.11*** 3.917 8.398 
 (9.675) (8.733) (10.36) (10.54) (10.62) (8.704) (8.872) (8.040) (11.40) (8.744) 
           
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
R-squared 0.321 0.334 0.318 0.316 0.337 0.319 0.319 0.378 0.359 0.259 
This table displays the outcomes of the cross-sectional regressions of the realised maximum CDS returns (MaxCDSRet) during the period 
from 2007 Q3 to 2008 Q4, on the maximum or minimum values of the risk measures during the period of 2006 Q1 to 2007Q2. Leverage is 
defined as ›AM 	= 	 (…AM + ÔAM)/ÔAM, where …AM is the book value of debt, ÔAM the market value of equity. The size of a company is its market 
capitalisation. Illiquidity is measured as the first-order autocorrelation of equity returns. VaR is the 95th percentile. CDSs is the CDS spread. 
the suffix of “SI” of the systemic risk measures means the systemic importance of the firms. the suffix of “SV” of the systemic risk measures 
means the systemic vulnerability of the firms. “~IRFMax~” refers to the IRF results based on the maximum values of the impulse response 
plots. “~IRFPrd~”refers to the IRF results based on the lasting periods in the impulse response plots. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses, and they are to remedy the problem of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) has been 
performed to test multicollinearity. Control variables that have multicollinearity with other variables are removed one by one until no 
multicollinearity exists. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%,5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Table 10 and Table 11 are the regression analyses based on the average levels of all the 
variables. In Table 10, the explained variable is MeanEqtRet, the mean equity returns during 
the period of 2007 Q3 and 2008 Q4. As can be seen from Table 10, volatility, VaR, ES, 
beta,	∆"#()$SI, ∆"#()$SV, CDSIRFMaxSI, CDSIRFMaxSV, EqtIRFMaxSI, EqtIRFPrdSI, 
CDSGrangerSV, DiDeSV, LRMES and SRISK could significantly explain the realized equity 
performance of the 96 institutions during the crash. The R-squared statistics suggest that beta 
(0.534) and ∆"#()$SI (0.508) could explain relatively higher percentage of the variability in 
MeanEqtRet than others.  
In Table 11, MeanCDSRet, the mean CDS returns during the crisis, is the dependent 
variable. VaR, CDSs, ∆"#$%&' SV, EqtGrangerSI, EqtGrangerSV, DiDeSV, LRMES and 
SRISK are significant to predict the realized credit risk of the 96 companies in the sample 
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during the crisis. According to R-squared statistic, ∆"#$%&'SV (0.569) fits the best regression 
line to explain the variation in the response variable. Both sector dummy and leverage have 
multicollinearity problem in the regression for SRISK, so both of these two variables are 
deleted in this particular regression. 
Insurers are insignificant for most regressions, while banks and NFIs are significant in a 
majority of cases. Given that the banking sector is the reference category, the results confirm 
that banks and insurers are the same in terms of forecasting crisis, however NFIs are distinct 
from these two financial sectors.  
Similar to the observations from Table 8 and Table 9, Size in Table 10 is insignificant in 
all regressions, while it is significant in majority of regressions in Table 11. Therefore the same 
conclusion is obtained that the size of a company does not explain its equity performance very 
































Table 10 Rank Regressions with MeanEqtRet, the Mean Value of Realised Equity Returns during 
the Crisis, as the Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Size -0.113 -0.123 -0.131 -0.0535 -0.0409 0.00723 -0.0236 0.0318 
 (0.131) (0.126) (0.129) (0.120) (0.142) (0.137) (0.138) (0.141) 
Illiquidity -0.350*** -0.364*** -0.352*** -0.391*** -0.344*** -0.367*** -0.341*** -0.316*** 
 (0.0795) (0.0787) (0.0781) (0.0753) (0.0880) (0.0811) (0.0862) (0.0828) 
Volatility -0.159**        
 (0.0778)        
VaR  -0.188**       
  (0.0777)       
ES   -0.201***      
   (0.0712)      
Beta    -0.371***     
    (0.0802)     
CDSs     -0.0423    
     (0.0933)    
Z-Score      0.164   
      (0.105)   ∆"#$%&'SI       0.0252  
       (0.0789)  ∆"#$%&'SV        -0.127 
        (0.102) 
Sector         
Insurers 7.608 7.447 6.335 6.813 10.79 15.27* 10.78 10.05 
 (7.269) (7.209) (7.225) (6.571) (7.671) (8.437) (7.662) (7.776) 
NFIs 29.51*** 29.23*** 28.99*** 20.67*** 30.82*** 27.23*** 30.61*** 26.12*** 
 (5.636) (5.639) (5.564) (6.124) (5.844) (6.038) (5.836) (6.380) 
Constant 66.30*** 69.01*** 69.88*** 78.88*** 55.35*** 43.86*** 51.16*** 56.41*** 
 (11.34) (10.92) (10.92) (10.21) (13.49) (13.55) (11.69) (11.79) 
         
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 

























 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Size 0.0630 -0.0448 0.0400 0.0558 -0.00426 -0.00876 -0.000887 0.0266 
 (0.127) (0.120) (0.131) (0.139) (0.137) (0.134) (0.126) (0.138) 
Illiquidity -0.386*** -0.401*** -0.355*** -0.345*** -0.345*** -0.352*** -0.332*** -0.361*** 
 (0.0803) (0.0751) (0.0794) (0.0845) (0.0838) (0.0815) (0.0805) (0.0849) ∆"#()$SI -0.326***        
 (0.0796)        ∆"#()$SV  -0.352***       
  (0.0730)       
CDSIRFMaxSI   -0.332***      
   (0.0886)      
CDSIRFMaxSV    -0.286***     
    (0.105)     
CDSIRFPrdSI     0.0883    
     (0.0815)    
CDSIRFPrdSV      0.121   
      (0.0878)   
EqtIRFMaxSI       -0.238***  
       (0.0810)  
EqtIRFMaxSV        -0.152 
        (0.0947) 
Sector         
Insurers 10.14 8.330 9.704 10.77 11.11 11.62 10.63 9.821 
 (6.632) (6.629) (7.063) (7.056) (7.802) (7.740) (7.042) (7.116) 
NFIs 21.48*** 21.05*** 18.45*** 18.65** 29.61*** 29.78*** 26.08*** 26.32*** 
 (5.972) (5.898) (6.710) (7.297) (5.939) (5.920) (5.843) (6.525) 
Constant 69.42*** 77.38*** 70.48*** 66.61*** 47.59*** 46.24*** 63.93*** 60.01*** 
 (9.915) (9.594) (11.02) (10.49) (12.55) (13.01) (10.78) (10.80) 
         
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 

























 (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 
Size -0.0357 -0.00819 -0.0352 0.0319 -0.0114 0.0111 0.0486 -0.0704 -0.0677 -0.0968 
 (0.126) (0.131) (0.136) (0.128) (0.136) (0.138) (0.160) (0.128) (0.125) (0.128) 
Illiquidity -0.354*** -0.366*** -0.344*** -0.378*** -0.351*** -0.351*** -0.335*** -0.364*** -0.364*** -0.342*** 
 (0.0780) (0.0830) (0.0860) (0.0832) (0.0887) (0.0873) (0.0871) (0.0878) (0.0747) (0.0790) 
EqtIRFPrdSI 0.208**          
 (0.0803)          
EqtIRFPrdSV  0.129         
  (0.0832)         
CDSGrangerSI   0.0841        
   (0.0898)        
CDSGrangerSV    -0.295***       
    (0.0848)       
EqtGrangerSI     0.0477      
     (0.0883)      
EqtGangerSV      -0.0790     
      (0.0762)     
DiDeSI       -0.0996    
       (0.0969)    
DiDeSV        -0.244***   
        (0.0800)   
LRMES         -0.296***  
         (0.0775)  
SRISK          -0.433*** 
          (0.130) 
Sector           
Insurers 9.798 10.12 10.25 12.74* 11.21 11.63 10.54 12.52* 4.919 3.062 
 (6.833) (7.267) (7.661) (7.025) (7.650) (7.600) (7.533) (7.269) (6.870) (6.890) 
NFIs 27.18*** 31.04*** 32.66*** 22.85*** 31.55*** 30.89*** 28.10*** 26.77*** 21.71*** 9.581 
 (6.122) (5.912) (5.908) (5.910) (6.129) (5.814) (6.368) (6.009) (6.057) (8.980) 
Constant 45.01*** 46.66*** 48.50*** 67.70*** 49.49*** 54.67*** 54.34*** 68.34*** 74.91*** 86.57*** 
 (10.88) (12.27) (11.88) (10.69) (12.18) (11.54) (10.92) (11.57) (10.36) (13.06) 
           
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
R-squared 0.459 0.434 0.425 0.490 0.421 0.425 0.426 0.464 0.487 0.488 
This table displays the outcomes of the cross-sectional regressions of the realised mean equity returns (MeanEqtRet) during the period from 
2007 Q3 to 2008 Q4, on the mean values of the risk measures during the period of 2006 Q1 to 2007Q2. Leverage is defined as ›AM 	= 	 (…AM +ÔAM)/ÔAM, where …AM is the book value of debt, ÔAM the market value of equity. The size of a company is its market capitalisation. Illiquidity is 
measured as the first-order autocorrelation of equity returns. VaR is the 95th percentile. CDSs is the CDS spread. the suffix of “SI” of the 
systemic risk measures means the systemic importance of the firms. the suffix of “SV” of the systemic risk measures means the systemic 
vulnerability of the firms. “~IRFMax~” refers to the IRF results based on the maximum values of the impulse response plots. “~IRFPrd~”refers 
to the IRF results based on the lasting periods in the impulse response plots. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and they are to 
remedy the problem of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) has been performed to test multicollinearity. 
Control variables that have multicollinearity with other variables are removed one by one until no multicollinearity exists. ***, **, and * 



















Table 11 Regressions with MeanCDSRet, the Mean Value of the Realised CDS Returns during 
the Crisis, as the Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Size 0.394*** 0.419*** 0.375*** 0.306*** 0.0986 0.308*** 0.288*** 0.0807 
 (0.121) (0.117) (0.119) (0.0984) (0.104) (0.0949) (0.102) (0.0884) 
Illiquidity 0.400*** 0.418*** 0.398*** 0.404*** 0.346*** 0.375*** 0.386*** 0.290*** 
 (0.0807) (0.0796) (0.0812) (0.0851) (0.0824) (0.0880) (0.0851) (0.0720) 
Volatility 0.164        
 (0.104)        
VaR  0.220**       
  (0.101)       
ES   0.139      
   (0.102)      
Beta    0.110     
    (0.0908)     
CDSs     -0.347***    
     (0.0911)    
Z-Score      0.0811   
      (0.110)   ∆"#$%&'SI       0.0290  
       (0.107)  ∆"#$%&'SV        0.561*** 
        (0.0961) 
Sector         
Insurers 5.559 6.150 5.508 3.756 5.982 5.109 3.139 4.213 
 (6.018) (5.994) (6.124) (6.038) (5.927) (6.787) (5.823) (5.640) 
NFIs -23.68*** -23.19*** -23.66*** -21.83*** -22.67*** -26.41*** -24.71*** -5.176 
 (5.540) (5.594) (5.501) (5.965) (5.440) (5.696) (5.548) (6.511) 
Constant 8.087 2.858 10.36 14.75 49.33*** 18.59* 21.57** 3.670 
 (12.28) (12.19) (11.96) (10.56) (9.835) (9.579) (8.307) (8.903) 
         
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 

























 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Size 0.279*** 0.301*** 0.281*** 0.246** 0.295*** 0.293*** 0.292*** 0.310*** 
 (0.0973) (0.0975) (0.0972) (0.105) (0.0948) (0.0966) (0.0958) (0.1000) 
Illiquidity 0.398*** 0.400*** 0.393*** 0.393*** 0.389*** 0.393*** 0.387*** 0.381*** 
 (0.0878) (0.0855) (0.0848) (0.0865) (0.0864) (0.0844) (0.0846) (0.0871) ∆"#()$SI 0.0684        
 (0.0904)        ∆"#()$SV  0.0660       
  (0.0861)       
CDSIRFMaxSI   0.0863      
   (0.121)      
CDSIRFMaxSV    0.197     
    (0.123)     
CDSIRFPrdSI     -0.00288    
     (0.0946)    
CDSIRFPrdSV      -0.0396   
      (0.0771)   
EqtIRFMaxSI       0.0502  
       (0.0781)  
EqtIRFMaxSV        -0.0499 
        (0.0911) 
Sector         
Insurers 2.749 3.084 2.876 2.435 2.674 2.294 2.646 2.510 
 (6.006) (6.031) (5.993) (5.938) (5.921) (5.869) (5.984) (5.948) 
NFIs -22.85*** -22.97*** -21.61*** -16.55** -24.72*** -24.50*** -23.81*** -26.15*** 
 (6.198) (5.964) (7.613) (8.137) (5.779) (5.599) (5.845) (6.303) 
Constant 19.03* 17.93* 17.90* 12.68 22.82*** 24.59*** 20.18** 25.27*** 
 (9.657) (10.29) (10.69) (10.58) (7.789) (8.456) (8.853) (9.382) 
         
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 

























 (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) 
Size 0.306*** 0.297*** 0.273*** 0.285*** 0.324*** 0.350*** 0.251** 0.224*** 0.331*** 0.195* 
 (0.0953) (0.0965) (0.0963) (0.0985) (0.0995) (0.102) (0.122) (0.0851) (0.101) (0.102) 
Illiquidity 0.397*** 0.385*** 0.382*** 0.397*** 0.328*** 0.364*** 0.386*** 0.355*** 0.406*** 0.443*** 
 (0.0815) (0.0886) (0.0843) (0.0895) (0.0825) (0.0864) (0.0854) (0.0795) (0.0814) (0.0903) 
EqtIRFPrdSI  -0.118          
 (0.0884)          
EqtIRFPrdSV  0.0151         
  (0.0946)         
CDSGrangerSI   0.106        
   (0.106)        
CDSGrangerSV    0.0656       
    (0.116)       
EqtGrangerSI     0.249**      
     (0.0962)      
EqtGrangerSV      -0.154*     
      (0.0848)     
DiDeSI       0.0678    
       (0.101)    
DiDeSV        -0.328***   
        (0.0936)   
LRMES         0.209**  
         (0.0972)  
SRISK          0.278*** 
          (0.0948) 
Sector           
Insurers 3.034 2.666 2.520 2.175 6.954 5.117 2.599 5.543 6.549  
 (5.988) (5.945) (5.939) (5.921) (5.856) (5.797) (5.985) (5.476) (6.219)  
NFIs -22.84*** -24.70*** -22.12*** -23.04*** -19.61*** -24.12*** -23.08*** -29.84*** -18.52***  
 (5.697) (5.503) (6.615) (6.843) (5.643) (5.421) (6.699) (5.102) (6.314)  
Constant 26.69*** 22.03** 18.14* 19.19* 8.999 27.66*** 21.15** 44.41*** 6.619 4.039 
 (8.412) (8.895) (9.724) (10.90) (9.661) (8.406) (8.561) (8.411) (11.65) (8.909) 
           
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
R-squared 0.376 0.364 0.373 0.367 0.412 0.384 0.367 0.445 0.397 0.289 
This table displays the outcomes of the cross-sectional regressions of the realised mean CDS returns (MeanCDSRet) during the period from 
2007 Q3 to 2008 Q4, on the mean values of the risk measures during the period of 2006 Q1 to 2007Q2. Leverage is defined as ›AM 	= 	 (…AM +ÔAM)/ÔAM, where …AM is the book value of debt, ÔAM the market value of equity. The size of a company is its market capitalisation. Illiquidity is 
measured as the first-order autocorrelation of equity returns. VaR is the 95th percentile. CDSs is the CDS spread. the suffix of “SI” of the 
systemic risk measures means the systemic importance of the firms. the suffix of “SV” of the systemic risk measures means the systemic 
vulnerability of the firms. “~IRFMax~” refers to the IRF results based on the maximum values of the impulse response plots. “~IRFPrd~”refers 
to the IRF results based on the lasting periods in the impulse response plots. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, and they are to 
remedy the problem of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) has been performed to test multicollinearity. 
Control variables that have multicollinearity with other variables are removed one by one until no multicollinearity exists. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at 1%,5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
5.3 Conclusions 
Results from Spearman’s correlation have revealed that the firm-level risk indicators in this 
thesis are weakly correlated with most of the systemic risk measures (generally consistent with 
Wagner, 2010, López-Espinosa et al. 2013, and Leroy and Lucotte, 2017). This signifies that 
firm-level risk could explain systemic risk to some extent, nevertheless there are other facets 
in systemic risk that are not reflected in firm-level risk. This is against the hypothesis H5.1. A 
new finding in this thesis is that firm-level risk correlates more to the systemic vulnerability 
than to the systemic importance of systemic risk, which means that firm-level risk tends more 
to capture a firm’s fragility when the firm is affected by others. 
Empirical results from cross-sectional regressions show that DiDeSV, LRMES and SRISK 
are statistically significant at 5 per cent in all regressions with MinEqtRet, MaxCDSRet, 
MeanEqtRet and MeanCDSRet as the dependent variable respectively. This is different from 
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what hypothesis H5.2 expects that the CDS-based risk measures will perform better in 
predicting the crisis. In terms of the firm-level risk measures, none of them could significantly 
explain all of the four dependent variables, with VaR and beta being significant in three 
regressions at 5 percent. This supports that the macro-prudential regulatory frameworks should 
emphasise on the systemic risk indicators and use the standard risk measures such as VaR and 





























This thesis applies both firm-level risk measures and systemic risk measures on different 
sectors using both CDS data and non-CDS data. Different from previous literature, this research 
has included firm-level risk measures in addition to systemic risk measures to investigate risk 
of insurers relative to banks and NFIs. Besides, this thesis is the first one that adopts relatively 
comprehensive and widely cited risk methodologies to compare CDS-based and non-CDS 
based risk measures. Moreover, impulse response function (IRF) is proposed in this study to 
quantify systemic risk. There is also rare previous research using statistical significance tests 
following the systemic risk analysis, this study fills this gap by applying the significance test 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test) as well as dominance test (Conover-Iman test) on both firm-level 
risk assessments and systemic risk assessments. Last but not least, the systemic importance and 
systemic vulnerability of a company are analysed separately to reflect the two dimensions of 
systemic risk, which has not been researched on by many existing studies. 
The aim of this thesis is trying to solve the following issues: (1) the risk level of insurance 
companies in the 2007-2009 financial crisis relative to banks and NFIs; (2) the role of the CDS 
data in assessing risks in comparison with non-CDS data; (3) the association between firm-
level risk and systemic risk; and (4) the performance of the risk measures on predicting the 
subprime mortgage crisis.  
Results from sector connectedness analysis disclose that banks and insurers have stronger 
connections between each other, while both of them have relatively lower level of connections 
with NFIs (in line with Billio et al. (2011)). Besides, this thesis finds that banks are the main 
risk triggers that contribute more risk to others, while insurance companies are the major risk 
receivers that are affected most by others. This agrees with Baluch et al. (2011), Billio et al. 
(2011); Girardi and Ergün (2013), Chen et al. (2014), and Berdin and Sottocornola (2015). 
There are also new findings in this thesis, i.e. Firm-level risk analysis (systemic risk analysis) 
suggest that insurers are riskier than other sectors in terms of credit risk (insurers contribute 
more credit risk to others), while banks are riskier in terms of equity-based risk (banks 
contribute more equity-based risk to the system).  
Regarding the role of data source in risk analysis, first, CDS-based and non-CDS based 
risk indicators have shown different risk ranking results among banks and insurers, signifying 
that more types of data should be considered together to have a more comprehensive risk profile 
of a company/sector. Second, structural break tests on both firm-level risk assessments and 
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systemic risk assessments suggest that the CDS-sourced risk switched to the crisis mode at 
earlier stage, if compared with the equity-based and accounting-based risk. This implies that 
credit risk of a company provides early-warning signals of crisis and regulatory bodies should 
pay more attention to credit risk changes. 
Rank correlations between firm-level risk measures and systemic risk measures show that 
firm-level risk cannot capture some factors that are only measured by systemic risk, therefore 
macro-prudential policies emphasizing on systemic risk methodologies are necessary. In 
addition, firm-level risk results are more associated with the systemic vulnerability of systemic 
risk, implying that the firm-level risk of a company approximately represents the vulnerability 
of the company as a risk receiver.  
The cross-sectional regressions show that DiDeSV, LRMES and SRISK, all of which are 
systemic risk measures, are the most outstanding risk indicators as compared with firm-level 
risk measures and other systemic risk methodologies.  
The limitation of this thesis stems from data restrictions. Limited CDS data confines the 
sample to 96 companies, i.e. 32 members in each of the three sectors. What’s more, since CDS 
data has less variations in the early quarters of the sample, Granger-causality tests and IRF are 
on annual basis rather than quarterly basis as for other risk measures. This makes comparisons 
across risk measures difficult in that risk indicators have different sample sizes. 
Future work could be done as follows: firstly, in response to the limitation in this thesis, 
alternative data with better quality and broader time span should be explored. Furthermore, 
multiple types of data reflecting manifold sources of information, should be combined in risk 
analysis to reflect multi-perspectives of risks. Last but not least, the further work should be 
devoted to convert risk evaluations to effective regulatory tools to instruct risk supervision in 
practice. The future research questions could possibly be: the role of derivatives data (data from 












Appendix 1 List of Companies 
Banks Country Insurers Country Non-FIs Country 
American Express US Aetna Inc. US 3M US 
Bank of America US AIG US Altria Group  US 
Capital One Financial US Allstate US Amgen Inc. US 
Citigroup Inc. US American Financial  US AT&T Inc. US 
Goldman Sachs US Berkshire Hathaway US Cisco Systems  US 
JPMorgan Chase&Co. US Chubb Limited US Coca-Cola US 
Morgan Stanley US Cigna Corporation US Eli Lilly and Co. US 
Wells Fargo & Co. US CNA Financial  US Exxon Mobil  US 
Banco Santander Spain The Hartford  US The Home Depot US 
KBC Bank Belgium Lincoln National  US Honeywell  US 
BNP Paribas France Loews Corporation US Johnson & Johnson US 
Credit Agricole France Marsh & McLennan  US McDonald's US 
Societe Generale France MBIA US Merck & Co. US 
Commerzbank AG Germany MetLife  US PepsiCo, Inc. US 
Deutsche Bank Germany MGIC US Pfizer Inc. US 
Intesa Sanpaolo  Italy Radian Group  US Procter & Gamble US 
UniCredit Italy The Travelers Co. US Walmart US 
ING Group Netherlands Unum Group US Walt Disney US 
Nordea Bank Sweden AXA France LVMH France 
Credit Suisse Group Switzerland Scor SE France Sanofi S.A. France 
UBS AG Switzerland Allianz SE Germany Total S.A. France 
Barclays UK Hannover Re SE Germany BASF SE Germany 
HSBC Holdings UK Munich Re Group Germany Bayer AG Germany 
Lloyds Banking  UK Assicurazioni Generali Italy BMW Germany 
RBS UK Aegon N.V. Netherlands Deutsche Telekom Germany 
Standard Chartered UK AON Plc UK Medtronic Ireland 
ANZ Australia Aviva Plc UK Nestle S.A. Switzerland 
Macquarie Group Australia Legal & General UK BP Plc UK 
National Australia  Australia Old Mutual Plc UK AstraZeneca Plc UK 
ICICI Bank India Prudential Plc UK Vodafone Group UK 
KB Kookmin Bank South Korea QBE Insurance  Autralia Japan Tobacco  Japan 












Appendix 2 Descriptive Statistics of CDSs by Company 
Company Mean St.dev. Min Max 
3M 27.9526 22.01611 4.3 140 
AIG 281.5753 459.4588 8 3683.12 
AON Plc 60.67029 29.06967 23.3 159.42 
AT&T Inc. 39.43228 16.26042 7.5 139.6 
AXA 111.1887 86.46018 8.2 388.74 
Aegon N.V. 137.4095 104.3087 8.2 625 
Aetna Inc. 53.5905 29.34715 11.6 204 
Allianz SE 62.36349 38.28839 5.5 192.45 
Allstate 70.25606 61.99243 8.9 415.23 
Altria Group  76.34063 35.33108 18.5 228.335 
American Express 94.4358 107.6882 8 712 
American Financial 120.5792 60.00617 20.8 179.45 
Amgen Inc 44.63566 23.30166 5.3 130 
Assicurazioni Ge 118.9811 106.1489 5.5 441.4099 
AstraZeneca Plc 44.84363 32.67211 2.9 213.3 
ANZ 78.09961 53.93927 4.4 239.45 
Aviva Plc 102.3527 74.7933 5.5 515 
BASF SE 58.42499 38.80003 8.3 176.4 
BMW 82.41493 76.59013 8.1 518.6 
BNP Paribas 83.27619 71.85257 5 361.1599 
BP Plc 59.41531 64.31477 3 594.53 
Banco Santander 133.943 117.4009 7 489.6 
Bank of America 114.861 94.49577 7.8 487.5398 
Barclays 95.16901 68.18481 5.3 282.6089 
Bayer AG 52.46108 24.56132 14 154.95 
Berkshire Hathaway 100.9266 85.66106 6.5 525 
CNA Financial 133.0835 94.9419 27 463.3 
Capital One 126.3647 106.12 21.4 570 
Cathay Financial 85.71825 57.33019 13.5 350 
Cigna  73.98725 55.03205 11.1 406.7 
Cisco Systems  46.70067 30.38541 5.6 181 
Citigroup  128.4471 111.5519 6.8 666.57 
Coca-Cola 30.39089 16.65775 6.4 104.7 
Commerzbank AG 101.59 77.32044 7.4 361.25 
Credit Agricole 102.1247 84.73732 5.5 397.8899 
Credit Suisse  80.14224 52.59022 9.2 262.88 
Deutsche Bank 83.49124 54.44783 8.7 308.1399 
Deutsche Telekom 72.69044 30.85568 20.7 193.3 
Eli Lilly  34.1516 21.15843 4 81.28 
Exxon Mobil  22.50868 17.58136 2.5 115 
Goldman Sachs 124.3479 91.33809 16 620 
HSBC Holdings 69.08947 45.31237 4.9 196.13 
Hannover Re SE 68.27739 39.10878 7.5 156.423 
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Honeywell  33.58528 20.63307 10.5 155 
ICICI Bank 244.409 166.1124 44 1794 
ING Group 89.46746 63.05261 1 268.2798 
Intesa Sanpaolo 134.3286 136.2714 5.4 607.8899 
JPMorgan Chase & Co 73.5369 41.96957 11 242.05 
Japan Tobacco 35.90476 24.55688 2 160 
Johnson & Johnson 25.05484 16.73658 2.9 80.3 
KB Kookmin Bank 115.2332 103.4344 12.1 830 
KBC Bank 134.5522 108.7965 6.9 508.3999 
LVMH 57.41444 29.40608 13.9 229.6 
Legal & General 122.0797 152.3319 7.5 1112.18 
Lincoln National 198.0811 289.9147 11 3189.145 
Lloyds Banking  112.5624 94.56347 3.5 383.5 
Loews Corporation 51.34251 28.75057 10.5 174.35 
MBIA 728.9861 569.7969 18.7 2425.17 
MGIC  615.0838 547.5275 23.5 2228.83 
Macquarie Group 151.2694 136.7055 9.6 850 
Marsh & McLennan 64.05191 27.47998 18.45 164.5 
McDonald 28.64297 12.43452 8.5 79.9 
Medtronic 47.24838 32.71351 6.4 180 
Merck & Co. 52.05516 36.67131 10.7 215 
MetLife 161.9366 166.8902 10.1 1028.49 
Morgan Stanley 157.3864 137.64 17 1300.9 
Munich Re Group 47.80157 24.21273 5 129.7 
National Australia 78.45448 54.04505 4.5 239.95 
Nestle S.A. 29.98614 18.81461 2.5 90 
Nordea Bank 63.08064 45.26462 5 200.37 
Old Mutual  210.0561 350.5137 11.3 2866.03 
PepsiCo, Inc. 37.24975 19.95174 5.5 105 
Pfizer Inc. 37.61121 26.05839 3 132 
Procter & Gamble 38.36057 25.50839 5.4 157.8 
Prudential Plc 111.1867 120.503 7 938.77 
QBE Insurance  142.4281 104.5363 8.5 497.92 
Radian Group  846.0016 813.8016 26.6 3576.657 
RBS 124.4779 97.31428 3.5 406.7798 
Sanofi S.A. 46.16595 24.04322 8 135.9 
Scor SE 87.81006 54.98085 10.8 253.07 
Shinhan Bank 122.3198 111.684 14 630 
Societe Generale 106.8797 92.98141 5.7 434.6299 
Standard Charter 86.6674 61.14728 5.5 352.06 
The Hartford 169.3279 186.3322 9.9 1151.88 
The Home Depot 60.39647 58.05714 7.3 360 
The Travelers Co. 62.88551 34.26668 14.5 178.99 
Total S.A. 42.63964 28.39009 5.2 160 
Toyota Motor  47.06249 45.53735 1.5 290 
UBS AG 86.40476 67.62681 4 360 
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UniCredit 152.5482 145.5418 7 678.3098 
Unum Group 171.2337 82.57939 45 423.69 
Vodafone Group 69.08665 35.45083 18.7 225.7 
Walmart 34.09324 22.44155 4.9 130 
Walt Disney 34.3585 18.25152 7.7 135 
Wells Fargo & Co 71.43657 50.67934 6 312.5 
Chubb Limited 47.34919 27.93914 8.6 191.7 
The table presents mean values, standard deviations, minimum values and maximum values of CDS spread for 
each of the 96 companies. Sample period is from 3rd January 2005 to 31st December 2014, thus observation 
number is 2608 for all companies. Firms with maximum CDS values exceeding 1000 are in bold. 
 
Appendix 3 Descriptive Statistics of CDS by Industry 
Sector Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
Banks 110.0124 101.3214 1 1794 
Insurers 169.3313 309.0164 5 3683.12 
NFIs 45.28999 36.07558 1.5 594.53 
The table presents mean values, standard deviations, minimum values and maximum values of CDS spread for 

































Appendix 4 Descriptive Statistics of Equity Returns by Company 
 
Company Mean       St.Dev.    Min  Max   
3M 0.0002648 0.0139535 -0.0938369 0.0942038 
AIG -0.0011444 0.0490621 -0.9362577 0.5068166 
AON Plc 0.0005338 0.01567 -0.1484011 0.1561607 
AT&T Inc. 0.0001043 0.0138197 -0.0803551 0.1508318 
AXA 0.0000327 0.0265372 -0.2035017 0.1977824 
Aegon N.V. -0.0001509 0.029618 -0.2768359 0.3021541 
Aetna Inc. 0.0004076 0.02245 -0.2270279 0.1634188 
Allianz SE 0.0001336 0.020406 -0.1391798 0.1780799 
Allstate 0.0001212 0.0217465 -0.2379861 0.1962799 
Altria Group  0.0004817 0.0122027 -0.132666 0.1516501 
American Express 0.0002464 0.0242289 -0.1935233 0.1877116 
American Financial 0.000413 0.0208203 -0.1552624 0.3741066 
Amgen  0.0003481 0.0165473 -0.0989767 0.1406494 
Assicurazioni -0.0000983 0.0169941 -0.0923087 0.1231283 
AstraZeneca  0.0003377 0.0145555 -0.117796 0.1343123 
ANZ 0.0001702 0.016739 -0.1157429 0.1365204 
Aviva  -0.0000995 0.0268576 -0.4059916 0.2239155 
BASF SE 0.0003714 0.0177643 -0.1292391 0.1269062 
BMW 0.0003765 0.019824 -0.1305267 0.1351835 
BNP Paribas -0.0000192 0.0260843 -0.1892621 0.1897678 
BP Plc -0.0000813 0.0164144 -0.1403684 0.1058255 
Banco Santander 0.0000641 0.0215954 -0.1271623 0.2087859 
Bank of America -0.0003661 0.0356493 -0.3420588 0.3020961 
Barclays -0.0002963 0.0332615 -0.2856365 0.549477 
Bayer AG 0.0006019 0.0171985 -0.1049652 0.108023 
Berkshire Hathaway 0.0003657 0.0141169 -0.1288329 0.1495317 
CNA Financial  0.0001481 0.0257438 -0.3947638 0.2410588 
Capital One -5.76E-06 0.0315604 -0.2882425 0.2345196 
Cathay Financial 9.26E-06 0.0196924 -0.0726031 0.0677208 
Cigna Corporation 0.000518 0.0242317 -0.242216 0.2113947 
Cisco Systems  0.0001398 0.0189595 -0.1768648 0.147993 
Citigroup  -0.0008394 0.0376085 -0.4946962 0.4563162 
Coca-Cola 0.0002721 0.011392 -0.0906805 0.1299708 
Commerzbank AG -0.000815 0.0310769 -0.2824824 0.1945733 
Credit Agricole -0.0002433 0.0283162 -0.1434817 0.2336148 
Credit Suisse  -0.000242 0.0244639 -0.1766572 0.246122 
Deutsche Bank -0.0003141 0.0252928 -0.1807454 0.2230318 
Deutsche Telekom -0.0000867 0.0150717 -0.1325544 0.1325544 
Eli Lilly and Co. 0.0000783 0.0138758 -0.131799 0.1340893 
Exxon Mobil  0.0002351 0.0157019 -0.150271 0.1586307 
Goldman Sachs 0.0002353 0.0246129 -0.2102226 0.2348178 
HSBC Holdings -0.0000882 0.0174087 -0.2079934 0.1442285 
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Hannover Re SE 0.0003633 0.0197347 -0.1536385 0.1331667 
Honeywell  0.0003991 0.0169503 -0.098805 0.1110663 
ICICI Bank 0.000598 0.0268907 -0.2213545 0.2073239 
ING Group -0.0001792 0.032172 -0.3213612 0.2565265 
Intesa Sanpaolo -0.000116 0.0263951 -0.1846294 0.1796358 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 0.0001799 0.0267511 -0.232278 0.2239172 
Japan Tobacco  0.000401 0.0210703 -0.1324031 0.1324031 
Johnson & Johnson 0.000195 0.0099315 -0.0797488 0.1153729 
KB Kookmin Bank -0.0000446 0.0239389 -0.1613979 0.1397621 
KBC Bank -0.0000731 0.0361036 -0.2866355 0.4048425 
LVMH 0.0003654 0.0177622 -0.1193052 0.1213783 
Legal & General 0.0003128 0.0258808 -0.3407595 0.2430024 
Lincoln National 0.0000858 0.0403995 -0.5089086 0.3623487 
Lloyds Banking Group -0.0004333 0.0341992 -0.4147273 0.4077654 
Loews Corporation 0.0002287 0.0195626 -0.199394 0.2122027 
MBIA -0.0007233 0.049261 -0.4126444 0.3821945 
MGIC  -0.0007599 0.0620362 -1.023808 0.5575128 
Macquarie Group 0.0000931 0.0253986 -0.2642844 0.3207205 
Marsh & McLennan 0.0002124 0.0160982 -0.1307455 0.1348 
McDonald 0.0004143 0.0122291 -0.0831566 0.0897446 
Medtronic 0.0001453 0.0149559 -0.1419609 0.0980337 
Merck & Co. 0.000229 0.016583 -0.1594444 0.122509 
MetLife 0.0001142 0.0304752 -0.3115613 0.2468601 
Morgan Stanley -0.0000686 0.0351127 -0.2996583 0.62585 
Munich Re Group 0.0002309 0.0157934 -0.1114155 0.1450963 
National Australia 0.0000589 0.0170442 -0.1448567 0.1599668 
Nestle S.A. 0.0003396 0.010963 -0.0690267 0.0904182 
Nordea Bank 0.0002078 0.0208392 -0.1203243 0.1490748 
Old Mutual Plc 0.0001376 0.0269532 -0.2438824 0.2643066 
PepsiCo, Inc. 0.0002298 0.0107088 -0.1270537 0.0820445 
Pfizer Inc. 0.0000627 0.0145059 -0.1123242 0.0968701 
Procter & Gamble 0.0001922 0.0109392 -0.082264 0.0972574 
Prudential Plc 0.0004572 0.0268805 -0.2231435 0.210721 
QBE Insurance -0.0001206 0.0190791 -0.2527024 0.1041962 
Radian Group  -0.0004372 0.0602574 -0.3667862 0.6048965 
RBS -0.0009657 0.0403829 -1.095735 0.3050463 
Sanofi S.A. 0.0000935 0.0157101 -0.1124466 0.1368112 
Scor SE 0.000239 0.0182978 -0.1017557 0.1354843 
Shinhan Bank 0.0002605 0.0218067 -0.1620014 0.134995 
Societe Generale -0.0002424 0.0291966 -0.1771218 0.2142546 
Standard Chartered 0.0000632 0.0245842 -0.1794696 0.2623711 
The Hartford -0.0001922 0.0441063 -0.7248634 0.7048674 
The Home Depot 0.0003414 0.0170065 -0.0857927 0.1316126 
The Travelers Co. 0.0004006 0.018406 -0.2006707 0.2275781 
Total S.A. 0.000027 0.0160391 -0.0964049 0.1278599 
Toyota Motor  0.0002281 0.0185724 -0.1231885 0.1443423 
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UBS AG -0.0002566 0.025964 -0.1736276 0.2589268 
UniCredit -0.0005632 0.0294287 -0.1895475 0.1900674 
Unum Group 0.0002641 0.0265327 -0.351448 0.2000952 
Vodafone Group 0.0001655 0.0163876 -0.1458503 0.0907243 
Walmart 0.0001826 0.0117572 -0.0840767 0.1050182 
Walt Disney 0.0004725 0.0170174 -0.1023062 0.1481805 
Wells Fargo & Co 0.0002192 0.0289886 -0.272101 0.2834067 
Chubb Limited 0.000383 0.0187972 -0.2201229 0.1885788 
Total 0.0000681 0.0253978 -1.095735 0.7048674 
The table presents mean values, standard deviations, minimum values and maximum values of equity returns 
for each of the 96 companies. Sample period is from 3rd January 2005 to 31st December 2014, thus there are 2608 
equity values. After convert stock price to equity returns, observation number becomes 2607 for all companies. 
Firms with minimum equity returns lower than -0.39 are in bold. 
 
Appendix 5 Descriptive Statistics of Equity Returns by Industry 
Sector Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
Banks -0.000118 0.0282143 -1.095735 0.62585 
Insurers 0.0000746 0.0300046 -1.023808 0.7048674 
NFIs 0.0002477 0.0154522 -0.1768648 0.1586307 
Total 0.0000681 0.0253978 -1.095735 0.7048674 
The table presents mean values, standard deviations, minimum values and maximum values of equity returns for 
each of the 3 sectors. Observation number is 83424 (32×2607) for all sectors.  
 
Appendix 6 Descriptive Statistics of EA 
Sector      Mean St.Dev.   Min  Max 
Banks 0.0623622 0.0324624 0.0073446 0.1826757 
Insurers 0.1470079 0.1196682 0.012816 0.6626226 
NFIs 0.4408854 0.1159747 0.0718646 0.7935777 
Total 0.2167518 0.1895312 0.0073446 0.7935777 
The table presents mean values, standard deviations, minimum values and maximum values of equity over assets 
(EA) for each of the 3 sectors. Sample period ranges from 2005 Q1 to 2014 Q4, thus there are 40 observations for 
each company and 1280 (32×40) observations for each sector.  
 
Appendix 7 Descriptive Statistics of ROA 
Sector  Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
Banks 0.0024588 0.0226234 -0.0161414 0.8070404 
Insurers 0.0032003 0.0121277 -0.1900672 0.0695376 
NFIs 0.0227773 0.0184358 -0.1950347 0.1433293 
Total 0.0094788 0.0205254 -0.1950347 0.8070404 
The table presents mean values, standard deviations, minimum values and maximum values of return on 











Appendix 8  Results of One-Sample Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test on the Firm-Level Risk Measures 
Company Volatility VaR ES Beta CDS Z-Score 
American Express 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Bank of America 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Capital One Financial 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Citigroup Inc. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Goldman Sachs 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
JPMorgan 
Chase&Co. 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Morgan Stanley 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Wells Fargo & Co. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Banco Santander 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
KBC Bank 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
BNP Paribas 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Credit Agricole 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Societe Generale 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Commerzbank AG 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Deutsche Bank 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Intesa Sanpaolo  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
UniCredit 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
ING Group 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
Nordea Bank 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Credit Suisse Group 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
UBS AG 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Barclays 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
HSBC Holdings 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Lloyds Banking  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
RBS 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
Standard Chartered 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
ANZ 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Macquarie Group 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
National Australia  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
ICICI Bank 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
KB Kookmin Bank 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Shinhan Bank 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Aetna Inc. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
AIG 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.004*** 
Allstate 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
American Financial  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Berkshire Hathaway 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 
Chubb Limited 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Cigna Corporation 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
CNA Financial  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
The Hartford  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
Lincoln National  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.003*** 
Loews Corporation 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.95712 
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Marsh & McLennan  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.96783 
MBIA 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.17037 
MetLife  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.17891 
MGIC 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.71667 
Radian Group  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.030** 
The Travelers Co. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.17891 
Unum Group 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 
AXA 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.066* 
Scor SE 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.16214 
Allianz SE 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.21624 
Hannover Re SE 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.055* 
Munich Re Group 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.95712 
Assicurazioni 
Generali 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.011** 
Aegon N.V. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
AON Plc 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.45974 
Aviva Plc 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.87186 
Legal & General 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
Old Mutual Plc 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.008*** 
Prudential Plc 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.023** 
QBE Insurance  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 
Cathay Financial  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
3M 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Altria Group  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Amgen Inc. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
AT&T Inc. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Cisco Systems  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Coca-Cola 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Eli Lilly and Co. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Exxon Mobil  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
The Home Depot 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Honeywell  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Johnson & Johnson 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
McDonald's 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Merck & Co. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
PepsiCo, Inc. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Pfizer Inc. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Procter & Gamble 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Walmart 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Walt Disney 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
LVMH 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Sanofi S.A. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Total S.A. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
BASF SE 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Bayer AG 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
BMW 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Deutsche Telekom 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.016** 
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Medtronic 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Nestle S.A. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
BP Plc 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
AstraZeneca Plc 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Vodafone Group 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.86129 
Japan Tobacco  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Toyota Motor  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
Appendix 9 Results of Kruskal-Wallis Test on the Firm-Level Risk Measures 
Banks  Insurers  NFIs  
American Express 0.000*** Aetna Inc. 0.000*** 3M 0.000*** 
Bank of America 0.000*** AIG 0.000*** Altria Group  0.000*** 
Capital One Financial 0.000*** Allstate 0.000*** Amgen Inc. 0.000*** 
Citigroup Inc. 0.000*** American Financial  0.000*** AT&T Inc. 0.000*** 
Goldman Sachs 0.000*** Berkshire Hathaway 0.000*** Cisco Systems  0.000*** 
JPMorgan Chase&Co. 0.000*** Chubb Limited 0.000*** Coca-Cola 0.000*** 
Morgan Stanley 0.000*** Cigna Corporation 0.000*** Eli Lilly and Co. 0.000*** 
Wells Fargo & Co. 0.000*** CNA Financial  0.000*** Exxon Mobil  0.000*** 
Banco Santander 0.000*** The Hartford  0.000*** The Home Depot 0.000*** 
KBC Bank 0.000*** Lincoln National  0.000*** Honeywell  0.000*** 
BNP Paribas 0.000*** Loews Corporation 0.000*** Johnson & Johnson 0.000*** 
Credit Agricole 0.000*** Marsh & McLennan  0.000*** McDonald's 0.000*** 
Societe Generale 0.000*** MBIA 0.000*** Merck & Co. 0.000*** 
Commerzbank AG 0.000*** MetLife  0.000*** PepsiCo, Inc. 0.000*** 
Deutsche Bank 0.000*** MGIC 0.000*** Pfizer Inc. 0.000*** 
Intesa Sanpaolo  0.000*** Radian Group  0.000*** Procter & Gamble 0.000*** 
UniCredit 0.000*** The Travelers Co. 0.000*** Walmart 0.000*** 
ING Group 0.000*** Unum Group 0.000*** Walt Disney 0.000*** 
Nordea Bank 0.000*** AXA 0.000*** LVMH 0.000*** 
Credit Suisse Group 0.000*** Scor SE 0.000*** Sanofi S.A. 0.000*** 
UBS AG 0.000*** Allianz SE 0.000*** Total S.A. 0.000*** 
Barclays 0.000*** Hannover Re SE 0.000*** BASF SE 0.000*** 
HSBC Holdings 0.000*** Munich Re Group 0.000*** Bayer AG 0.000*** 
Lloyds Banking  0.000*** Assicurazioni Generali 0.000*** BMW 0.000*** 
RBS 0.000*** Aegon N.V. 0.000*** Deutsche Telekom 0.000*** 
Standard Chartered 0.000*** AON Plc 0.000*** Medtronic 0.000*** 
ANZ 0.000*** Aviva Plc 0.000*** Nestle S.A. 0.000*** 
Macquarie Group 0.000*** Legal & General 0.000*** BP Plc 0.000*** 
National Australia  0.000*** Old Mutual Plc 0.000*** AstraZeneca Plc 0.000*** 
ICICI Bank 0.000*** Prudential Plc 0.000*** Vodafone Group 0.000*** 
KB Kookmin Bank 0.000*** QBE Insurance  0.000*** Japan Tobacco  0.000*** 






Appendix 10 Results of Conover-Iman Test on Volatility for Sector Risk Ranking 
Volatility (Pre-crisis)  Volatility (Crisis)  Volatility (Post-crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g  data: x and g  data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 4.4465, df = 2, 
p-value = 0.11 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 9.015, df = 2, p-
value = 0.01 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 26.7291, df = 
2, p-value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                           Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs                    t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs                   t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs               t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks :  1.145321 (0.7208) Insurers - Banks :  0.129973 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks : -1.360283 (0.3274) 
Insurers - NFIs  :  2.210736 (0.1964) Insurers - NFIs  :  3.249336 (0.0211)** Insurers - NFIs  :  4.942361 (0.0000)*** 
Banks - NFIs      :  1.065415 (0.5429) Banks - NFIs      :  3.119362 (0.0143)** Banks - NFIs      :  6.302645 (0.0000)*** 
 
Appendix 11 Results of Conover-Iman Test on VaR for Sector Risk Ranking 
VaR(Pre-crisis)  VaR(Crisis)   VaR(Post-Crisis)  
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g  data: x and g  data: x and g  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 1.7729, df = 2, 
p-value = 0.41 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 8.765, df = 2, 
p-value = 0.01 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 25.7565, df = 
2, p-value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs                   t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs                 t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs                  t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks :  0.379408 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks :  0.429423 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks : -1.810976 (0.1373) 
Insurers - NFIs  :  1.289987 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  :  3.306561 (0.0185)** Insurers - NFIs  :  4.437886 (0.0001)*** 
Banks - NFIs      :  0.910579 (1.0000) Banks - NFIs      :  2.877138 (0.0248)** Banks - NFIs      :  6.248863 (0.0000)*** 
 
Appendix 12 Results of Conover-Iman Test on ES for Sector Risk Ranking 
ES(Pre-crisis)  ES(Crisis)   ES(Post-Crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g  data: x and g  data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 1.489, df = 2, p-
value = 0.47 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 8.495, df = 2, 
p-value = 0.01 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 26.1263, df = 
2, p-value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs                    t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs                  t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs                t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks : 0.880706 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks : 0.553030 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks : -1.229709 (0.4095) 
Insurers - NFIs  : 1.157499 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  : 3.275642 (0.0199)** Insurers - NFIs  : 4.918836 (0.0000)*** 
Banks - NFIs      : 0.276793 (1.0000) Banks - NFIs      : 2.722612 (0.0351)** Banks - NFIs      : 6.148545 (0.0000)*** 
 
Appendix 13 Results of Conover-Iman Test on Beta for Sector Risk Ranking 
Beta(Pre-crisis)  Beta(Crisis)   Beta(Post-Crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g  data: x and g  data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 17.9381, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 15.965, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 44.6942, df = 
2, p-value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs                   t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs                   t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs                t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks : -1.428574 (0.3018) Insurers - Banks : -1.343863 (0.3544) Insurers - Banks : -2.932588 (0.0086)*** 
Insurers - NFIs  :  4.880963 (0.0001)*** Insurers - NFIs  :  5.192201 (0.0001)*** Insurers - NFIs  :  8.410443 (0.0000)*** 
Banks - NFIs      :  6.309538 (0.0000)*** Banks - NFIs      :  6.536065 (0.0000)*** Banks - NFIs      :  11.34303 (0.0000)*** 
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Appendix 14 Results of Conover-Iman Test on CDS Spread for Sector Risk Ranking 
CDS(Pre-crisis)  CDS(Crisis)   CDS(Post-Crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g  data: x and g  data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 13.9845, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 8.705, df = 2, p-
value = 0.01 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 45.4504, df = 
2, p-value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs                   t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs                   t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs                t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks :  4.325637 (0.0005)*** Insurers - Banks :  1.456972 (0.2932) Insurers - Banks :  2.918273 (0.0089)*** 
Insurers - NFIs  :  4.359697 (0.0009)*** Insurers - NFIs  :  3.556728 (0.0103)** Insurers - NFIs  :  11.63080 (0.0000)*** 
Banks - NFIs      :  0.034060 (1.0000) Banks - NFIs      :  2.099755 (0.1320) Banks - NFIs      :  8.712528 (0.0000)*** 
 
Appendix 15 Results of Conover-Iman Test on Z-Score for Sector Risk Ranking 
Zscore(Pre-crisis)  Zscore(Crisis)  Zscore(Post-Crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g  data: x and g  data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 19.2723, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 18.005, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 47.6418, df = 
2, p-value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs                   t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs                   t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs                t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks : -4.739450 (0.0002)*** Insurers - Banks : -5.291999 (0.0001)*** Insurers - Banks : -8.887081 (0.0000)*** 
Insurers - NFIs  : -7.193809 (0.0000)*** Insurers - NFIs  : -8.626683 (0.0000)*** Insurers - NFIs  : -12.83689 (0.0000)*** 
Banks - NFIs      : -2.454358 (0.0382)** Banks - NFIs      : -3.334684 (0.0058)*** Banks - NFIs      : -3.949814 (0.0004)*** 
 







  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g 
  
data: x and g 
  
data: x and g 
 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 24.1775, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 20.9514, df = 2,  
p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 16.3392, df = 2,  
p-value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs:            t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:               t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:                 t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  3.552430 (0.0019)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  4.062069 (0.0007)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  4.533757(0.0002)*** 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  7.585906 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  6.551821 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  4.798723 (0.0001)*** 
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  5.589234 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis : 3.751406 (0.0011)**** 
   
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  1.060400 (0.5424) 
 






   
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g 
  
data: x and g 
  
data: x and g 
  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 23.8919, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 21.3571, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 15.5367, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pair:               t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:                  t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:                   t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  3.868717 (0.0008)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  4.210802 (0.0004)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  4.242678 (0.0004)*** 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  7.549136 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  6.692023 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  4.670656 (0.0002)*** 




Appendix 18 Results of Conover-Iman Test on ES for Time Period Risk Ranking 
ES (banks) 





  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g 
  
data: x and g 
  
data: x and g 
 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 23.1156, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 22.5834, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 17.1422, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs:                 t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:                  t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:                   t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  3.693939 (0.0013)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  4.199113 (0.0003)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  4.469252 (0.0002)*** 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  7.238493 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  7.120207 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  5.167627 (0.0000)*** 
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  5.003954 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  4.309972 (0.0003)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  1.589048 (0.2210) 
 







  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g 
  
data: x and g 
  
data: x and g 
 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 18.7796, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 16.8847, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 11.6909, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs:                  t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:                 t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:                  t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  0.780322 (0.8070) Crisis - Post-crisis     :  1.227272 (0.4170) Crisis - Post-crisis     : -2.156767 (0.0689) 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  4.970517 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  4.764239 (0.0002)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      : -3.951476 (0.0018)*** 
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  5.337278 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  4.596886 (0.0001)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis : -2.579816 (0.0385)** 
 







  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g 
  
data: x and g 
  
data: x and g 
 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 21.9712, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 22.0522, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 22.2705, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs:                 t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:                   t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:                   t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     : -0.208229 (1.0000) Crisis - Post-crisis     :  0.469634 (1.0000) Crisis - Post-crisis     :  0.840335 (0.7446) 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  5.183469 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  5.628840 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  5.900103 (0.0000)*** 
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  6.672273 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  6.492387 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  6.428471 (0.0000)*** 
 
Appendix 21 Results of Conover-Iman Test on Z-Score for Time Period Risk Ranking 
Z-Score (banks)   Z-Score (insurers)   Z-Score(NFIs)  
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 18.6837, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 3.3998, df = 2, p-
value = 0.18 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 8.5706, df = 2, 
p-value = 0.01 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pair:                  t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:                   t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:                   t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     : -5.789074 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  0.062406 (1.0000) Crisis - Post-crisis     : -2.772725 (0.0238)** 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      : -4.246703 (0.0004)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      : -1.406415 (0.4618) Crisis - Pre-crisis      : -3.042444 (0.0236)** 





Appendix 22 Rank Correlations between the Firm-Level Risk Measures Based on Time Series Data 
Time series  Volatility VaR ES Beta CDS Z-Score 
Volatility Spearman’s ρ 1.000      
 P value 1.000      
VaR Spearman’s ρ 0.974 1.000     
 P value 0.000*** 1.000     
ES Spearman’s ρ 0.982 0.987 1.000    
 P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000    
Beta Spearman’s ρ 0.759 0.681 0.726 1.000   
 P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000   
CDS Spearman’s ρ 0.776 0.736 0.756 0.879 1.000  
 P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000  
Z-Score Spearman’s ρ -0.608 -0.583 -0.607 -0.491 -0.453 1.000 
 P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 1.000 
 
Appendix 23 Rank Correlations between the Firm-Level Risk Measures Based on Cross-sectional data 
Cross section  Volatility VaR ES Beta CDS Z-Score 
Volatility Spearman’s ρ 1.000      
 P value 1.000      
VaR Spearman’s ρ 0.993 1.000     
 P value 0.000***      
ES Spearman’s ρ 0.989 0.987 1.000    
 P value 0.000*** 0.000***     
Beta Spearman’s ρ 0.855 0.865 0.846 1.000   
 P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***    
CDS Spearman’s ρ 0.819 0.823 0.820 0.661 1.000  
 P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***   
Z-Score Spearman’s ρ -0.342 -0.343 -0.366 -0.371 -0.401 1.000 























Appendix 24 Rank Correlations across Time by Firm-Level Risk Measures 
  Volatility   VaR   ES   












pre-crisis Spearman’s ρ 1.000   1.000   1.000   
 P value 1.000   1.000   1.000   
crisis Spearman’s ρ 0.223 1.000  0.276 1.000  0.221 1.000  
 P value 0.029** 1.000  0.007*** 1.000  0.031** 1.000  
post-crisis Spearman’s ρ 0.352 0.799 1.000 0.368 0.809 1.000 0.340 0.775 1.000 
 P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000 0.001*** 0.000*** 1.000 
(Continued) 
 
  Beta   CDS   Z-Score   
 












pre-crisis Spearman’s ρ 1.000   1.000   1.000   
 P value 1.000   1.000   1.000   
crisis Spearman’s ρ 0.592 1.000  0.477 1.000  0.681 1.000  
 P value 0.000*** 1.000  0.000*** 1.000  0.000*** 1.000  
post-crisis Spearman’s ρ 0.679 0.855 1.000 0.238 0.755 1.000 0.596 0.651 1.000 











Appendix 25 Company Risk Ranking Resulted from Volatility 
2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2009 Q1 2009 Q2 
Radian group Radian group MBIA MBIA Radian group  The Hartford  Citigroup Inc. MGIC  
MGIC  MBIA Radian group Radian group AIG Lincoln National  MGIC  Radian group 
MBIA MGIC  MGIC  MGIC  MGIC  MGIC  RBS Capital One  
Macquarie Group Capital One  Macquarie Group Macquarie Group MBIA Radian group Lloyds Banking Group The Hartford 
Cathay Financial  Morgan Stanley ICICI Bank RBS Bank of America Morgan Stanley Lincoln National  Lincoln National  
Old Mutual Plc ICICI Bank Capital One  UBS AG Capital One  MBIA Bank of America KBC Bank 
Prudential Plc RBS CNA Financial  AIG Morgan Stanley Citigroup Inc. The Hartford  AIG 
Standard Chartered Goldman Sachs UBS AG Capital One Financial Citigroup Inc. MetLife AIG Bank of America 
Legal & General Barclays Morgan Stanley Morgan Stanley JPMorgan Chase & Co. AIG Barclays MBIA 
Morgan Stanley Citigroup Inc. RBS Citigroup Inc. UBS AG Unum Group Radian group Wells Fargo & Co. 
Barclays Shinhan Bank Citigroup Inc. Commerzbank AG Macquarie Group CNA Financial  MBIA Lloyds Banking  
American Express AIG Societe Generale Credit Agricole Wells Fargo & Co. ING Group Wells Fargo & Co. RBS 
Capital One  Prudential Plc Old Mutual Plc Barclays RBS Aegon N.V. KBC Bank American Express 
Goldman Sachs Wells Fargo & Co. Commerzbank AG ICICI Bank Old Mutual Plc RBS MetLife CNA Financial  
American Financial  KB Kookmin Bank Barclays National Australia  Barclays Cigna Corporation Capital One Financial MetLife 
Lincoln National  American Express Wells Fargo & Co. CNA Financial  Lloyds Banking Group Bank of America Aegon N.V. Aegon N.V. 
MetLife Old Mutual Plc QBE Insurance  American Express ICICI Bank Allstate Legal & General Citigroup Inc. 
Unum Group Unum Group JPMorgan Chase & Co. ANZ  Credit Agricole Old Mutual Plc ING Group Barclays 
ICICI Bank Standard Chartered American Express JPMorgan Chase & Co. Prudential Plc Prudential Plc Morgan Stanley ICICI Bank 









Appendix 26 Company Risk Ranking Resulted from VaR 
2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2009 Q1 2009 Q2 
Radian Group  MBIA MBIA Radian group AIG The Hartford  Lloyds Banking Group KBC Bank 
MGIC  Radian group MGIC  MBIA Radian group MGIC MGIC  MGIC  
Macquarie Group MGIC Radian group MGIC  MGIC  Morgan Stanley KBC Bank The Hartford  
MBIA Morgan Stanley Macquarie Group Macquarie Group MBIA Radian group Citigroup Inc. Radian group 
Prudential Plc Citigroup Inc. Societe Generale AIG UBS AG Citigroup Inc. AIG Capital One  
Old Mutual Plc Barclays UBS AG Citigroup Inc. Morgan Stanley Lincoln National  Lincoln National  AIG 
Cathay Financial  RBS Credit Suisse Group RBS JPMorgan Chase & Co. MBIA The Hartford  Lincoln National  
The Home Depot Capital One  ICICI Bank Barclays RBS AIG Bank of America MBIA 
Lincoln National  Wells Fargo & Co. QBE Insurance Group  Credit Agricole Citigroup Inc. RBS Barclays Bank of America 
Barclays Shinhan Bank Citigroup Inc. UBS AG Old Mutual Plc MetLife Capital One  Lloyds Banking Group 
Commerzbank AG Goldman Sachs Commerzbank AG Legal & General Bank of America KB Kookmin Bank MetLife MetLife 
MetLife AIG Old Mutual Plc Wells Fargo & Co. ICICI Bank CNA Financial  Radian group Barclays 
Marsh & McLennan  American Express RBS Capital One Financial Commerzbank AG Loews Corporation MBIA CNA Financial  
Capital One  Prudential Plc National Australia Japan Tobacco Inc. Macquarie Group Aegon N.V. Wells Fargo & Co. Legal & General 
Goldman Sachs Lincoln National  KBC Bank Commerzbank AG The Hartford  KBC Bank RBS Wells Fargo  
CNA Financial  KB Kookmin Bank ANZ  JPMorgan Chase & Co. Goldman Sachs Bank of America Unum Group Unum Group 
The Hartford  Old Mutual Plc Capital One Financial American Express Lincoln National  Prudential Plc ING Group UBS AG 
Societe Generale Unum Group CNA Financial  Lloyds Banking Group American Express Old Mutual Plc Aviva Plc RBS 
Legal & General ICICI Bank Aviva Plc ICICI Bank Wells Fargo & Co. ING Group Morgan Stanley JPMorgan Chase & Co. 









Appendix 27 Company Risk Ranking Resulted from Expected Shortfall 
2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2009 Q1 2009 Q2 
Radian group MBIA MBIA MBIA AIG The Hartford  RBS KBC Bank 
MGIC  Radian group MGIC  Radian group Radian group Lincoln National  Lloyds Banking Group MGIC  
Macquarie Group MGIC  Radian group MGIC  MGIC  RBS MGIC Capital One  
MBIA Capital One  UBS AG AIG Morgan Stanley MGIC Citigroup Inc. Bank of America 
Cathay Financial  Morgan Stanley CNA Financial  Macquarie Group MBIA Radian group Lincoln National  AIG 
Standard Chartered Citigroup Inc. Macquarie Group RBS Bank of America Morgan Stanley Bank of America The Hartford  
Lincoln National  AIG ICICI Bank Standard Chartered UBS AG Citigroup Inc. KBC Bank Radian group 
Prudential Plc Shinhan Bank Merck & Co. Credit Agricole Macquarie Group CNA Financial  Barclays MBIA 
Legal & General Wells Fargo & Co. AIG Barclays Commerzbank AG MBIA The Hartford  Citigroup Inc. 
Old Mutual Plc Cisco Systems Inc. Societe Generale Capital One  Lincoln National  Unum Group AIG Lincoln National  
Unum Group Barclays QBE Insurance Group  Commerzbank AG The Hartford  AIG Aviva Plc Lloyds Banking Group 
Marsh & McLennan  Medtronic Credit Suisse Group Morgan Stanley JPMorgan Chase & Co. MetLife Radian group RBS 
MetLife RBS RBS Merck & Co. Goldman Sachs Bank of America MetLife Aegon N.V. 
American Express Lincoln National  Commerzbank AG Citigroup Inc. Citigroup Inc. ING Group MBIA CNA Financial  
The Home Depot ICICI Bank Allianz SE Cigna Corporation Old Mutual Plc Allstate Wells Fargo & Co. Barclays 
Morgan Stanley Goldman Sachs ING Group Lloyds Banking  Lloyds Banking  Old Mutual Plc Capital One  American Express 
Barclays 3M Bayer AG CNA Financial  Capital One Financial Aegon N.V. Legal & General Wells Fargo & Co. 
The Hartford  American Express AXA Wells Fargo & Co. American Express Cigna Corporation JPMorgan Chase & Co. Commerzbank AG 
Capital One  Old Mutual Plc Capital One  JPMorgan Chase & Co. The Travelers Co. chubb Limited ING Group MetLife 









Appendix 28 Company Risk Ranking Resulted from Beta 
2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2009 Q1 2009 Q2 
Radian group Radian group MBIA MBIA MGIC Corp. Lincoln National  Lincoln National  Capital One  
MGIC  MGIC  Radian group MGIC Corp. Radian group Morgan Stanley Citigroup Inc. The Hartford  
MBIA RBS MGIC  Radian group AIG Radian group The Hartford  MGIC 
Prudential Plc Barclays Capital One  Morgan Stanley MBIA MGIC Corp. RBS Radian group 
Old Mutual Plc Capital One  Citigroup Inc. Commerzbank AG Bank of America Prudential Plc Bank of America KBC Bank 
Morgan Stanley Morgan Stanley Morgan Stanley AIG Citigroup Inc. ING Group Lloyds Banking Group Lincoln National  
American Express Prudential Plc American Express Citigroup Inc. Capital One Financial Citigroup Inc. Aegon N.V. MBIA 
Legal & General MBIA Wells Fargo & Co. Capital One Financial JPMorgan Chase & Co. Aegon N.V. MBIA Aegon N.V. 
Goldman Sachs Old Mutual Plc RBS RBS RBS Unum Group MGIC. Bank of America 
Lincoln National  Goldman Sachs Old Mutual Plc American Express Wells Fargo & Co. Credit Suisse Group Barclays Wells Fargo & Co. 
MetLife Standard Chartered Commerzbank AG Prudential Plc Barclays Bank of America MetLife CNA Financial  
Barclays Citigroup Inc. Goldman Sachs Bank of America Prudential Plc AXA ING Group American Express 
Standard Chartered Lloyds Banking  JPMorgan Chase & Co. JPMorgan Chase & Co. Credit Agricole The Hartford  Wells Fargo & Co. MetLife 
Unum Group Aviva Plc Lincoln National  Credit Agricole Morgan Stanley Capital One Financial Radian group ING Group 
Capital One  AIG Barclays Macquarie Group AXA Deutsche Bank Morgan Stanley RBS 
Societe Generale Legal & General Bank of America Wells Fargo & Co. American Express AIG Unum Group AIG 
AXA Societe Generale AIG Barclays UBS AG MBIA Aviva Plc Barclays 
BNP Paribas American Express Credit Suisse Group Standard Chartered Aviva Plc Standard Chartered Capital One Financial Aviva Plc 
Commerzbank AG Commerzbank AG Aviva Plc Goldman Sachs Legal & General Allstate JPMorgan Chase & Co. Lloyds Banking  










Appendix 29 Company Risk Ranking Resulted from CDS spread 
2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2009 Q1 2009 Q2 
Radian group Radian group Radian group MBIA Radian group Radian group Radian group AIG 
MGIC  MBIA MBIA Radian group MBIA MBIA Old Mutual Plc Radian group 
MBIA MGIC  MGIC  MGIC Corp. MGIC  AIG MBIA MBIA 
ICICI Bank Capital One  Capital One  ICICI Bank AIG MGIC  MGIC Corp. MGIC  
Capital One Financial ICICI Bank ICICI Bank Capital One Financial Capital One  ICICI Bank Lincoln National  Old Mutual Plc 
Unum Group Morgan Stanley Shinhan Bank Macquarie Group ICICI Bank Old Mutual Plc AIG Lincoln National  
Morgan Stanley KBC Bank Macquarie Group Morgan Stanley Morgan Stanley Lincoln National  The Hartford  The Hartford  
CNA Financial  The Home Depot American Express Unum Group Macquarie Group The Hartford  Legal & General Legal & General 
Goldman Sachs Unum Group Morgan Stanley AIG American Express MetLife MetLife MetLife 
Marsh & McLennan Co. Shinhan Bank The Home Depot Cathay Financial  Shinhan Bank Morgan Stanley ICICI Bank Citigroup Inc. 
Macquarie Group Goldman Sachs AIG Old Mutual Plc KB Kookmin Bank Shinhan Bank Macquarie Group Prudential Plc 
KBC Bank CNA Financial  Unum Group Shinhan Bank Goldman Sachs Macquarie Group Prudential Plc ICICI Bank 
Old Mutual Plc Citigroup Inc. KB Kookmin Bank The Home Depot MetLife KB Kookmin Bank Shinhan Bank American Express 
The Home Depot American Express Aegon N.V. American Express Lincoln National  American Express KB Kookmin Bank CNA Financial  
Commerzbank AG AIG Old Mutual Plc Aegon N.V. Citigroup Inc. Aegon N.V. American Express Aegon N.V. 
AON Plc Macquarie Group Lincoln National  KB Kookmin Bank Unum Group CNA Financial  Morgan Stanley Unum Group 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. KB Kookmin Bank The Hartford Citigroup Inc. Cathay Financial  Capital One  Citigroup Inc. Macquarie Group 
Vodafone Group Cathay Financial  Cathay Financial  Lincoln National  Aegon N.V. Prudential Plc Berkshire Hathaway Shinhan Bank 
Cathay Financial  Marsh & McLennan  MetLife CNA Financial  The Home Depot BMW QBE Insurance Group  Berkshire Hathaway 










Appendix 30 Company Risk Ranking Resulted from Z-Score 
2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2009 Q1 2009 Q2 
Old Mutual Plc Amgen Inc AON Plc The Travelers Co. Prudential Plc Merck & Co. Pfizer Inc. AssicurazioniGenerali  
The Travelers Co. Pfizer Inc. Capital One  Hannover Re SE Cigna Corporation Cathay Financial  The Home Depot BP Plc 
AssicurazioniGenerali  Capital One  Radian group Old Mutual Plc Aegon N.V. Old Mutual Plc BP Plc Citigroup Inc. 
McDonald Cigna Corporation Deutsche Telekom AG MetLife Cathay Financial  Medtronic Deutsche Telekom AG BMW 
Prudential Plc Aegon N.V. Hannover Re SE Marsh & McLennan C Old Mutual Plc chubb Limited Total S.A. American Financial  
Scor SE Allstate Aetna Inc. Citigroup Inc. chubb Limited Lincoln National  BASF SE Morgan Stanley 
MGIC Corp. Scor SE Merck & Co. AIG Munich Re Group Legal & General AssicurazioniGenerali  Capital One  
Munich Re Group AON Plc Allianz SE Munich Re Group Loews Corporation Allstate Wells Fargo & Co. Deutsche Telekom AG 
Unum Group Munich Re Group Morgan Stanley Unum Group Marsh & McLennan  Allianz SE BMW Lincoln National  
Aviva Plc Unum Group Citigroup Inc. MBIA MGIC  Eli Lilly and Co. Intesa Sanpaolo Allianz SE 
AON Plc Hannover Re SE Societe Generale UBS AG AON Plc ING Group Morgan Stanley Berkshire Hathaway 
Loews Corporation Radian group Credit Agricole AON Plc MetLife RBS Credit Agricole Scor SE 
Marsh & McLennan Co. Marsh & McLennan C Loews Corporation MGIC  The Travelers Co. MetLife The Hartford  KBC Bank 
AXA MGIC  Munich Re Group Credit Agricole Hannover Re SE The Travelers Co. Goldman Sachs ING Group 
ING Group Aviva Plc MBIA Aviva Plc Vodafone Group Marsh & McLennan  Capital One  RBS 
Allianz SE Credit Agricole MetLife Loews Corporation ING Group Credit Agricole Citigroup Inc. UBS AG 
Radian group Loews Corporation Marsh & McLennan C Aetna Inc. BNP Paribas AON Plc Berkshire Hathaway Aetna Inc. 
Credit Agricole ING Group UBS AG Allianz SE UBS AG Aegon N.V. Commerzbank AG Loews Corporation 
MetLife Aetna Inc. Unum Group Lincoln National  Societe Generale Unum Group Hannover Re SE AON Plc 







Appendix 31 Results of One-Sample Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests on the Systemic Risk Measures 
Company ∆CoRisk SI ∆CoVaR SI CDS Granger SI Equity Granger SI CDSIRFMax SI 
American Express 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Bank of America 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Capital One Financial 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Citigroup Inc. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
Goldman Sachs 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
JPMorgan Chase&Co. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Morgan Stanley 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
Wells Fargo & Co. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Banco Santander 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
KBC Bank 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
BNP Paribas 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Credit Agricole 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Societe Generale 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Commerzbank AG 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Deutsche Bank 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Intesa Sanpaolo  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
UniCredit 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
ING Group 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Nordea Bank 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Credit Suisse Group 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
UBS AG 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Barclays 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
HSBC Holdings 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Lloyds Banking  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
RBS 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Standard Chartered 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
ANZ 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Macquarie Group 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
National Australia  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
ICICI Bank 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
KB Kookmin Bank 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Shinhan Bank 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Aetna Inc. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
AIG 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Allstate 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
American Financial  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Berkshire Hathaway 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
Chubb Limited 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
Cigna Corporation 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
CNA Financial  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
The Hartford  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Lincoln National  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Loews Corporation 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
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Marsh & McLennan  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
MBIA 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
MetLife  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
MGIC 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Radian Group  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
The Travelers Co. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Unum Group 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
AXA 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Scor SE 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Allianz SE 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Hannover Re SE 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Munich Re Group 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Assicurazioni Generali 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Aegon N.V. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
AON Plc 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Aviva Plc 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Legal & General 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Old Mutual Plc 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Prudential Plc 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
QBE Insurance  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Cathay Financial  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
3M 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Altria Group  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
Amgen Inc. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
AT&T Inc. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Cisco Systems  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Coca-Cola 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Eli Lilly and Co. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Exxon Mobil  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
The Home Depot 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Honeywell  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Johnson & Johnson 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
McDonald's 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
Merck & Co. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
PepsiCo, Inc. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Pfizer Inc. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
Procter & Gamble 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Walmart 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Walt Disney 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
LVMH 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Sanofi S.A. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Total S.A. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
BASF SE 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Bayer AG 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
BMW 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Deutsche Telekom 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
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Medtronic 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.008*** 0.002*** 
Nestle S.A. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
BP Plc 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
AstraZeneca Plc 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Vodafone Group 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Japan Tobacco  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Toyota Motor  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
(continued) 
Company EquityIRFMax SI CDSIRFPrd SI EquityIRFPrd SI DiDe SI ∆CoRisk SV 
American Express 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Bank of America 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Capital One Financial 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Citigroup Inc. 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Goldman Sachs 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
JPMorgan Chase&Co. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Morgan Stanley 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Wells Fargo & Co. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Banco Santander 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
KBC Bank 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
BNP Paribas 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Credit Agricole 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Societe Generale 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Commerzbank AG 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Deutsche Bank 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Intesa Sanpaolo  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
UniCredit 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
ING Group 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Nordea Bank 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Credit Suisse Group 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
UBS AG 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Barclays 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
HSBC Holdings 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Lloyds Banking  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
RBS 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Standard Chartered 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
ANZ 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Macquarie Group 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
National Australia  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
ICICI Bank 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
KB Kookmin Bank 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Shinhan Bank 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Aetna Inc. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
AIG 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Allstate 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
American Financial  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
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Berkshire Hathaway 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Chubb Limited 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Cigna Corporation 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
CNA Financial  0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
The Hartford  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Lincoln National  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Loews Corporation 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Marsh & McLennan  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
MBIA 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
MetLife  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
MGIC 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Radian Group  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
The Travelers Co. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Unum Group 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
AXA 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Scor SE 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Allianz SE 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Hannover Re SE 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Munich Re Group 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Assicurazioni Generali 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Aegon N.V. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
AON Plc 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Aviva Plc 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Legal & General 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Old Mutual Plc 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Prudential Plc 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
QBE Insurance  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Cathay Financial  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
3M 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Altria Group  0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Amgen Inc. 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
AT&T Inc. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Cisco Systems  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Coca-Cola 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Eli Lilly and Co. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Exxon Mobil  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
The Home Depot 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Honeywell  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Johnson & Johnson 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
McDonald's 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Merck & Co. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
PepsiCo, Inc. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Pfizer Inc. 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Procter & Gamble 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Walmart 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Walt Disney 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
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LVMH 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Sanofi S.A. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Total S.A. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
BASF SE 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Bayer AG 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
BMW 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Deutsche Telekom 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Medtronic 0.008*** 0.002*** 0.008*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Nestle S.A. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
BP Plc 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
AstraZeneca Plc 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Vodafone Group 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Japan Tobacco  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Toyota Motor  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(continued) 
Company ∆CoVaR SV CDS Granger SV Equity Granger SV CDSIRFMax SV EquityIRFMax SV 
American Express 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Bank of America 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Capital One Financial 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Citigroup Inc. 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Goldman Sachs 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
JPMorgan Chase&Co. 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Morgan Stanley 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Wells Fargo & Co. 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Banco Santander 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
KBC Bank 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
BNP Paribas 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Credit Agricole 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Societe Generale 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Commerzbank AG 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Deutsche Bank 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Intesa Sanpaolo  0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
UniCredit 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
ING Group 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Nordea Bank 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Credit Suisse Group 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
UBS AG 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Barclays 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
HSBC Holdings 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Lloyds Banking  0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
RBS 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Standard Chartered 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
ANZ 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 
Macquarie Group 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 
National Australia  0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
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ICICI Bank 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
KB Kookmin Bank 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 
Shinhan Bank 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Aetna Inc. 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
AIG 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Allstate 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
American Financial  0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Berkshire Hathaway 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Chubb Limited 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Cigna Corporation 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
CNA Financial  0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
The Hartford  0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Lincoln National  0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Loews Corporation 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Marsh & McLennan  0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
MBIA 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
MetLife  0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
MGIC 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Radian Group  0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
The Travelers Co. 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Unum Group 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
AXA 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Scor SE 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Allianz SE 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Hannover Re SE 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Munich Re Group 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Assicurazioni Generali 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Aegon N.V. 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
AON Plc 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Aviva Plc 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Legal & General 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Old Mutual Plc 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Prudential Plc 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
QBE Insurance  0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Cathay Financial  0.000*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 
3M 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Altria Group  0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Amgen Inc. 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
AT&T Inc. 0.000*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
Cisco Systems  0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Coca-Cola 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Eli Lilly and Co. 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Exxon Mobil  0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
The Home Depot 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Honeywell  0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Johnson & Johnson 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 143 
McDonald's 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Merck & Co. 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
PepsiCo, Inc. 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Pfizer Inc. 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Procter & Gamble 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Walmart 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Walt Disney 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
LVMH 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Sanofi S.A. 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Total S.A. 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
BASF SE 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Bayer AG 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
BMW 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Deutsche Telekom 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Medtronic 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Nestle S.A. 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
BP Plc 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
AstraZeneca Plc 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Vodafone Group 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Japan Tobacco  0.000*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
Toyota Motor  0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
(continued) 
Company CDSIRFPrd SV EquityIRFPrd SV DiDe SV LRMES SRISK 
American Express 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Bank of America 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Capital One Financial 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.3199 
Citigroup Inc. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Goldman Sachs 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
JPMorgan Chase&Co. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Morgan Stanley 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Wells Fargo & Co. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.10675 
Banco Santander 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
KBC Bank 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
BNP Paribas 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Credit Agricole 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Societe Generale 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Commerzbank AG 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Deutsche Bank 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Intesa Sanpaolo  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
UniCredit 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
ING Group 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Nordea Bank 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Credit Suisse Group 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
UBS AG 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Barclays 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
HSBC Holdings 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
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Lloyds Banking  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
RBS 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Standard Chartered 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
ANZ 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.037** 
Macquarie Group 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.17891 
National Australia  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
ICICI Bank 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
KB Kookmin Bank 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Shinhan Bank 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Aetna Inc. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
AIG 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.75721 
Allstate 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
American Financial  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.747 
Berkshire Hathaway 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Chubb Limited 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Cigna Corporation 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
CNA Financial  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
The Hartford  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Lincoln National  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Loews Corporation 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Marsh & McLennan  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
MBIA 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.747 
MetLife  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
MGIC 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.017** 
Radian Group  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.053* 
The Travelers Co. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Unum Group 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.47622 
AXA 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Scor SE 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
Allianz SE 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Hannover Re SE 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.47622 
Munich Re Group 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.54527 
Assicurazioni Generali 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Aegon N.V. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
AON Plc 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Aviva Plc 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Legal & General 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Old Mutual Plc 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Prudential Plc 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
QBE Insurance  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Cathay Financial  0.002*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.2477 
3M 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Altria Group  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Amgen Inc. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
AT&T Inc. 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Cisco Systems  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
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Coca-Cola 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Eli Lilly and Co. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Exxon Mobil  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
The Home Depot 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Honeywell  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Johnson & Johnson 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
McDonald's 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Merck & Co. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
PepsiCo, Inc. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Pfizer Inc. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Procter & Gamble 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Walmart 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Walt Disney 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
LVMH 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Sanofi S.A. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Total S.A. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
BASF SE 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Bayer AG 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
BMW 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Deutsche Telekom 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Medtronic 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Nestle S.A. 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
BP Plc 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
AstraZeneca Plc 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Vodafone Group 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Japan Tobacco  0.004*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 














Appendix 32 Results of Kruskal Wallis Test on Systemic Risk Meaures 
Banks  Insurers  NFIs  
American Express 0.000*** Aetna Inc. 0.000*** 3M 0.000*** 
Bank of America 0.000*** AIG 0.000*** Altria Group  0.000*** 
Capital One Financial 0.000*** Allstate 0.000*** Amgen Inc. 0.000*** 
Citigroup Inc. 0.000*** American Financial  0.000*** AT&T Inc. 0.000*** 
Goldman Sachs 0.000*** Berkshire Hathaway 0.000*** Cisco Systems  0.000*** 
JPMorgan Chase&Co. 0.000*** Chubb Limited 0.000*** Coca-Cola 0.000*** 
Morgan Stanley 0.000*** Cigna Corporation 0.000*** Eli Lilly and Co. 0.000*** 
Wells Fargo & Co. 0.000*** CNA Financial  0.000*** Exxon Mobil  0.000*** 
Banco Santander 0.000*** The Hartford  0.000*** The Home Depot 0.000*** 
KBC Bank 0.000*** Lincoln National  0.000*** Honeywell  0.000*** 
BNP Paribas 0.000*** Loews Corporation 0.000*** Johnson & Johnson 0.000*** 
Credit Agricole 0.000*** Marsh & McLennan  0.000*** McDonald's 0.000*** 
Societe Generale 0.000*** MBIA 0.000*** Merck & Co. 0.000*** 
Commerzbank AG 0.000*** MetLife  0.000*** PepsiCo, Inc. 0.000*** 
Deutsche Bank 0.000*** MGIC 0.000*** Pfizer Inc. 0.000*** 
Intesa Sanpaolo  0.000*** Radian Group  0.000*** Procter & Gamble 0.000*** 
UniCredit 0.000*** The Travelers Co. 0.000*** Walmart 0.000*** 
ING Group 0.000*** Unum Group 0.000*** Walt Disney 0.000*** 
Nordea Bank 0.000*** AXA 0.000*** LVMH 0.000*** 
Credit Suisse Group 0.000*** Scor SE 0.000*** Sanofi S.A. 0.000*** 
UBS AG 0.000*** Allianz SE 0.000*** Total S.A. 0.000*** 
Barclays 0.000*** Hannover Re SE 0.000*** BASF SE 0.000*** 
HSBC Holdings 0.000*** Munich Re Group 0.000*** Bayer AG 0.000*** 
Lloyds Banking  0.000*** Assicurazioni Generali 0.000*** BMW 0.000*** 
RBS 0.000*** Aegon N.V. 0.000*** Deutsche Telekom 0.000*** 
Standard Chartered 0.000*** AON Plc 0.000*** Medtronic 0.000*** 
ANZ 0.000*** Aviva Plc 0.000*** Nestle S.A. 0.000*** 
Macquarie Group 0.000*** Legal & General 0.000*** BP Plc 0.000*** 
National Australia  0.000*** Old Mutual Plc 0.000*** AstraZeneca Plc 0.000*** 
ICICI Bank 0.000*** Prudential Plc 0.000*** Vodafone Group 0.000*** 
KB Kookmin Bank 0.000*** QBE Insurance  0.000*** Japan Tobacco  0.000*** 















Appendix 33 Results of Kruskal Wallis Test on Both Firm-Level Risk Measures and Systemic Risk Meaures 
Banks  Insurers  NFIs  
American Express 0.000*** Aetna Inc. 0.000*** 3M 0.000*** 
Bank of America 0.000*** AIG 0.000*** Altria Group  0.000*** 
Capital One Financial 0.000*** Allstate 0.000*** Amgen Inc. 0.000*** 
Citigroup Inc. 0.000*** American Financial  0.000*** AT&T Inc. 0.000*** 
Goldman Sachs 0.000*** Berkshire Hathaway 0.000*** Cisco Systems  0.000*** 
JPMorgan Chase&Co. 0.000*** Chubb Limited 0.000*** Coca-Cola 0.000*** 
Morgan Stanley 0.000*** Cigna Corporation 0.000*** Eli Lilly and Co. 0.000*** 
Wells Fargo & Co. 0.000*** CNA Financial  0.000*** Exxon Mobil  0.000*** 
Banco Santander 0.000*** The Hartford  0.000*** The Home Depot 0.000*** 
KBC Bank 0.000*** Lincoln National  0.000*** Honeywell  0.000*** 
BNP Paribas 0.000*** Loews Corporation 0.000*** Johnson & 
Johnson 
0.000*** 
Credit Agricole 0.000*** Marsh & McLennan  0.000*** McDonald's 0.000*** 
Societe Generale 0.000*** MBIA 0.000*** Merck & Co. 0.000*** 
Commerzbank AG 0.000*** MetLife  0.000*** PepsiCo, Inc. 0.000*** 
Deutsche Bank 0.000*** MGIC 0.000*** Pfizer Inc. 0.000*** 
Intesa Sanpaolo  0.000*** Radian Group  0.000*** Procter & 
Gamble 
0.000*** 
UniCredit 0.000*** The Travelers Co. 0.000*** Walmart 0.000*** 
ING Group 0.000*** Unum Group 0.000*** Walt Disney 0.000*** 
Nordea Bank 0.000*** AXA 0.000*** LVMH 0.000*** 
Credit Suisse Group 0.000*** Scor SE 0.000*** Sanofi S.A. 0.000*** 
UBS AG 0.000*** Allianz SE 0.000*** Total S.A. 0.000*** 
Barclays 0.000*** Hannover Re SE 0.000*** BASF SE 0.000*** 
HSBC Holdings 0.000*** Munich Re Group 0.000*** Bayer AG 0.000*** 
Lloyds Banking  0.000*** Assicurazioni 
Generali 
0.000*** BMW 0.000*** 
RBS 0.000*** Aegon N.V. 0.000*** Deutsche 
Telekom 
0.000*** 
Standard Chartered 0.000*** AON Plc 0.000*** Medtronic 0.000*** 
ANZ 0.000*** Aviva Plc 0.000*** Nestle S.A. 0.000*** 
Macquarie Group 0.000*** Legal & General 0.000*** BP Plc 0.000*** 
National Australia  0.000*** Old Mutual Plc 0.000*** AstraZeneca Plc 0.000*** 
ICICI Bank 0.000*** Prudential Plc 0.000*** Vodafone Group 0.000*** 
KB Kookmin Bank 0.000*** QBE Insurance  0.000*** Japan Tobacco  0.000*** 
Shinhan Bank 0.000*** Cathay Financial  0.000*** Toyota Motor  0.000*** 
Banks  Insurers  NFIs  
American Express 0.000*** Aetna Inc. 0.000*** 3M 0.000*** 
Bank of America 0.000*** AIG 0.000*** Altria Group  0.000*** 
Capital One Financial 0.000*** Allstate 0.000*** Amgen Inc. 0.000*** 
Citigroup Inc. 0.000*** American Financial  0.000*** AT&T Inc. 0.000*** 
Goldman Sachs 0.000*** Berkshire Hathaway 0.000*** Cisco Systems  0.000*** 
JPMorgan Chase&Co. 0.000*** Chubb Limited 0.000*** Coca-Cola 0.000*** 
Morgan Stanley 0.000*** Cigna Corporation 0.000*** Eli Lilly and Co. 0.000*** 
Wells Fargo & Co. 0.000*** CNA Financial  0.000*** Exxon Mobil  0.000*** 
Banco Santander 0.000*** The Hartford  0.000*** The Home Depot 0.000*** 
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KBC Bank 0.000*** Lincoln National  0.000*** Honeywell  0.000*** 
BNP Paribas 0.000*** Loews Corporation 0.000*** Johnson & 
Johnson 
0.000*** 
Credit Agricole 0.000*** Marsh & McLennan  0.000*** McDonald's 0.000*** 
Societe Generale 0.000*** MBIA 0.000*** Merck & Co. 0.000*** 
Commerzbank AG 0.000*** MetLife  0.000*** PepsiCo, Inc. 0.000*** 
Deutsche Bank 0.000*** MGIC 0.000*** Pfizer Inc. 0.000*** 
Intesa Sanpaolo  0.000*** Radian Group  0.000*** Procter & 
Gamble 
0.000*** 
UniCredit 0.000*** The Travelers Co. 0.000*** Walmart 0.000*** 
ING Group 0.000*** Unum Group 0.000*** Walt Disney 0.000*** 
Nordea Bank 0.000*** AXA 0.000*** LVMH 0.000*** 
Credit Suisse Group 0.000*** Scor SE 0.000*** Sanofi S.A. 0.000*** 
UBS AG 0.000*** Allianz SE 0.000*** Total S.A. 0.000*** 
Barclays 0.000*** Hannover Re SE 0.000*** BASF SE 0.000*** 
HSBC Holdings 0.000*** Munich Re Group 0.000*** Bayer AG 0.000*** 
Lloyds Banking  0.000*** Assicurazioni 
Generali 
0.000*** BMW 0.000*** 
RBS 0.000*** Aegon N.V. 0.000*** Deutsche 
Telekom 
0.000*** 
Standard Chartered 0.000*** AON Plc 0.000*** Medtronic 0.000*** 
ANZ 0.000*** Aviva Plc 0.000*** Nestle S.A. 0.000*** 
Macquarie Group 0.000*** Legal & General 0.000*** BP Plc 0.000*** 
National Australia  0.000*** Old Mutual Plc 0.000*** AstraZeneca Plc 0.000*** 
ICICI Bank 0.000*** Prudential Plc 0.000*** Vodafone Group 0.000*** 
KB Kookmin Bank 0.000*** QBE Insurance  0.000*** Japan Tobacco  0.000*** 

























Appendix 34 Conover-Iman Test on Sector Connectedness Resulted from ∆CoRisk ∆CoRisk	(Pre-crisis)  ∆CoRisk	(Crisis)  ∆CoRisk	(Post-Crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g  data: x and g  data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis  
chi-squared = 62.6872, df = 8, p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis  
chi-squared = 16.0337, df = 8, p-value = 0.04 
Kruskal-Wallis  
chi-squared = 43.6544, df = 8, p-value = 0 
 Conover-Iman test(Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test(Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test(Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs          t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs          t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs          t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
B-B - B-I :  8.755098 (0.0000)*** B-B - B-I :  2.468210 (0.3501) B-B - B-I :  3.528314 (0.0099)*** 
B-B - B-N :  2.192528 (0.1737) B-B - B-N :  3.516880 (0.1226) B-B - B-N :  4.603165 (0.0003)*** 
B-I - B-N : -6.562569 (0.0000)*** B-I - B-N :  1.048669 (1.0000) B-I - B-N :  1.074850 (1.0000) 
B-B - I-B :  4.760490 (0.0001)*** B-B - I-B :  1.023092 (1.0000) B-B - I-B :  2.132176 (0.3680) 
B-I - I-B : -3.994607 (0.0013)*** B-I - I-B : -1.445118 (1.0000) B-I - I-B : -1.396137 (1.0000) 
B-N - I-B :  2.567961 (0.0756) B-N - I-B : -2.493787 (0.3826) B-N - I-B : -2.470988 (0.1962) 
B-B - I-I :  7.223331 (0.0000)*** B-B - I-I :  1.982241 (0.9734) B-B - I-I :  4.071581 (0.0017)*** 
B-I - I-I : -1.531766 (0.6486) B-I - I-I : -0.485968 (1.0000) B-I - I-I :  0.543266 (1.0000) 
B-N - I-I :  5.030802 (0.0000)*** B-N - I-I : -1.534638 (1.0000) B-N - I-I : -0.531583 (1.0000) 
I-B - I-I :  2.462840 (0.0956)* I-B - I-I :  0.959149 (1.0000) I-B - I-I :  1.939404 (0.5067) 
B-B - I-N :  1.231420 (1.0000) B-B - I-N :  2.813504 (0.3271) B-B - I-N :  4.512621 (0.0003)*** 
B-I - I-N : -7.523678 (0.0000)*** B-I - I-N :  0.345293 (1.0000) B-I - I-N :  0.984306 (1.0000) 
B-N - I-N : -0.961108 (1.0000) B-N - I-N : -0.703376 (1.0000) B-N - I-N : -0.090544 (1.0000) 
I-B - I-N : -3.529070 (0.0052)*** I-B - I-N :  1.790411 (1.0000) I-B - I-N :  2.380444 (0.2114) 
I-I - I-N : -5.991911 (0.0000)*** I-I - I-N :  0.831262 (1.0000) I-I - I-N :  0.441039 (1.0000) 
B-B - N-B :  6.682708 (0.0000)*** B-B - N-B :  2.519365 (0.4300) B-B - N-B :  4.760888 (0.0002)*** 
B-I - N-B : -2.072390 (0.2223) B-I - N-B :  0.051154 (1.0000) B-I - N-B :  1.232573 (1.0000) 
B-N - N-B :  4.490179 (0.0002)*** B-N - N-B : -0.997515 (1.0000) B-N - N-B :  0.157722 (1.0000) 
I-B - N-B :  1.922217 (0.3011) I-B - N-B :  1.496272 (1.0000) I-B - N-B :  2.628711 (0.1394) 
I-I - N-B : -0.540623 (1.0000) I-I - N-B :  0.537123 (1.0000) I-I - N-B :  0.689306 (1.0000) 
I-N - N-B :  5.451287 (0.0000)*** I-N - N-B : -0.294139 (1.0000) I-N - N-B :  0.248267 (1.0000) 
B-B - N-I :  10.04658 (0.0000)*** B-B - N-I :  2.903024 (0.3824) B-B - N-I :  5.949649 (0.0000)*** 
B-I - N-I :  1.291489 (0.9402) B-I - N-I :  0.434814 (1.0000) B-I - N-I :  2.421335 (0.2055) 
B-N - N-I :  7.854059 (0.0000)*** B-N - N-I : -0.613855 (1.0000) B-N - N-I :  1.346484 (1.0000) 
I-B - N-I :  5.286097 (0.0000)*** I-B - N-I :  1.879932 (1.0000) I-B - N-I :  3.817472 (0.0039)*** 
I-I - N-I :  2.823256 (0.0391)** I-I - N-I :  0.920783 (1.0000) I-I - N-I :  1.878068 (0.5473) 
I-N - N-I :  8.815167 (0.0000)*** I-N - N-I :  0.089520 (1.0000) I-N - N-I :  1.437028 (1.0000) 
N-B - N-I :  3.363880 (0.0084)*** N-B - N-I :  0.383659 (1.0000) N-B - N-I :  1.188761 (1.0000) 
B-B - N-N :  3.574122 (0.0047)*** B-B - N-N :  2.570519 (0.4708) B-B - N-N :  5.508610 (0.0000)*** 
B-I - N-N : -5.180975 (0.0000)*** B-I - N-N :  0.102309 (1.0000) B-I - N-N :  1.980295 (0.4921) 
B-N - N-N :  1.381593 (0.8285) B-N - N-N : -0.946360 (1.0000) B-N - N-N :  0.905444 (1.0000) 
I-B - N-N : -1.186368 (1.0000) I-B - N-N :  1.547427 (1.0000) I-B - N-N :  3.376433 (0.0149)** 
I-I - N-N : -3.649209 (0.0039)*** I-I - N-N :  0.588278 (1.0000) I-I - N-N :  1.437028 (1.0000) 
I-N - N-N :  2.342702 (0.1248) I-N - N-N : -0.242984 (1.0000) I-N - N-N :  0.995989 (1.0000) 
N-B - N-N : -3.108585 (0.0177)** N-B - N-N :  0.051154 (1.0000) N-B - N-N :  0.747722 (1.0000) 
N-I - N-N : -6.472465 (0.0000)*** N-I - N-N : -0.332505 (1.0000) N-I - N-N : -0.441039 (1.0000) 
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Appendix 35  Conover-Iman Test on Sector Connectedness Resulted from ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR	(Pre-crisis)  ∆CoVaR	(Crisis)  ∆CoVaR	(Post-Crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g  data: x and g  data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis  
chi-squared = 14.6526, df = 8, p-value = 0.07 
Kruskal-Wallis  
chi-squared = 28.1473, df = 8, p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis  
chi-squared = 55.249, df = 8, p-value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs          t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs         t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs          t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
B-B - B-I :  1.277554 (1.0000) B-B - B-I :  0.420031 (1.0000) B-B - B-I :  0.802005 (1.0000) 
B-B - B-N :  2.197750 (0.7720) B-B - B-N :  1.549771 (0.9982) B-B - B-N :  2.547278 (0.0973)* 
B-I - B-N :  0.920196 (1.0000) B-I - B-N :  1.129740 (1.0000) B-I - B-N :  1.745272 (0.5170) 
B-B - I-B :  0.509234 (1.0000) B-B - I-B :  0.550386 (1.0000) B-B - I-B :  1.786284 (0.5168) 
B-I - I-B : -0.768319 (1.0000) B-I - I-B :  0.130354 (1.0000) B-I - I-B :  0.984279 (1.0000) 
B-N - I-B : -1.688515 (1.0000) B-N - I-B : -0.999385 (1.0000) B-N - I-B : -0.760993 (1.0000) 
B-B - I-I : -0.330555 (1.0000) B-B - I-I :  0.289676 (1.0000) B-B - I-I :  1.086048 (1.0000) 
B-I - I-I : -1.608110 (1.0000) B-I - I-I : -0.130354 (1.0000) B-I - I-I :  0.284043 (1.0000) 
B-N - I-I : -2.528306 (0.6715) B-N - I-I : -1.260094 (1.0000) B-N - I-I : -1.461229 (0.8753) 
I-B - I-I : -0.839790 (1.0000) I-B - I-I : -0.260709 (1.0000) I-B - I-I : -0.700235 (1.0000) 
B-B - I-N :  1.366893 (1.0000) B-B - I-N :  1.332513 (1.0000) B-B - I-N :  2.835878 (0.0508)* 
B-I - I-N :  0.089339 (1.0000) B-I - I-N :  0.912482 (1.0000) B-I - I-N :  2.033873 (0.3103) 
B-N - I-N : -0.830856 (1.0000) B-N - I-N : -0.217257 (1.0000) B-N - I-N :  0.288600 (1.0000) 
I-B - I-N :  0.857658 (1.0000) I-B - I-N :  0.782127 (1.0000) I-B - I-N :  1.049594 (1.0000) 
I-I - I-N :  1.697449 (1.0000) I-I - I-N :  1.042836 (1.0000) I-I - I-N :  1.749829 (0.5343) 
B-B - N-B :  2.287090 (0.9318) B-B - N-B :  4.040993 (0.0221)** B-B - N-B :  5.919345 (0.0000)*** 
B-I - N-B :  1.009535 (1.0000) B-I - N-B :  3.620961 (0.0294)** B-I - N-B :  5.117340 (0.0000)*** 
B-N - N-B :  0.089339 (1.0000) B-N - N-B :  2.491221 (0.1651) B-N - N-B :  3.372067 (0.0113)** 
I-B - N-B :  1.777855 (1.0000) I-B - N-B :  3.490607 (0.0222)** I-B - N-B :  4.133061 (0.0010)*** 
I-I - N-B :  2.617645 (1.0000) I-I - N-B :  3.751316 (0.0289)** I-I - N-B :  4.833297 (0.0001)*** 
I-N - N-B :  0.920196 (1.0000) I-N - N-B :  2.708479 (0.1005) I-N - N-B :  3.083467 (0.0253)*** 
B-B - N-I :  2.269222 (0.7789) B-B - N-I :  3.591994 (0.0193)** B-B - N-I :  5.206958 (0.0000)*** 
B-I - N-I :  0.991667 (1.0000) B-I - N-I :  3.171962 (0.0352)** B-I - N-I :  4.404953 (0.0004)*** 
B-N - N-I :  0.071471 (1.0000) B-N - N-I :  2.042222 (0.3784) B-N - N-I :  2.659680 (0.0798)* 
I-B - N-I :  1.759987 (1.0000) I-B - N-I :  3.041607 (0.0429)** I-B - N-I :  3.420674 (0.0105)** 
I-I - N-I :  2.599778 (0.8328) I-I - N-I :  3.302317 (0.0297)** I-I - N-I :  4.120909 (0.0009)*** 
I-N - N-I :  0.902328 (1.0000) I-N - N-I :  2.259480 (0.2566) I-N - N-I :  2.371080 (0.1482) 
N-B - N-I : -0.017867 (1.0000) N-B - N-I : -0.448999 (1.0000) N-B - N-I : -0.712387 (1.0000) 
B-B - N-N :  1.840392 (1.0000) B-B - N-N :  3.606477 (0.0231)** B-B - N-N :  5.134049 (0.0000)*** 
B-I - N-N :  0.562838 (1.0000) B-I - N-N :  3.186446 (0.0374)** B-I - N-N :  4.332043 (0.0005)*** 
B-N - N-N : -0.357357 (1.0000) B-N - N-N :  2.056706 (0.3877) B-N - N-N :  2.586770 (0.0923)* 
I-B - N-N :  1.331157 (1.0000) I-B - N-N :  3.056091 (0.0449)** I-B - N-N :  3.347764 (0.0114)** 
I-I - N-N :  2.170948 (0.7055) I-I - N-N :  3.316800 (0.0325)** I-I - N-N :  4.048000 (0.0011)*** 
I-N - N-N :  0.473499 (1.0000) I-N - N-N :  2.273963 (0.2643) I-N - N-N :  2.298170 (0.1702) 
N-B - N-N : -0.446697 (1.0000) N-B - N-N : -0.434515 (1.0000) N-B - N-N : -0.785296 (1.0000) 
N-I - N-N : -0.428829 (1.0000) N-I - N-N :  0.014483 (1.0000) N-I - N-N : -0.072909 (1.0000) 
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Appendix 36 Conover-Iman Test on Sector Connectedness Resulted from CDS-Based and Equity-Based Granger-
Causality Tests 
CDS-based Granger-causality tests Equity-based Granger-causality tests 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g   data: x and g   
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 16.6799, df = 8, p-value = 
0.03 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 40.5066, df = 8, p-value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
B-B - B-I :  0.742823 (1.0000) B-B - B-I :  3.407316 (0.0128)** 
B-B - B-N :  0.914940 (1.0000) B-B - B-N :  4.878657 (0.0003)*** 
B-I - B-N :  0.172117 (1.0000) B-I - B-N :  1.471341 (0.9479) 
B-B - I-B :  1.440352 (1.0000) B-B - I-B : -0.475696 (1.0000) 
B-I - I-B :  0.697529 (1.0000) B-I - I-B : -3.883013 (0.0031)*** 
B-N - I-B :  0.525411 (1.0000) B-N - I-B : -5.354354 (0.0001)*** 
B-B - I-I :  0.724705 (1.0000) B-B - I-I :  2.223605 (0.2418) 
B-I - I-I : -0.018117 (1.0000) B-I - I-I : -1.183710 (1.0000) 
B-N - I-I : -0.190235 (1.0000) B-N - I-I : -2.655051 (0.0844)* 
I-B - I-I : -0.715646 (1.0000) I-B - I-I :  2.699302 (0.0794)* 
B-B - I-N :  0.865117 (1.0000) B-B - I-N :  4.441680 (0.0007)*** 
B-I - I-N :  0.122294 (1.0000) B-I - I-N :  1.034363 (1.0000) 
B-N - I-N : -0.049823 (1.0000) B-N - I-N : -0.436977 (1.0000) 
I-B - I-N : -0.575235 (1.0000) I-B - I-N :  4.917376 (0.0003)*** 
I-I - I-N :  0.140411 (1.0000) I-I - I-N :  2.218074 (0.2321) 
B-B - N-B :  3.007528 (0.2636) B-B - N-B :  0.370600 (1.0000) 
B-I - N-B :  2.264704 (0.6563) B-I - N-B : -3.036715 (0.0345)** 
B-N - N-B :  2.092587 (0.5399) B-N - N-B : -4.508056 (0.0007)*** 
I-B - N-B :  1.567175 (1.0000) I-B - N-B :  0.846297 (1.0000) 
I-I - N-B :  2.282822 (0.7533) I-I - N-B : -1.853004 (0.4832) 
I-N - N-B :  2.142410 (0.5872) I-N - N-B : -4.071079 (0.0020)*** 
B-B - N-I :  3.089057 (0.4134) B-B - N-I :  3.318814 (0.0157)** 
B-I - N-I :  2.346234 (0.8043) B-I - N-I : -0.088501 (1.0000) 
B-N - N-I :  2.174116 (0.6127) B-N - N-I : -1.559842 (0.8381) 
I-B - N-I :  1.648705 (1.0000) I-B - N-I :  3.794511 (0.0039)*** 
I-I - N-I :  2.364351 (1.0000) I-I - N-I :  1.095208 (1.0000) 
I-N - N-I :  2.223940 (0.6212) I-N - N-I : -1.122865 (1.0000) 
N-B - N-I :  0.081529 (1.0000) N-B - N-I :  2.948213 (0.0418)** 
B-B - N-N :  2.137881 (0.5341) B-B - N-N :  4.286802 (0.0011)*** 
B-I - N-N :  1.395058 (1.0000) B-I - N-N :  0.879485 (1.0000) 
B-N - N-N :  1.222940 (1.0000) B-N - N-N : -0.591855 (1.0000) 
I-B - N-N :  0.697529 (1.0000) I-B - N-N :  4.762498 (0.0003)*** 
I-I - N-N :  1.413175 (1.0000) I-I - N-N :  2.063196 (0.3178) 
I-N - N-N :  1.272764 (1.0000) I-N - N-N : -0.154878 (1.0000) 
N-B - N-N : -0.869646 (1.0000) N-B - N-N :  3.916201 (0.0031)*** 




Appendix 37Conover-Iman Test on Sector Connectedness Resulted from IRF 
CDS-based IRF maximum values Equity-based IRF maximum values CDS-based IRF lasting periods Equity-based IRF lasting periods 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g data: x and g data: x and g data: x and g  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 20.6488, 
df = 8, p-value = 0.01 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 12.8355, 
df = 8, p-value = 0.12 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 3.4632, df 
= 8, p-value = 0.9 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 4.6359, 
df = 8, p-value = 0.8 
Conover-Iman test  
(Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Conover-Iman test  
(Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Conover-Iman test  
(Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
 Conover-Iman test  
(Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs:       t statistic (adjusted p-value) pairs:       t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:    t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:  t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
B-B - B-I :  0.875852 (1.0000) B-B - B-I :  0.026480 (1.0000) B-B - B-I :  0.049974 (1.0000) B-B - B-I : -0.226444 (1.0000) 
B-B - B-N :  2.869814 (0.1574) B-B - B-N :  1.959533 (1.0000) B-B - B-N :  0.691317 (1.0000) B-B - B-N :  0.176123 (1.0000) 
B-I - B-N :  1.993961 (0.6766) B-I - B-N :  1.933053 (1.0000) B-I - B-N :  0.641342 (1.0000) B-I - B-N :  0.402567 (1.0000) 
B-B - I-B :  1.583988 (0.9776) B-B - I-B :  1.041553 (1.0000) B-B - I-B : -0.199899 (1.0000) B-B - I-B :  0.637398 (1.0000) 
B-I - I-B :  0.708136 (1.0000) B-I - I-B :  1.015073 (1.0000) B-I - I-B : -0.249873 (1.0000) B-I - I-B :  0.863842 (1.0000) 
B-N - I-B : -1.285825 (1.0000) B-N - I-B : -0.917979 (1.0000) B-N - I-B : -0.891216 (1.0000) B-N - I-B :  0.461275 (1.0000) 
B-B - I-I :  1.295143 (1.0000) B-B - I-I :  0.070613 (1.0000) B-B - I-I : -0.616355 (1.0000) B-B - I-I :  0.310312 (1.0000) 
B-I - I-I :  0.419291 (1.0000) B-I - I-I :  0.044133 (1.0000) B-I - I-I : -0.666330 (1.0000) B-I - I-I :  0.536756 (1.0000) 
B-N - I-I : -1.574670 (0.9431) B-N - I-I : -1.888919 (1.0000) B-N - I-I : -1.307673 (1.0000) B-N - I-I :  0.134189 (1.0000) 
I-B - I-I : -0.288844 (1.0000) I-B - I-I : -0.970940 (1.0000) I-B - I-I : -0.416456 (1.0000) I-B - I-I : -0.327085 (1.0000) 
B-B - I-N :  3.410233 (0.1525) B-B - I-N :  1.712385 (1.0000) B-B - I-N :  0.058303 (1.0000) B-B - I-N :  0.285151 (1.0000) 
B-I - I-N :  2.534381 (0.3304) B-I - I-N :  1.685905 (1.0000) B-I - I-N :  0.008329 (1.0000) B-I - I-N :  0.511596 (1.0000) 
B-N - I-N :  0.540419 (1.0000) B-N - I-N : -0.247148 (1.0000) B-N - I-N : -0.633013 (1.0000) B-N - I-N :  0.109028 (1.0000) 
I-B - I-N :  1.826245 (0.7675) I-B - I-N :  0.670831 (1.0000) I-B - I-N :  0.258202 (1.0000) I-B - I-N : -0.352246 (1.0000) 
I-I - I-N :  2.115090 (0.6261) I-I - I-N :  1.641771 (1.0000) I-I - I-N :  0.674659 (1.0000) I-I - I-N : -0.025160 (1.0000) 
B-B - N-B :  2.925719 (0.1675) B-B - N-B :  2.374389 (1.0000) B-B - N-B :  0.757950 (1.0000) B-B - N-B :  1.585109 (1.0000) 
B-I - N-B :  2.049867 (0.6554) B-I - N-B :  2.347909 (1.0000) B-I - N-B :  0.707975 (1.0000) B-I - N-B :  1.811553 (1.0000) 
B-N - N-B :  0.055905 (1.0000) B-N - N-B :  0.414856 (1.0000) B-N - N-B :  0.066633 (1.0000) B-N - N-B :  1.408985 (1.0000) 
I-B - N-B :  1.341731 (1.0000) I-B - N-B :  1.332835 (1.0000) I-B - N-B :  0.957849 (1.0000) I-B - N-B :  0.947710 (1.0000) 
I-I - N-B :  1.630576 (1.0000) I-I - N-B :  2.303776 (1.0000) I-I - N-B :  1.374306 (1.0000) I-I - N-B :  1.274796 (1.0000) 
I-N - N-B : -0.484514 (1.0000) I-N - N-B :  0.662004 (1.0000) I-N - N-B :  0.699646 (1.0000) I-N - N-B :  1.299957 (1.0000) 
B-B - N-I :  3.167976 (0.1085) B-B - N-I :  1.606464 (1.0000) B-B - N-I : -0.266532 (1.0000) B-B - N-I :  0.738040 (1.0000) 
B-I - N-I :  2.292124 (0.4601) B-I - N-I :  1.579984 (1.0000) B-I - N-I : -0.316506 (1.0000) B-I - N-I :  0.964484 (1.0000) 
B-N - N-I :  0.298162 (1.0000) B-N - N-I : -0.353069 (1.0000) B-N - N-I : -0.957849 (1.0000) B-N - N-I :  0.561916 (1.0000) 
I-B - N-I :  1.583988 (1.0000) I-B - N-I :  0.564910 (1.0000) I-B - N-I : -0.066633 (1.0000) I-B - N-I :  0.100641 (1.0000) 
I-I - N-I :  1.872833 (0.7479) I-I - N-I :  1.535850 (1.0000) I-I - N-I :  0.349823 (1.0000) I-I - N-I :  0.427727 (1.0000) 
I-N - N-I : -0.242257 (1.0000) I-N - N-I : -0.105920 (1.0000) I-N - N-I : -0.324836 (1.0000) I-N - N-I :  0.452888 (1.0000) 
N-B - N-I :  0.242257 (1.0000) N-B - N-I : -0.767925 (1.0000) N-B - N-I : -1.024482 (1.0000) N-B - N-I : -0.847068 (1.0000) 
B-B - N-N :  3.242517 (0.1293) B-B - N-N :  1.774172 (1.0000) B-B - N-N :  0.424785 (1.0000) B-B - N-N :  0.645785 (1.0000) 
B-I - N-N :  2.366665 (0.4366) B-I - N-N :  1.747692 (1.0000) B-I - N-N :  0.374810 (1.0000) B-I - N-N :  0.872229 (1.0000) 
B-N - N-N :  0.372703 (1.0000) B-N - N-N : -0.185361 (1.0000) B-N - N-N : -0.266532 (1.0000) B-N - N-N :  0.469661 (1.0000) 
I-B - N-N :  1.658529 (1.0000) I-B - N-N :  0.732618 (1.0000) I-B - N-N :  0.624684 (1.0000) I-B - N-N :  0.008386 (1.0000) 
I-I - N-N :  1.947374 (0.6882) I-I - N-N :  1.703558 (1.0000) I-I - N-N :  1.041141 (1.0000) I-I - N-N :  0.335472 (1.0000) 
I-N - N-N : -0.167716 (1.0000) I-N - N-N :  0.061787 (1.0000) I-N - N-N :  0.366481 (1.0000) I-N - N-N :  0.360633 (1.0000) 
N-B - N-N :  0.316797 (1.0000) N-B - N-N : -0.600217 (1.0000) N-B - N-N : -0.333165 (1.0000) N-B - N-N : -0.939323 (1.0000) 





Appendix 38 Conover-Iman Test on Sector Connectedness Resulted from DiDe 
DiDe (Pre-crisis)  DiDe (Crisis)   DiDe (Post-Crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g  data: x and g  data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis  
chi-squared = 79.0125, df = 8, p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis  
chi-squared = 45.71, df = 8, p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis  
chi-squared = 146.0215, df = 8, p-value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs           t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs          t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs            t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
B-B - B-I :  8.970110 (0.0000)*** B-B - B-I :  1.357474 (0.9633) B-B - B-I :  3.348451 (0.0059)*** 
B-B - B-N :  10.84700 (0.0000)*** B-B - B-N :  1.960796 (0.3550) B-B - B-N :  4.549030 (0.0001)*** 
B-I - B-N :  1.876898 (0.3012) B-I - B-N :  0.603322 (1.0000) B-I - B-N :  1.200579 (1.0000) 
B-B - I-B : -1.096888 (1.0000) B-B - I-B : -0.471345 (1.0000) B-B - I-B :  1.162586 (1.0000) 
B-I - I-B : -10.06699 (0.0000)*** B-I - I-B : -1.828819 (0.4519) B-I - I-B : -2.185864 (0.1613) 
B-N - I-B : -11.94389 (0.0000)*** B-N - I-B : -2.432141 (0.1413) B-N - I-B : -3.386444 (0.0054)*** 
B-B - I-I : -0.024375 (1.0000) B-B - I-I : -0.773006 (1.0000) B-B - I-I : -0.316608 (1.0000) 
B-I - I-I : -8.994485 (0.0000)*** B-I - I-I : -2.130480 (0.2530) B-I - I-I : -3.665059 (0.0022)*** 
B-N - I-I : -10.87138 (0.0000)* B-N - I-I : -2.733802 (0.0678)* B-N - I-I : -4.865638 (0.0000)*** 
I-B - I-I :  1.072513 (1.0000) I-B - I-I : -0.301661 (1.0000) I-B - I-I : -1.479194 (0.7294) 
B-B - I-N :  2.486280 (0.0750)* B-B - I-N : -0.226245 (1.0000) B-B - I-N :  0.886503 (1.0000) 
B-I - I-N : -6.483829 (0.0000)*** B-I - I-N : -1.583720 (0.6836) B-I - I-N : -2.461947 (0.0819)* 
B-N - I-N : -8.360728 (0.0000)*** B-N - I-N : -2.187042 (0.2323) B-N - I-N : -3.662526 (0.0021)*** 
I-B - I-N :  3.583169 (0.0033)*** I-B - I-N :  0.245099 (1.0000) I-B - I-N : -0.276082 (1.0000) 
I-I - I-N :  2.510655 (0.0728)* I-I - I-N :  0.546760 (1.0000) I-I - I-N :  1.203112 (1.0000) 
B-B - N-B :  12.96765 (0.0000)*** B-B - N-B :  5.901243 (0.0000)*** B-B - N-B :  14.38162 (0.0000)*** 
B-I - N-B :  3.997549 (0.0008)*** B-I - N-B :  4.543769 (0.0003)*** B-I - N-B :  11.03317 (0.0000)*** 
B-N - N-B :  2.120651 (0.1794) B-N - N-B :  3.940447 (0.0021)*** B-N - N-B :  9.832592 (0.0000)*** 
I-B - N-B :  14.06454 (0.0000)*** I-B - N-B :  6.372588 (0.0000)*** I-B - N-B :  13.21903 (0.0000)*** 
I-I - N-B :  12.99203 (0.0000)*** I-I - N-B :  6.674249 (0.0000)*** I-I - N-B :  14.69823 (0.0000)*** 
I-N - N-B :  10.48137 (0.0000)*** I-N - N-B :  6.127489 (0.0000)*** I-N - N-B :  13.49511 (0.0000)*** 
B-B - N-I :  16.18519 (0.0000)*** B-B - N-I :  5.712705 (0.0000)*** B-B - N-I :  13.24183 (0.0000)*** 
B-I - N-I :  7.215088 (0.0000)*** B-I - N-I :  4.355230 (0.0006)*** B-I - N-I :  9.893381 (0.0000)*** 
B-N - N-I :  5.338190 (0.0000)*** B-N - N-I :  3.751908 (0.0036)*** B-N - N-I :  8.692801 (0.0000)*** 
I-B - N-I :  17.28208 (0.0000)*** I-B - N-I :  6.184050 (0.0000)*** I-B - N-I :  12.07924 (0.0000)*** 
I-I - N-I :  16.20957 (0.0000)*** I-I - N-I :  6.485711 (0.0000)*** I-I - N-I :  13.55844 (0.0000)*** 
I-N - N-I :  13.69891 (0.0000)*** I-N - N-I :  5.938951 (0.0000)*** I-N - N-I :  12.35532 (0.0000)*** 
N-B - N-I :  3.217539 (0.0100)** N-B - N-I : -0.188538 (1.0000) N-B - N-I : -1.139790 (1.0000) 
B-B - N-N :  7.580718 (0.0000)*** B-B - N-N :  4.185546 (0.0010)*** B-B - N-N :  10.25304 (0.0000)*** 
B-I - N-N : -1.389392 (0.7675) B-I - N-N :  2.828072 (0.0554)* B-I - N-N :  6.904597 (0.0000)*** 
B-N - N-N : -3.266290 (0.0089)*** B-N - N-N :  2.224749 (0.2231) B-N - N-N :  5.704017 (0.0000)*** 
I-B - N-N :  8.677606 (0.0000)*** I-B - N-N :  4.656891 (0.0003)*** I-B - N-N :  9.090461 (0.0000)*** 
I-I - N-N :  7.605093 (0.0000)*** I-I - N-N :  4.958552 (0.0001)*** I-I - N-N :  10.56965 (0.0000)*** 
I-N - N-N :  5.094437 (0.0000)*** I-N - N-N :  4.411792 (0.0005)*** I-N - N-N :  9.366544 (0.0000)*** 
N-B - N-N : -5.386941 (0.0000)*** N-B - N-N : -1.715697 (0.5478) N-B - N-N : -4.128574 (0.0004)*** 
N-I - N-N : -8.604481 (0.0000)*** N-I - N-N : -1.527158 (0.7332) N-I - N-N : -2.988783 (0.0183)** 
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Appendix 39 Conover-Iman Test for Sector risk Ranking Resulted from ∆CoRisk Systemic Importance ∆CoRisk Systemic Importance (Pre-crisis) ∆CoRisk Systemic Importance (Crisis) ∆CoRisk	Systemic Importance (Post-crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g  data: x and g  data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 16.1832, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 4.265, df = 2, 
p-value = 0.12 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 8.4882, df = 2, 
p-value = 0.01 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs:              t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:               t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pair:                   t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks : -4.460792 (0.0004)*** Insurers - Banks : -1.310104 (0.5619) 
 
 Insurers - Banks : -2.487579 (0.0427)** 
Insurers - NFIs  : -5.493042 (0.0000)*** Insurers - NFIs  :  0.860925 (0.7315) Insurers - NFIs  :  0.323385 (1.0000) 
Banks - NFIs      : -1.032249 (0.5704) Banks - NFIs      :  2.171029 (0.2285) Banks - NFIs      :  2.810964 (0.0362)** 
 
Appendix 40 Conover-Iman Test for Sector risk Ranking Resulted from ∆CoVaR Systemic Importance ∆CoVaR Systemic Importance (Pre-crisis) ∆CoVaR	Systemic Importance (Crisis) ∆CoVaR Systemic Importance (Post-crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g  data: x and g  data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 1.1329, df = 2, p-
value = 0.57 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 0.96, df = 2, p-
value = 0.62 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 2.2872, df = 2, p-
value = 0.32 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs:               t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:              t statistic (adjusted p-value) pairs:                 t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks : -0.325022 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks :  0.000000 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks :  0.086584 (1.0000) 
Insurers - NFIs  :  0.700048 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  :  0.828266 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  :  1.353865 (0.9934) 
Banks - NFIs      :  1.025071 (1.0000) Banks - NFIs      :  0.828266 (1.0000) Banks - NFIs      :  1.267280 (0.5767) 
 
Appendix 41 Conover-Iman Test for Sector risk Ranking Resulted from ∆CoRisk Systemic Vulnerability ∆CoRisk Systemic Vulnerability (Pre-crisis) ∆CoRisk Systemic Vulnerability (Crisis) ∆CoRisk Systemic Vulnerability (Post-crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g  data: x and g  data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 13.3858, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 1.085, df = 2, p-
value = 0.58 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 9.3588, df = 2, p-
value = 0.01 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs:             t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:              t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:              t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks : -1.503033 (0.2648) Insurers - Banks :  0.034609 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks : -1.370474 (0.3216) 
Insurers - NFIs  :  3.206472 (0.0095)*** Insurers - NFIs  :  0.899844 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  :  1.871867 (0.1811) 
Banks - NFIs      :  4.709506 (0.0004)*** Banks - NFIs      :  0.865234 (1.0000) Banks - NFIs      :  3.242341 (0.0104)*** 
 
Appendix 42 Conover-Iman Test for Sector risk Ranking Resulted from ∆CoVaR Systemic Vulnerability ∆CoVaR Systemic Vulnerability (Pre-crisis) ∆CoVaR Systemic Vulnerability (Crisis) ∆CoVaR Systemic Vulnerability (Post-crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g  data: x and g  data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 2.449, df = 2, 
p-value = 0.29 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 8.645, df = 2, 
p-value = 0.01 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 17.3717, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                               Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs:              t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:              t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:                  t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks :  0.973328 (0.9323) Insurers - Banks : -0.085524 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks : -0.763227 (0.8217) 
Insurers - NFIs  :  1.562448 (0.7141) Insurers - NFIs  :  3.036137 (0.0173)** Insurers - NFIs  :  3.716781 (0.0012)*** 
Banks - NFIs      :  0.589119 (1.0000) Banks - NFIs      :  3.121662 (0.0284)** Banks - NFIs      :  4.480009 (0.0002)*** 
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Appendix 43 Conover-Iman Test for Sector risk Ranking Resulted from CDS-Based Granger-Causality Test Systemic 
Importance 
CDS-based Granger-causality test systemic 
importance(pre-crisis) 
CDS-based Granger-causality test systemic 
importance(crisis) 
CDS-based Granger-causality test systemic 
importance(post-crisis) 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g 
  
data: x and g 
  
data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 2.5714, df = 2, p-
value = 0.28 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 0.0889, df = 2, p-
value = 0.96 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 1.14, df = 2, p-
value = 0.57 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test  (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks :  0.891132 (0.8039) Insurers - Banks : -0.259645 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks : -0.409832 (1.0000) 
Insurers - NFIs  :  1.782265 (0.9500) aInsurers - NFIs  : -0.129822 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  : -1.024581 (1.0000) 
Banks - NFIs      :  0.891132 (1.0000) Banks - NFIs      :  0.129822 (1.0000) Banks - NFIs      : -0.614748 (1.0000) 
 
Appendix 44 Conover-Iman Test for Sector risk Ranking Resulted from Equity-Based Granger-Causality Test 
Systemic Importance 
Equity-based Granger-causality test systemic 
importance(pre-crisis) 
Equity-based Granger-causality test systemic 
importance(crisis) 
Equity-based Granger-causality test 
systemic importance(post-crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g 
  
data: x and g 
  
data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 4.5714, df = 2, p-
value = 0.1 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 3.8222, df = 2, p-
value = 0.15 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 8.7957, df = 2, 
p-value = 0.01 
 Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks : -2.828427 (0.1215) Insurers - Banks : -1.429179 (0.5579) Insurers - Banks : -3.009129 (0.0299)** 
Insurers - NFIs  :  2.828427 (0.1823) aInsurers - NFIs  :  0.893237 (0.7446) Insurers - NFIs  :  1.397095 (0.3441) 
Banks - NFIs      :  5.656854 (0.0602)* Banks - NFIs      :  2.322416 (0.3259) Banks - NFIs      :  4.406225 (0.0047)*** 
 
Appendix 45 Conover-Iman Test for Sector risk Ranking Resulted from CDS-Based Granger-Causality Test Systemic 
Vulnerability 
CDS-based Granger-causality test systemic 
vulnerability(pre-crisis) 
CDS-based Granger-causality test systemic 
vulnerability(crisis) 
CDS-based Granger-causality test systemic 
vulnerability(post-crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g 
  
data: x and g 
  
data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 2.5714, df = 2, p-
value = 0.28 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 2.4889, df = 2, p-
value = 0.29 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 5.82, df = 2, p-
value = 0.05 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks :  0.891132 (0.8039) Insurers - Banks : -0.311085 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks : -0.770799 (0.8355) 
Insurers - NFIs  :  1.782265 (0.9500) Insurers - NFIs  :  1.244342 (0.7144) Insurers - NFIs  :  2.055465 (0.1712) 














Appendix 46 Conover-Iman Test for Sector risk Ranking Resulted from Equity-Based Granger-Causality Test 
Systemic Vulnerability 
Equity-based Granger-causality test systemic 
vulnerability(pre-crisis) 
Equity-based Granger-causality test systemic 
vulnerability(crisis) 
Equity-based Granger-causality test 
systemic vulnerability(post-crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g 
  
data: x and g 
  
data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 0.2857, df = 2, p-
value = 0.87 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 0.2667, df = 2, p-
value = 0.88 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 2.54, df = 2, p-
value = 0.28 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test  (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks :  0.213200 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks :  0.393919 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks :  1.374791 (0.5344) 
Insurers - NFIs  : -0.213200 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  :  0.393919 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  :  1.447149 (0.9541) 
Banks - NFIs      : -0.426401 (1.0000) Banks - NFIs      :  0.000000 (1.0000) Banks - NFIs      :  0.072357 (1.0000) 
 
Appendix 47 Conover-Iman Test for Sector risk Ranking Resulted from CDS-Based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Importance 
CDS-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
importance (pre-crisis) 
CDS-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
importance (crisis) 
CDS-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
importance (post-crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g data: x and g data: x and g  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 2.5714, df = 2, p-
value = 0.28 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 0.6222, df = 2, p-
value = 0.73 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 9.74, df = 2, p-
value = 0.01 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks : -0.891132 (0.8039) Insurers - Banks : -0.134433 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks : -2.254885 (0.0800)* 
Insurers - NFIs  :  0.891132 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  :  0.537732 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  :  2.966954 (0.0324)** 
Banks - NFIs      :  1.782265 (0.9500) Banks - NFIs      :  0.672166 (1.0000) Banks - NFIs      :  5.221839 (0.0012)*** 
 
Appendix 48 Conover-Iman Test for Sector risk Ranking Resulted from Equity-Based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Importance 
Equity-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
importance (pre-crisis) 
Equity-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
importance (crisis) 
Equity-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
importance (post-crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g data: x and g data: x and g  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 2, df = 2, p-value 
= 0.37 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 1.8667, df = 2, p-
value = 0.39 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 4.34, df = 2, p-
value = 0.11 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks :  0.267261 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks : -0.442325 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks : -0.078811 (1.0000) 
Insurers - NFIs  :  1.336306 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  :  0.884651 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  :  1.970276 (0.1989) 













Appendix 49 Conover-Iman Test for Sector risk Ranking Resulted from CDS-Based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Vulnerability 
CDS-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Vulnerability (pre-crisis) 
CDS-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Vulnerability (crisis) 
CDS-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Vulnerability (post-crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g data: x and g data: x and g  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 2.5714, df = 2, p-
value = 0.28 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 1.6889, df = 2, p-
value = 0.43 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 8.06, df = 2, p-
value = 0.02 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks :  0.891132 (0.8039) Insurers - Banks : -1.162803 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks : -2.311586 (0.1082) 
Insurers - NFIs  :  1.782265 (0.9500) Insurers - NFIs  : -0.145350 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  :  1.708564 (0.2076) 
Banks - NFIs      :  0.891132 (1.0000) Banks - NFIs      :  1.017453 (0.9575) Banks - NFIs      :  4.020151 (0.0093)*** 
 
Appendix 50 Conover-Iman Test for Sector risk Ranking Resulted from Equity-Based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Vulnerability 
Equity-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Vulnerability (pre-crisis) 
Equity-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Vulnerability (crisis) 
Equity-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Vulnerability (post-crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g data: x and g data: x and g  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 2.5714, df = 2, p-
value = 0.28 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 1.8667, df = 2, p-
value = 0.39 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 1.22, df = 2, p-
value = 0.54 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks : -0.891132 (0.8039) Insurers - Banks : -0.442325 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks :  0.068518 (1.0000) 
Insurers - NFIs  :  0.891132 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  :  0.884651 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  :  0.959264 (1.0000) 
Banks - NFIs      :  1.782265 (0.9500) Banks - NFIs      :  1.326977 (1.0000) Banks - NFIs      :  0.890745 (1.0000) 
 
Appendix 51 Conover-Iman Test for Sector risk Ranking Resulted from CDS-Based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Importance 
CDS-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
importance (pre-crisis) 
CDS-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
importance (crisis) 
CDS-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
importance (post-crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g data: x and g data: x and g  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 2.5714, df = 2, p-
value = 0.28 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 1.4222, df = 2, p-
value = 0.49 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 1.22, df = 2, p-
value = 0.54 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks : -0.891132 (0.8039) Insurers - Banks :  0.569494 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks :  0.068518 (1.0000) 
Insurers - NFIs  : -1.782265 (0.9500) Insurers - NFIs  :  1.138989 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  :  0.959264 (1.0000) 













Appendix 52 Conover-Iman Test for Sector risk Ranking Resulted from Equity-Based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Importance 
Equity-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
importance (pre-crisis) 
Equity-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
importance (crisis) 
Equity-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
importance (post-crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g data: x and g data: x and g  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 2.5714, df = 2, p-
value = 0.28 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 3.2889, df = 2, p-
value = 0.19 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 0.38, df = 2, p-
value = 0.83 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks :  0.891132 (0.8039) Insurers - Banks :  1.682316 (0.3946) Insurers - Banks :  0.066372 (1.0000) 
Insurers - NFIs  : -0.891132 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  :  1.850548 (0.6254) Insurers - NFIs  :  0.530978 (1.0000) 
Banks - NFIs      : -1.782265 (0.9500) Banks - NFIs      :  0.168231 (1.0000) Banks - NFIs      :  0.464606 (1.0000) 
 
Appendix 53 Conover-Iman Test for Sector risk Ranking Resulted from CDS-Based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Vulenrability 
CDS-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Vulnerability (pre-crisis) 
CDS-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Vulnerability (crisis) 
CDS-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Vulnerability (post-crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g data: x and g data: x and g  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 3.7143, df = 2, p-
value = 0.16 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 1.0667, df = 2, p-
value = 0.59 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 0.98, df = 2, p-
value = 0.61 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks : -2.041241 (0.3682) Insurers - Banks :  0.000000 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks :  0.746728 (1.0000) 
Insurers - NFIs  : -2.857738 (0.3558) Insurers - NFIs  :  0.832050 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  : -0.135768 (1.0000) 
Banks - NFIs      : -0.816496 (0.8690) Banks - NFIs      :  0.832050 (1.0000) Banks - NFIs      : -0.882497 (1.0000) 
 
Appendix 54 Conover-Iman Test for Sector risk Ranking Resulted from Equity-Based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Vulenrability 
Equity-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Vulnerability (pre-crisis) 
Equity-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Vulnerability (crisis) 
Equity-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Vulnerability (post-crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g data: x and g data: x and g  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 0.8571, df = 2, p-
value = 0.65 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 2.4889, df = 2, p-
value = 0.29 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 1.86, df = 2, p-
value = 0.39 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks : -0.682288 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks : -1.244342 (0.7144) Insurers - Banks : -0.210905 (1.0000) 
Insurers - NFIs  :  0.000000 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  :  0.311085 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  :  1.054526 (0.8591) 














Appendix 55 Conover-Iman Test for Sector risk Ranking Resulted from DiDe Systemic Importance 
DiDe Systemic Importance (Pre-crisis) DiDe Systemic Importance (Crisis) DiDe Systemic Importance (Post-crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g  data: x and g  data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 19.8606, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 0.375, df = 2, p-
value = 0.83 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 1.1726, df = 2, 
p-value = 0.56 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs:                t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:                 t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:                  t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks : -7.159820 (0.0000)*** Insurers - Banks : -0.510930 (1.0000) Insurers - Banks : -1.068912 (1.0000) 
Insurers - NFIs  : -1.222408 (0.4255) Insurers - NFIs  :  0.000000 (1.0000) Insurers - NFIs  : -0.429125 (1.0000) 
Banks - NFIs      :  5.937411 (0.0000)*** Banks - NFIs      :  0.510930 (1.0000) Banks - NFIs      :  0.639786 (1.0000) 
 
Appendix 56  Conover-Iman Test for Sector risk Ranking Resulted from DiDe Systemic Vulnerability 
DiDe Systemic Vulnerability (Pre-crisis) DiDe Systemic Vulnerability (Crisis) DiDe Systemic Vulnerability (Post-crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g  data: x and g  data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 25.8065, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 14.78, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 44.8829, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs:                 t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:                t statistic (adjusted p-value) pairs:                t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks :  7.385489 (0.0000)*** Insurers - Banks :  1.808334 (0.1556) Insurers - Banks :  2.195836 (0.0583)* 
Insurers - NFIs  :  14.77097 (0.0000)*** Insurers - NFIs  :  5.990107 (0.0000)*** Insurers - NFIs  :  11.18764 (0.0000)*** 
Banks - NFIs      :  7.385489 (0.0000)*** Banks - NFIs      :  4.181773 (0.0012)*** Banks - NFIs      :  8.991812 (0.0000)*** 
 
Appendix 57 Conover-Iman Test for Sector risk Ranking Resulted from LRMES 
LRMES (Pre-crisis)  LRMES (Crisis)  LRMES (Post-crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g  data: x and g  data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 5.9071, df = 2, p-
value = 0.05 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 8.645, df = 2, p-
value = 0.01 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 21.0813, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs:                   t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:                 t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:                 t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks : -0.741550 (0.8521) Insurers - Banks : -0.726962 (0.8713) Insurers - Banks : -1.363855 (0.3254) 
Insurers - NFIs  :  1.812678 (0.2228) Insurers - NFIs  :  2.651274 (0.0411)** Insurers - NFIs  :  3.931666 (0.0006)*** 
Banks - NFIs      :  2.554228 (0.0913)* Banks - NFIs      :  3.378237 (0.0156)** Banks - NFIs      :  5.295522 (0.0000)*** 
 
Appendix 58 Conover-Iman Test for Sector risk Ranking Resulted from SRISK 
SRISK (Pre-crisis)  SRISK (Crisis)  SRISK (Post-crisis) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g  data: x and g  data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 25.8065, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 20.48, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 57.791, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
pairs:                   t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:                  t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs:               t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Insurers - Banks : -7.385489 (0.0000)*** Insurers - Banks : -6.531972 (0.0000)*** Insurers - Banks : -11.23658 (0.0000)*** 
Insurers - NFIs  :  7.385489 (0.0000)*** Insurers - NFIs  :  6.531972 (0.0000)*** Insurers - NFIs  :  11.23658 (0.0000)*** 
Banks - NFIs      :  14.77097 (0.0000)*** Banks - NFIs      :  13.06394 (0.0000)*** Banks - NFIs      :  22.47317 (0.0000)*** 
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Appendix 59 Conover-Iman Test for Risk Ranking among Time Periods Resulted from ∆CoRisk Systemic Importance ∆CoRisk Systemic Importance (banks) ∆CoRisk Systemic Importance (insurers) ∆CoRisk Systemic Importance(NFIs) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 47.7425, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 48.5326, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 54.5843, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  9.618528 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  9.528558 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  10.91136 (0.0000)*** 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  5.847914 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  6.944865 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  3.240057 (0.0030)*** 
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis : -3.770614 (0.0005)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis : -2.583693 (0.0208)** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis : -7.671311 (0.0000)*** 
 
   
 
Appendix 60 Conover-Iman Test for Risk Ranking among Time Periods Resulted from ∆CoVaR Systemic Importance ∆CoVaR Systemic Importance (banks) ∆CoVaR Systemic Importance (insurers) ∆CoVaR Systemic Importance(NFIs) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 63.1798, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 76.3306, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 75.3135, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  7.034590 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  9.824822 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  9.460361 (0.0000)*** 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  13.58588 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  19.49941 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  18.86220 (0.0000)*** 
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  6.551298 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  9.674595 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  9.401843 (0.0000)*** 
 
Appendix 61 Conover-Iman Test for Risk Ranking among Time Periods Resulted from ∆CoRisk Systemic 
Vulnerability ∆CoRisk Systemic Vulnerability (banks) ∆CoRisk Systemic Vulnerability (insurers) ∆CoRisk Systemic Vulnerability(NFIs) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 72.0044, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 41.8208, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 64.9505, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  17.06436 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  8.550936 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  14.16988 (0.0000)*** 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  8.437429 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  4.159754 (0.0001)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  7.499380 (0.0000)*** 
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis : -8.626933 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis : -4.391181 (0.0001)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis : -6.670501 (0.0000)*** 
 
Appendix 62 Conover-Iman Test for Risk Ranking among Time Periods Resulted from ∆CoVaR Systemic Vulnerability ∆CoVaR Systemic Vulnerability (banks) ∆CoVaR Systemic Vulnerability (insurers) ∆CoVaR Systemic Vulnerability(NFIs) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 62.3032, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 68.325, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 60.201, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  6.576397 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  6.702830 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  6.462712 (0.0000)*** 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  13.31171 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  15.39137 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  12.68334 (0.0000)*** 
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  6.735320 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  8.688544 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  6.220636 (0.0000)*** 
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Appendix 63 Conover-Iman Test for Risk Ranking among Time Periods Resulted from CDS-Based Granger-Causality 
Test Systemic Importance 
CDS-based Granger-causality test systemic 
importance(banks) 
CDS-based Granger-causality test systemic 
importance(insurers) 
CDS-based Granger-causality test systemic 
importance(NFIs) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 17.668, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 24.8369, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 56.117, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  2.367222 (0.0550)* Crisis - Post-crisis     :  2.911358 (0.0124)** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  2.019637 (0.0849)* 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  4.608947 (0.0001)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  5.737468 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  10.88938 (0.0000)*** 
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  2.241725 (0.0502)* Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  2.826109 (0.0106)** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  8.869749 (0.0000)*** 
 
Appendix 64 Conover-Iman Test for Risk Ranking among Time Periods Resulted from Equity-Based Granger-
Causality Test Systemic Importance 
Equity-based Granger-causality test systemic 
importance(banks) 
Equity-based Granger-causality test systemic 
importance(insurers) 
Equity-based Granger-causality test systemic 
importance(NFIs) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 11.0184, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 7.872, df = 2, p-
value = 0.02 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 20.8075, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  3.053040 (0.0162)** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  2.346069 (0.0580)* Crisis - Post-crisis     :  3.902272 (0.0005)*** 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  2.996371 (0.0096)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  2.647442 (0.0524)* Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  4.804343 (0.0000)*** 
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis : -0.056668 (1.0000) Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  0.301372 (1.0000) Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  0.902070 (0.6771) 
 
Appendix 65Conover-Iman Test for Risk Ranking among Time Periods Resulted from CDS-Based Granger-Causality 
Test Systemic Vulnerability 
CDS-based Granger-causality test systemic 
vulnerability(banks) 
CDS-based Granger-causality test systemic 
vulnerability(insurers) 
CDS-based Granger-causality test systemic 
vulnerability(NFIs) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 31.499, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 32.759, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 40.5879, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  0.448035 (1.0000) Crisis - Post-crisis     :  2.391677 (0.0344)** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  4.511533 (0.0001)*** 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  6.093282 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  6.889786 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  8.319056 (0.0000)*** 














Appendix 66 Conover-Iman Test for Risk Ranking among Time Periods Resulted from Equity-Based Granger-
Causality Test Systemic Vulnerability 
Equity-based Granger-causality test systemic 
vulnerability(banks) 
Equity-based Granger-causality test systemic 
vulnerability(insurers) 
Equity-based Granger-causality test systemic 
vulnerability(NFIs) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test   Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 11.8017, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 19.074, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 16.7802, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  1.376029 (0.3155) Crisis - Post-crisis     :  2.835966 (0.0154)** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  2.994762 (0.0097)*** 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  3.599029 (0.0028)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  4.807733 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  4.367362 (0.0002)*** 
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  2.222999 (0.0788)* Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  1.971766 (0.0946)* Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  1.372599 (0.3175) 
 
Appendix 67 Conover-Iman Test for Risk Ranking among Time Periods Resulted from CDS-Based IRF Maximum 
Values Systemic Importance 
CDS-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Importance (banks) 
CDS-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Importance (insurers) 
CDS-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Importance(NFIs) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 64.8825, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 54.291, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 63.1223, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     : -2.507484 (0.0255)** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  0.094951 (1.0000) Crisis - Post-crisis     :  2.996775 (0.0064)*** 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  10.81056 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  9.691870 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  12.96047 (0.0000)*** 
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  13.31805 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  9.596918 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  9.963703 (0.0000)*** 
 
Appendix 68 Conover-Iman Test for Risk Ranking among Time Periods Resulted from Equity-Based IRF Maximum 
Values Systemic Importance 
Equity-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Importance (banks) 
Equity-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Importance (insurers) 
Equity-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Importance(NFIs) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test  
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g   
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 52.7282, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 45.1653, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 48.5739, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  0.565736 (1.0000) Crisis - Post-crisis     :  0.367795 (1.0000) Crisis - Post-crisis     :  2.476874 (0.0276)** 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  9.597549 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  8.128269 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  9.507385 (0.0000)*** 












Appendix 69 Conover-Iman Test for Risk Ranking among Time Periods Resulted from CDS-Based IRF Maximum 
Values Systemic Vulnerability 
CDS-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Vulnerability (banks) 
CDS-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Vulnerability (insurers) 
CDS-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Vulnerability(NFIs) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test  
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g   
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 60.9675, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 47.6166, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 67.8425, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  0.459902 (1.0000) Crisis - Post-crisis     :  0.898970 (0.6801) Crisis - Post-crisis     :  5.513704 (0.0000)*** 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  11.40112 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  8.785389 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  15.06304 (0.0000)*** 
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  10.94122 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  7.886419 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  9.549337 (0.0000)*** 
 
Appendix 70 Conover-Iman Test for Risk Ranking among Time Periods Resulted from Equity-Based IRF Maximum 
Values Systemic Vulnerability 
Equity-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Vulnerability (banks) 
Equity-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Vulnerability (insurers) 
Equity-based IRF Maximum Values Systemic 
Vulnerability(NFIs) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test  
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g   
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 31.1894, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 41.9891, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 43.9384, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  1.782255 (0.1429) Crisis - Post-crisis     :  1.372935 (0.3173) Crisis - Post-crisis     :  1.919696 (0.1063) 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  6.522296 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  8.023648 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  8.526602 (0.0000)*** 
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  4.740041 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  6.650713 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  6.606905 (0.0000)*** 
 
Appendix 71 Conover-Iman Test for Risk Ranking among Time Periods Resulted from CDS-Based IRF Lasting Periods 
Systemic Importance 
CDS-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Importance (banks) 
CDS-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Importance (insurers) 
CDS-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Importance(NFIs) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test  
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g   
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 50.9601, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 39.955, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 60.5261, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  2.014912 (0.0858)* Crisis - Post-crisis     :  3.295438 (0.0026)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     : -0.987597 (0.5975) 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      : -7.805339 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      : -4.870249 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      : -11.52688 (0.0000)*** 

















Appendix 72 Conover-Iman Test for Risk Ranking among Time Periods Resulted from Equity-Based IRF Lasting 
Periods Systemic Importance 
Equity-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Importance (banks) 
Equity-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Importance (insurers) 
Equity-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Importance(NFIs) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test  
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g   
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 36.4391, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 30.4419, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 7.8968, df = 2, 
p-value = 0.02 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  2.702991 (0.0150)** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  4.152405 (0.0002)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  2.591883 (0.0610)* 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  7.509566 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  6.543673 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  2.429600 (0.0468)** 
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  4.806574 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  2.391268 (0.0345)** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis : -0.162282 (1.0000) 
 
Appendix 73 Conover-Iman Test for Risk Ranking among Time Periods Resulted from CDS-Based IRF Lasting Periods 
Systemic Vulnerability 
CDS-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Vulnerability (banks) 
CDS-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Vulnerability (insurers) 
CDS-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Vulnerability(NFIs) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test  
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g   
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 57.7541, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 44.656, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 65.2254, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  3.084399 (0.0049)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  1.140481 (0.4712) Crisis - Post-crisis     : -4.861366 (0.0000)*** 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      : -8.508689 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      : -7.233216 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      : -14.05276 (0.0000)*** 
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis : -11.59308 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis : -8.373698 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis : -9.191393 (0.0000)*** 
 
Appendix 74 Conover-Iman Test for Risk Ranking among Time Periods Resulted from Equity-Based IRF Lasting 
Periods Systemic Vulnerability 
Equity-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Vulnerability (banks) 
Equity-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Vulnerability (insurers) 
Equity-based IRF Lasting Periods Systemic 
Vulnerability(NFIs) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test  
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g   
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 14.7947, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 32.7402, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 27.7988, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  2.256503 (0.0725)* Crisis - Post-crisis     :  3.405739 (0.0018)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  3.916855 (0.0005)*** 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  4.136117 (0.0004)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  6.992459 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  6.123386 (0.0000)*** 
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  1.879614 (0.1160) Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  3.586720 (0.0015)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  2.206530 (0.0546)* 
 
Appendix 75 Conover-Iman Test for Risk Ranking among Time Periods Resulted from DiDe Systemic Importance 
DiDe Systemic Importance (banks) DiDe Systemic Importance (insurers) DiDe Systemic Importance(NFIs) 
 Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test  
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g   
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 34.3969, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 45.5142, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 53.6483, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  1.912192 (0.1080) Crisis - Post-crisis     :  1.254903 (0.3899) Crisis - Post-crisis     :  1.278578 (0.3744) 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  7.026196 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  8.562872 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  10.08731 (0.0000)*** 
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  5.114003 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  7.307968 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  8.808733 (0.0000)*** 
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Appendix 76 Conover-Iman Test for Risk Ranking among Time Periods Resulted from DiDe Systemic Vulnerability 
DiDe Systemic Vulnerability (banks)  
DiDe Systemic Vulnerability 
(insurers)  DiDe Systemic Vulnerability(NFIs) 
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test 
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g  
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 44.2812, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 25.8375, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 13.3647, df = 2, 
p-value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     : -0.644083 (0.9554) Crisis - Post-crisis     :  0.327812 (1.0000) Crisis - Post-crisis     :  1.379348 (0.3137) 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  7.461647 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  5.260615 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  3.850681 (0.0012)*** 
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  8.105730 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  4.932803 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  2.471333 (0.0420)** 
 
Appendix 77 Conover-Iman Test for Risk Ranking among Time Periods Resulted from LRMES 
LRMES (banks)   LRMES (insurers)   LRMES(NFIs)   
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test  
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g   
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 74.2053, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 62.5284, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 54.3664, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  9.935528 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  6.508033 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Post-crisis     :  7.318071 (0.0000)*** 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  18.19141 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  13.38057 (0.0000)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  10.94995 (0.0000)*** 
Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  8.255883 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  6.872544 (0.0000)*** Post-crisis - Pre-crisis :  3.631881 (0.0008)*** 
 
Appendix 78 Conover-Iman Test for Risk Ranking among Time Periods Resulted from SRISK 
SRISK (banks)   SRISK (insurers)   SRISK(NFIs)   
  Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test    Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test  
data: x and g   data: x and g   data: x and g   
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 15.469, df = 2, p-
value = 0 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 4.9221, df = 2, 
p-value = 0.09 
Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 3.7498, df = 2, 
p-value = 0.15 
Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              Conover-Iman test (Benjamini-Yekuteili)                              
Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) Pairs: t statistic (adjusted p-value) 
Crisis - Post-crisis     :  0.800638 (0.7799) Crisis - Post-crisis     :  0.683916 (0.9088) Crisis - Post-crisis     :  1.658000 (0.2769) 
Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  4.017748 (0.0007)*** Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  2.202209 (0.1657) Crisis - Pre-crisis      :  1.725951 (0.4822) 



















Appendix 79  Rank Correlations between the Systemic Risk Measures Based on Cross-Sectional Data 
Cross section  ∆CoRisk SI ∆CoVaR SI CDSGranger SI EquityGranger SI CDSIRFMax SI 
∆CoRisk SI Spearman’s ρ 1.000     
 P value 1.000     
∆CoVaR SI Spearman’s ρ 0.276 1.000    
 P value 0.007*** 1.000    
CDSGranger SI Spearman’s ρ 0.065 -0.286 1.000   
 P value 0.529 0.005*** 1.000   
EquityGranger SI Spearman’s ρ 0.353 -0.122 0.511 1.000  
 P value 0.000*** 0.236 0.000*** 1.000  
CDSIRFMax SI Spearman’s ρ 0.506 0.658 -0.182 0.124 1.000 
 P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.076* 0.229 1.000 
EquityIRFMax SI Spearman’s ρ 0.367 0.923 -0.279 -0.067 0.676 
 P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.006*** 0.517 0.000*** 
CDSIRFPrd SI Spearman’s ρ -0.052 0.143 -0.228 -0.058 -0.016 
 P value 0.616 0.163 0.025** 0.572 0.873 
EquityIRFPrd SI Spearman’s ρ -0.146 0.215 -0.430 -0.406 -0.007 
 P value 0.155 0.035** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.948 
DiDe SI Spearman’s ρ 0.396 0.792 -0.185 -0.169 0.484 
 P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.071* 0.099* 0.000*** 
∆CoRisk SV Spearman’s ρ 0.224 0.165 0.116 0.465 0.452 
 P value 0.029** 0.108 0.259 0.000*** 0.000*** 
∆CoVaR SV Spearman’s ρ 0.147 0.762 -0.426 -0.105 0.669 
 P value 0.154 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.307 0.000*** 
CDSGranger SV Spearman’s ρ 0.243 0.513 -0.439 -0.294 0.734 
 P value 0.017** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 
EquityGranger SV Spearman’s ρ -0.207 0.343 -0.431 -0.438 0.052 
 P value 0.043** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.618 
CDSIRFMax SV Spearman’s ρ 0.611 0.603 -0.209 0.115 0.936 
 P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.041** 0.263 0.000*** 
EquityIRFMax SV Spearman’s ρ 0.273 0.884 -0.390 -0.223 0.589 
 P value 0.007*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.029** 0.000*** 
CDSIRFPrd SV Spearman’s ρ -0.109 -0.065 0.132 0.116 -0.237 
 P value 0.291 0.525 0.201 0.259 0.020** 
EquityIRFPrd SV Spearman’s ρ 0.034 -0.198 0.156 0.430 -0.083 
 P value 0.740 0.053* 0.130 0.000*** 0.421 
DiDe SV Spearman’s ρ 0.042 0.718 -0.374 -0.053 0.623 
 P value 0.682 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.611 0.000*** 
LRMES Spearman’s ρ 0.182 0.686 -0.317 0.059 0.608 
 P value 0.077* 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.565 0.000*** 
SRISK Spearman’s ρ 0.440 0.585 -0.084 0.329 0.667 








  EquityIRFMax SI CDSIRFPrd SI EquityIRFPrd SI DiDe SI ∆CoRisk SV 
EquityIRFMax SI Spearman’s ρ 1.000     
 P value 1.000     
CDSIRFPrd SI Spearman’s ρ 0.110 1.000    
 P value 0.284 1.000    
EquityIRFPrd SI Spearman’s ρ 0.211 0.104 1.000   
 P value 0.039** 0.311 1.000   
DiDe SI Spearman’s ρ 0.774 0.075 0.175 1.000  
 P value 0.000*** 0.467 0.088* 1.000  
∆CoRisk SV Spearman’s ρ 0.253 0.175 -0.231 -0.054 1.000 
 P value 0.013** 0.089* 0.024** 0.603 1.000 
∆CoVaR SV Spearman’s ρ 0.721 0.269 0.170 0.478 0.280 
 P value 0.000*** 0.008*** 0.097* 0.000*** 0.006*** 
CDSGranger SV Spearman’s ρ 0.560 0.011 0.378 0.361 0.233 
 P value 0.000*** 0.914 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.022** 
EquityGranger SV Spearman’s ρ 0.383 0.072 0.635 0.388 -0.276 
 P value 0.000*** 0.484 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.006*** 
CDSIRFMax SV Spearman’s ρ 0.607 -0.006 -0.001 0.482 0.379 
 P value 0.000*** 0.952 0.994 0.000*** 0.000*** 
EquityIRFMax SV Spearman’s ρ 0.894 0.078 0.300 0.830 0.094 
 P value 0.000*** 0.452 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.362 
CDSIRFPrd SV Spearman’s ρ -0.099 0.642 0.010 -0.036 0.163 
 P value 0.335 0.000*** 0.924 0.724 0.112 
EquityIRFPrd SV Spearman’s ρ -0.131 -0.114 -0.018 -0.222 0.232 
 P value 0.205 0.270 0.859 0.030** 0.023** 
DiDe SV Spearman’s ρ 0.698 0.169 0.167 0.300 0.311 
 P value 0.000*** 0.100 0.104 0.003*** 0.002*** 
LRMES Spearman’s ρ 0.656 0.301 0.086 0.391 0.373 
 P value 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.405 0.000*** 0.000*** 
SRISK Spearman’s ρ 0.583 0.177 -0.112 0.308 0.446 


















  ∆CoVaR SV CDSGranger SV EquityGranger SV CDSIRFMax SV EquityIRFMax SV 
∆CoVaR SV Spearman’s ρ 1.000     
 P value 1.000     
CDSGranger SV Spearman’s ρ 0.611 1.000    
 P value 0.000*** 1.000    
EquityGranger SV Spearman’s ρ 0.321 0.482 1.000   
 P value 0.001*** 0.000*** 1.000   
CDSIRFMax SV Spearman’s ρ 0.612 0.750 0.042 1.000  
 P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.684 1.000  
EquityIRFMax SV Spearman’s ρ 0.668 0.542 0.521 0.541 1.000 
 P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000 
CDSIRFPrd SV Spearman’s ρ -0.099 -0.295 -0.117 -0.225 -0.159 
 P value 0.336 0.004*** 0.258 0.028** 0.122 
EquityIRFPrd SV Spearman’s  -0.220 -0.123 -0.213 -0.060 -0.082 
 P value 0.032** 0.233 0.037** 0.559 0.428 
DiDe SV Spearman’s  0.899 0.588 0.281 0.530 0.602 
 P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.006*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
LRMES Spearman’s  0.934 0.516 0.174 0.571 0.579 
 P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.090* 0.000*** 0.000*** 
SRISK Spearman’s  0.708 0.392 -0.094 0.630 0.462 
 P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.363 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(continued) 
 
  CDSIRFPrd SV EquityIRFPrd SV DiDe SV LRMES SRISK 
CDSIRFPrd SV Spearman’s  1.000     
 P value 1.000     
EquityIRFPrd SV Spearman’s  0.074 1.000    
 P value 0.471 1.000    
DiDe SV Spearman’s  -0.132 -0.099 1.000   
 P value 0.201 0.336 1.000   
LRMES Spearman’s  -0.047 -0.088 0.850 1.000  
 P value 0.652 0.392 0.000*** 1.000  
SRISK Spearman’s  -0.004 0.070 0.694 0.757 1.000 















Appendix 80 Rank Correlations across Time by Systemic Risk Measures 
  ∆CoRisk SI   ∆CoVaR SI   CDSGranger SI  EquityGranger SI  














Spearman’s  1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
 P value 1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
crisis Spearman’s  0.058 1.000  0.622 1.000  0.101 1.000  0.720 1.000  
 P value 0.574 1.000  0.000*** 1.000  0.328 1.000  0.000*** 1.000  
post-
crisis 
Spearman’s  0.156 0.730 1.000 0.707 0.764 1.000 -0.133 0.490 1.000 0.762 0.778 1.000 
 P value 0.129 0.000*** 1.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000 0.196 0.000*** 1.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000 
 (continued) 
  CDSIRFMax SI  EquityIRFMax SI  CDSIRFPrd SI  EquityIRFPrd SI  














Spearman’s  1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
 P value 1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
crisis Spearman’s  0.563 1.000  0.327 1.000  -0.204 1.000  0.232 1.000  
 P value 0.000*** 1.000  0.001*** 1.000  0.046** 1.000  0.023** 1.000  
post-
crisis 
Spearman’s  0.569 0.827 1.000 0.404 0.583 1.000 -0.259 -0.049 1.000 -0.059 0.352 1.000 
 P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000 0.011** 0.636 1.000 0.570 0.000*** 1.000 
 (continued) 
  DiDe SI   ∆CoRisk 
SV 
  ∆CoVaR 
SV 
  CDSGranger SV  










Spearman’s  1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
 P value 1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
crisis Spearman’s  0.762 1.000  0.675 1.000  0.613 1.000  0.447 1.000  
 P value 0.000*** 1.000  0.000*** 1.000  0.000*** 1.000  0.000*** 1.000  
post-
crisis 
Spearman’s  0.739 0.886 1.000 0.806 0.713 1.000 0.750 0.870 1.000 0.486 0.601 1.000 
 P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000 
 (continued) 
  EquityGranger SV  CDSIRFMax SV  EquityIRFMax SV  CDSIRFPrd SV  












Spearman’s  1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
 P value 1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
crisis Spearman’s  0.691 1.000  0.438 1.000  0.570 1.000  -0.067 1.000  
 P value 0.000*** 1.000  0.000*** 1.000  0.000*** 1.000  0.517 1.000  
post-
crisis 
Spearman’s  0.597 0.767 1.000 0.569 0.789 1.000 0.510 0.755 1.000 -0.017 -0.146 1.000 
 P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000 0.866 0.155 1.000 
(continued) 
  EquityIRFPrd SV  DiDe SV   LRMES   SRISK   










Spearman’s  1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
 P value 1.000   1.000   1.000   1.000   
crisis Spearman’s  0.266 1.000  0.687 1.000  0.557 1.000  0.854 1.000  
 P value 0.009*** 1.000  0.000*** 1.000  0.000*** 1.000  0.000*** 1.000  
post-
crisis 
Spearman’s  0.096 0.233 1.000 0.676 0.865 1.000 0.655 0.832 1.000 0.873 0.978 1.000 
 P value 0.354 0.022** 1.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000 
 
 170 
Appendix 81 Systemic Important Companies Ranked by ∆CoRisk 
2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2009 Q1 2009 Q2 
Macquarie Group JPMorgan Chase & Co. Japan Tobacco  Credit Suisse  Goldman Sachs ICICI Bank Munich Re Group Deutsche Telekom  
Shinhan Bank Munich Re Group Merck & Co. BNP Paribas Morgan Stanley BASF SE Allianz SE Goldman Sachs 
Aegon N.V. Bank of America Chubb Limited Walt Disney Deutsche Bank Allstate JPMorgan Chase & Co. Altria Group  
Hannover Re SE Deutsche Bank The Travelers Co. Munich Re Group Credit Suisse BNP Paribas Deutsche Telekom AG Vodafone Group 
Commerzbank AG Allianz SE Allianz SE Deutsche Bank Banco Santander Intesa Sanpaolo Wells Fargo & Co. BNP Paribas 
Sanofi S.A. Credit Suisse Group Munich Re Group Societe Generale Intesa Sanpaolo Banco Santander AXA Bank of America 
Allianz SE Intesa Sanpaolo Loews Corporation Allianz SE Barclays Chubb Limited Hannover Re SE Allianz SE 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. HSBC Holdings Deutsche Bank The Travelers Co. UniCredit Munich Re Group Assicurazioni Generali Japan Tobacco  
RBS Morgan Stanley JPMorgan Chase & Co. ANZ Lloyds Banking  Deutsche Bank HSBC Holdings HSBC Holdings 
UBS AG Goldman Sachs Societe Generale Honeywell  AIG KB Kookmin Bank Intesa Sanpaolo JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
BNP Paribas UBS AG BNP Paribas Hannover Re SE ANZ Allianz SE BNP Paribas Deutsche Bank 
Societe Generale MGIC  Cisco Systems Inc. BASF SE BNP Paribas AON Plc Aviva Plc Hannover Re SE 
Munich Re Group BNP Paribas MetLife Chubb Limited Societe Generale Loews Corporation Scor SE Banco Santander 
American Express Banco Santander Credit Suisse Group Intesa Sanpaolo Commerzbank AG Walt Disney AT&T Inc. ICICI Bank 
Barclays Bayer AG Intesa Sanpaolo Credit Agricole UBS AG The Hartford  Banco Santander BMW 
Chubb Limited Assicurazioni Generali  Banco Santander Goldman Sachs Citigroup  Deutsche Telekom AG Walt Disney Nordea Bank 
Banco Santander Barclays Assicurazioni Generali  Vodafone Group National Australia Bank Unum Group Vodafone Group PepsiCo, Inc. 
AXA Citigroup Inc. CNA Financial  AXA JPMorgan Chase & Co. Lincoln National  UniCredit Intesa Sanpaolo 
HSBC Holdings AXA Allstate McDonald Standard Chartered UniCredit Bank of America Walt Disney 










Appendix 82 Systemic Vulnerable Companies Ranked by ∆CoRisk 
2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2009 Q1 2009 Q2 
QBE Insurance  American Express Capital One  Old Mutual Plc Old Mutual Plc AIG Old Mutual Plc Old Mutual Plc 
Intesa Sanpaolo AstraZeneca Plc AIG Nordea Bank Macquarie Group Macquarie Group Prudential Plc Lincoln National  
AXA AIG Citigroup  Macquarie Group The Hartford  The Hartford  Lincoln National  AIG 
BP Plc QBE Insurance  American Express Pfizer Inc. Lincoln National Old Mutual Plc Legal & General Legal & General 
Toyota Motor  Citigroup Inc. BP Plc AIG QBE Insurance  MetLife The Hartford  The Hartford  
Standard Chartered BP Plc Lincoln National  Lincoln National  Aegon N.V. Prudential Plc Macquarie Group Macquarie Group 
AstraZeneca Plc The Home Depot RBS QBE Insurance MetLife Aegon N.V. MetLife Prudential Plc 
Medtronic Prudential Plc Legal & General Merck & Co. UBS AG Lincoln National AIG MetLife 
The Hartford  Legal & General Aviva Plc The Hartford  Prudential Plc UBS AG Aegon N.V. Citigroup  
UniCredit Aviva Plc MBIA Citigroup Inc. AIG Shinhan Bank AstraZeneca Plc BMW 
Assicurazioni Generali  Pfizer Inc. AstraZeneca Plc Aegon N.V. Citigroup Inc. Legal & General Medtronic QBE Insurance  
KBC Bank Lincoln National  Aegon N.V. UBS AG Cathay Financial  QBE Insurance  Johnson & Johnson Medtronic 
HSBC Holdings Nestle S.A. Macquarie Group American Express Legal & General Citigroup Inc. Eli Lilly  AstraZeneca Plc 
Societe Generale Old Mutual Plc KB Kookmin Bank Prudential Plc BP Plc American Express Shinhan Bank Aegon N.V. 
National Australia Bank Lloyds Banking  Prudential Plc MetLife Shinhan Bank BP Plc QBE Insurance  UBS AG 
Bank of America Aegon N.V. QBE Insurance   AT&T Inc. Nestle S.A. KB Kookmin Bank UBS AG Shinhan Bank 
Berkshire Hathaway Radian Group Inc. UBS AG BP Plc Pfizer Inc. Cathay Financial  BP Plc Allstate 
BNP Paribas ANZ Nestle S.A. Amgen Inc KB Kookmin Bank RBS BMW RBS 
Aviva Plc MetLife Pfizer Inc. Legal & General AT&T Inc. Johnson & Johnson KB Kookmin Bank Eli Lilly  










Appendix 83 Systemic Important Companies Ranked by ∆CoVaR 
2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2009 Q1 2009 Q2 
Prudential Plc Pfizer Inc. Intesa Sanpaolo Lincoln National  UBS AG Loews Corporation MetLife 3M 
UniCredit Bank of America Loews Corporation Allianz SE AT&T Inc. Banco Santander Banco Santander Unum Group 
Old Mutual Plc The Home Depot KBC Bank Deutsche Bank Morgan Stanley BASF SE Societe Generale UBS AG 
ING Group Allianz SE Prudential Plc Citigroup Inc. JPMorgan Chase & Co. CNA Financial  3M AXA 
Societe Generale Citigroup Inc. The Hartford  HSBC Holdings chubb Limited Pfizer Inc. Unum Group Allianz SE 
AstraZeneca Plc KBC Bank Banco Santander MGIC  American Express Morgan Stanley Loews Corporation UniCredit 
The Hartford  AIG Coca-Cola BMW Deutsche Telekom AG American Financial  Honeywell  MetLife 
MetLife Aviva Plc American Financial  Pfizer Inc. Goldman Sachs Intesa Sanpaolo chubb Limited Deutsche Bank 
Banco Santander ING Group MetLife AT&T Inc. Allianz SE Procter & Gamble Co. Intesa Sanpaolo Loews Corporation 
Exxon Mobil Corp. American Express Lincoln National  American Express Nordea Bank American Express Exxon Mobil Corp. The Hartford  
Sanofi S.A. Morgan Stanley Deutsche Bank Banco Santander Citigroup Inc. AIG UBS AG Standard Chartered 
AXA Lloyds Banking  AXA LVMH Cisco Systems Inc. Assicurazioni Generali Lloyds Banking  Cisco Systems  
Loews Corporation Wells Fargo & Co. Commerzbank AG Legal & General Honeywell  The Travelers Co Old Mutual Plc Total S.A. 
AIG MetLife Unum Group Unum Group The Hartford  Aetna Inc. American Express Honeywell  
Credit Suisse  JPMorgan Chase & Co. Aviva Plc Cisco Systems  RBS HSBC Holdings CNA Financial  Commerzbank AG 
Aviva Plc Barclays ING Group Wells Fargo & Co. Aegon N.V. Merck & Co. Allianz SE Banco Santander 
Assicurazioni Generali Prudential Plc Sanofi S.A. Commerzbank AG Banco Santander Citigroup  Cisco Systems Inc. American Financial  
Lincoln National  Credit Agricole AIG Bank of America Cigna Corporation UniCredit Assicurazioni Generali  MBIA 
Lloyds Banking  Goldman Sachs Citigroup Inc. Allstate ING Group Total S.A. The Hartford  BMW 










Appendix 84 Systemic Vulnerable Companies Ranked by ∆CoVaR 
2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2009 Q1 2009 Q2 
Radian Group  Radian Group  MBIA MBIA AIG Morgan Stanley Lincoln National  The Hartford  
MGIC  MGIC  Radian Group  MGIC  Radian Group  The Hartford  Citigroup  MGIC  
MBIA MBIA UBS AG Radian Group Inc. MGIC  Lincoln National  The Hartford  Capital One  
Old Mutual Plc Capital One  MGIC  Citigroup  Bank of America Radian Group Bank of America Radian Group  
Prudential Plc Morgan Stanley Citigroup Inc. Morgan Stanley MBIA Citigroup Inc. Radian Group Inc. MBIA 
Barclays RBS RBS UBS AG RBS ING Group MGIC  Lincoln National  
Legal & General Goldman Sachs Commerzbank AG Capital One  Citigroup Inc. MGIC  MetLife Bank of America 
Lincoln National  Citigroup Inc. Capital One  RBS UBS AG AIG MBIA AIG 
Standard Chartered Barclays Morgan Stanley Commerzbank AG Morgan Stanley MetLife Wells Fargo & Co. CNA Financial  
Societe Generale AIG Credit Agricole AIG JPMorgan Chase & Co. Bank of America Lloyds Banking  KBC Bank 
AXA Prudential Plc Barclays Barclays Credit Agricole MBIA RBS Aegon N.V. 
RBS JPMorgan Chase & Co. Old Mutual Plc American Express Capital One  Unum Group Capital One  Wells Fargo & Co. 
BNP Paribas American Express AXA JPMorgan Chase & Co. Wells Fargo & Co. Cigna Corporation Aegon N.V. MetLife 
Morgan Stanley Old Mutual Plc ING Group Bank of America Barclays Deutsche Bank Morgan Stanley ING Group 
Commerzbank AG Bank of America Credit Suisse Group Standard Chartered Prudential Plc Credit Suisse  JPMorgan Chase & Co. RBS 
MetLife Lloyds Banking  AIG Wells Fargo & Co. AXA CNA Financial  ING Group American Express 
Aviva Plc Wells Fargo & Co. BNP Paribas Prudential Plc Aegon N.V. American Financial  Unum Group Unum Group 
Goldman Sachs UBS AG Prudential Plc Goldman Sachs Goldman Sachs Goldman Sachs Barclays Deutsche Bank 
UniCredit Standard Chartered Aegon N.V. Lloyds Banking  Aviva Plc Allstate CNA Financial  Barclays 











Appendix 85 Risky Companies Ranked by the Maximum Values of CDS-Based IRF 
                                Impulse                          Response 
2007 2008 2009  2007 2008 2009 
AXA Morgan Stanley Morgan Stanley RBS Credit Agricole Intesa Sanpaolo 
Assicurazioni Generali  Chubb Limited Goldman Sachs AXA Intesa Sanpaolo Aegon N.V. 
Capital One  The Hartford  Societe Generale Deutsche Bank Barclays UniCredit 
Aviva Plc The Travelers Co. Munich Re Group Vodafone  Nestle S.A. AXA 
HSBC  AXA Citigroup Inc. BNP Paribas RBS Banco Santander 
Allianz SE Allianz SE Credit Agricole Hannover Re SE Bayer AG BMW 
Citigroup Inc. Walmart Assicurazioni Generali  BMW Allianz SE Credit Suisse  
BNP Paribas Allstate MetLife  Banco Santander Munich Re Group Hannover Re SE 
Commerzbank AG MetLife Aviva Plc  Barclays Societe Generale RBS 
Bank of America American Express UBS AG  Credit Suisse  Credit Suisse  Allianz SE 
Munich Re Group Cigna Corporation Intesa Sanpaolo Deutsche Telekom AG Vodafone Group Assicurazioni Generali  
Deutsche Bank Lincoln National  Hannover Re SE Intesa Sanpaolo Sanofi S.A. Morgan Stanley 
Banco Santander Scor SE Banco Santander HSBC Holdings Assicurazioni Generali  Barclays 
UniCredit Aviva Plc Lloyds Banking Group Bayer AG ING Group Credit Agricole 
Credit Suisse  Assicurazioni Generali  American Express LVMH BMW UBS AG 
Intesa Sanpaolo AIG Standard Chartered Allstate UBS AG Standard Chartered 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. Hannover Re SE BNP Paribas The Travelers Co BNP Paribas Societe Generale 
UBS AG BNP Paribas Commerzbank AG UBS AG LVMH Capital One  
Bayer AG Lloyds Banking  BMW  Allianz SE UniCredit American Express 










Appendix 86 Risky Companies Ranked by the Maximum Values of Equity-Based IRF 
Impulse  Response 
2007 2008 2009  2007 2008 2009 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. The Hartford  Amgen Inc Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank UniCredit 
Goldman Sachs Morgan Stanley Bank of America Exxon Mobil Corp. UBS AG JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
American Express Honeywell  American Financial  Pfizer Inc. Munich Re Group Lincoln National  
Citigroup  CNA Financial  Morgan Stanley Goldman Sachs Goldman Sachs MetLife 
Deutsche Bank Cisco Systems Inc. Allstate Allianz SE Allianz SE Goldman Sachs 
Commerzbank AG Goldman Sachs BASF SE Banco Santander Citigroup Inc. Unum Group 
Morgan Stanley Citigroup Inc. Allianz SE Credit Suisse  Lincoln National  Honeywell  
MetLife Allstate CNA Financial  MetLife Hannover Re SE Aegon N.V. 
American Financial  MetLife Deutsche Bank AT&T Inc. Pfizer Inc. The Hartford  
Exxon Mobil  3M Citigroup  UBS AG Bank of America ING Group 
The Hartford  UBS AG MetLife Munich Re Group Cisco Systems Inc. Loews Corporation 
The Home Depot Bank of America The Travelers Co. Bank of America Morgan Stanley HSBC Holdings 
AIG Lincoln National Corp. Wells Fargo & Co. The Hartford  Capital One  Wells Fargo & Co. 
Bank of America AT&T Inc. The Hartford  Coca-Cola Walt Disney Allstate 
Lincoln National  Deutsche Bank UBS AG Hannover Re SE AT&T Inc. Cisco Systems Inc. 
Walmart Deutsche Telekom AG Marsh & McLennan Co. Lincoln National  ING Group Walt Disney 
Altria Group Inc. The Travelers Co. Aegon N.V. JPMorgan Chase & Co. The Travelers Co. Allianz SE 
Old Mutual Plc Eli Lilly and Company BNP Paribas American Express American Express CNA Financial  
Loews Corporation Procter & Gamble Co. Loews Corporation AIG MetLife Credit Suisse  










Appendix 87 Risky Companies Ranked by the Lasting Periods of CDS-Based IRF 
Impulse                               Response 
2007 2008 2009  2007 2008 2009 
Radian Group  AT&T Inc. AIG  Prudential Plc KB Kookmin Bank Aetna Inc. 
MGIC  JPMorgan Chase & Co. Aetna Inc. Radian Group  QBE Insurance  American Financial  
Cathay Financial  Credit Suisse  Cigna Corporation ING Group JPMorgan Chase & Co. AIG 
KBC Bank AIG Intesa Sanpaolo ANZ Banco Santander Cigna Corporation 
Prudential Plc MetLife Wells Fargo & Co. MGIC Toyota Motor  Prudential Plc 
ING Group Lincoln National  Aegon N.V. Sanofi S.A. MetLife RBS 
Sanofi S.A. Bank of America Prudential Plc Lloyds Banking  Macquarie Group Aegon N.V. 
ANZ MGIC  Citigroup  AT&T Inc. Lincoln National  KB Kookmin Bank 
Wells Fargo & Co. Aetna Inc. McDonald Assicurazioni Generali  American Financial  Exxon Mobil  
Legal & General Wells Fargo & Co. Aviva Plc HSBC  Shinhan Bank Macquarie Group 
AT&T Inc. KB Kookmin Bank RBS Cathay Financial  Nordea Bank QBE Insurance  
Bank of America McDonald Deutsche Telekom AG KBC Bank Credit Agricole Legal & General 
Old Mutual Plc PepsiCo, Inc. Lincoln National  Commerzbank AG Bank of America Intesa Sanpaolo 
Citigroup Inc. Goldman Sachs 3M  Legal & General Credit Suisse  Wells Fargo & Co. 
Assicurazioni Generali Radian Group  American Financial  Macquarie Group AIG Deutsche Telekom AG 
Scor SE Deutsche Bank Merck & Co. Wells Fargo & Co. Morgan Stanley Aviva Plc 
Deutsche Bank Prudential Plc American Express McDonald Walt Disney Merck & Co. 
Barclays BMW AXA  Munich Re Group Honeywell  Sanofi S.A. 
The Home Depot Honeywell  UBS AG QBE Insurance  MGIC  3M 










Appendix 88 Risky Companies Ranked by the Lasting Periods of Equity-Based IRF 
Impulse                               Response 
2007 2008 2009  2007 2008 2009 
MGIC  Capital One Amgen Inc Macquarie Group Nestle S.A. Shinhan Bank 
American Financial  Nestle S.A. Credit Suisse  National Australia Bank ANZ KB Kookmin Bank 
Radian Group  Altria Group  UniCredit ICICI Bank Altria Group  UniCredit 
Wells Fargo & Co. AT&T Inc. AIG  KB Kookmin Bank KBC Bank ANZ 
Walt Disney American Express Aetna Inc. Toyota Motor  Scor SE Japan Tobacco  
Aetna Inc. Walt Disney Deutsche Bank Walt Disney Aetna Inc. Macquarie Group 
Capital One  Lincoln National  Eli Lilly and Co. Wells Fargo & Co. MetLife PepsiCo, Inc. 
Johnson & Johnson Loews Corporation Munich Re Group Shinhan Bank Japan Tobacco  Commerzbank AG 
American Express Pfizer Inc. Wells Fargo & Co. Nestle S.A. Amgen Inc Toyota Motor  
Citigroup Inc. Bank of America Hannover Re SE QBE Insurance  Legal & General Assicurazioni Generali  
Exxon Mobil  KBC Bank CNA Financial  Aetna Inc. Pfizer Inc. Aetna Inc. 
Coca-Cola AON Plc Intesa Sanpaolo Aviva Plc Marsh & McLennan  QBE Insurance  
Loews Corporation Unum Group PepsiCo, Inc. Total S.A. Shinhan Bank Goldman Sachs 
Lincoln National  Exxon Mobil  Johnson & Johnson Cathay Financial  LVMH CNA Financial  
AT&T Inc. Berkshire Hathaway MetLife Assicurazioni Generali  Lincoln National  JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
MetLife Aetna Inc. Commerzbank AG Japan Tobacco  Walt Disney Vodafone  
Macquarie Group McDonald Loews Corporation Bank of America National Australia Bank AON Plc 
The Hartford  Goldman Sachs The Hartford  American Financial  The Travelers Co. Barclays 
Marsh & McLennan  Citigroup Inc. UBS AG Legal & General ICICI Bank ING Group 









Appendix 89 Systemic Important Companies Ranked by DiDe 
2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2009 Q1 2009 Q2 
BNP Paribas Loews Corporation Honeywell  Loews Corporation Honeywell  BNP Paribas Deutsche Bank Loews Corporation 
3M Nordea Bank Loews Corporation Allianz SE Loews Corporation Loews Corporation Loews Corporation Allianz SE 
Allianz SE BNP Paribas Allianz SE Honeywell  Allianz SE Credit Agricole BNP Paribas BNP Paribas 
Loews Corporation Honeywell  3M BNP Paribas BNP Paribas Banco Santander Allianz SE ING Group 
Deutsche Bank 3M Deutsche Bank Walt Disney Walt Disney Deutsche Bank Honeywell  Deutsche Bank 
AXA Deutsche Bank BNP Paribas 3M 3M Allianz SE Walt Disney Honeywell  
Credit Agricole Societe Generale BASF SE ING Group BASF SE Societe Generale ING Group 3M 
Societe Generale Allstate Walt Disney Deutsche Bank AXA ING Group Societe Generale Banco Santander 
Nordea Bank The Hartford  Banco Santander BASF SE Intesa Sanpaolo JPMorgan Chase & Co. Credit Agricole AXA 
Exxon Mobil Corp. Allianz SE AXA Intesa Sanpaolo LVMH Munich Re Group 3M JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
Lincoln National  ING Group JPMorgan Chase & Co. Nordea Bank Deutsche Bank Walt Disney Banco Santander Walt Disney 
MetLife Walt Disney Nordea Bank Banco Santander Assicurazioni Generali  Bank of America AXA Munich Re Group 
The Hartford  JPMorgan Chase & Co. Allstate AXA Allstate Honeywell  Munich Re Group Intesa Sanpaolo 
Allstate MetLife Societe Generale JPMorgan Chase & Co. Munich Re Group Wells Fargo & Co. Total S.A. Societe Generale 
Wells Fargo & Co. Credit Agricole ING Group UniCredit Banco Santander Intesa Sanpaolo Marsh & McLennan  Assicurazioni Generali  
JPMorgan Chase & Co. AXA Bank of America Total S.A. Societe Generale HSBC Holdings JPMorgan Chase & Co. chubb Limited 
BASF SE Banco Santander Intesa Sanpaolo Exxon Mobil Corp. Credit Agricole AXA BASF SE Credit Suisse  
Honeywell  Lincoln National C Assicurazioni Generali  Societe Generale chubb Limited Commerzbank AG Intesa Sanpaolo LVMH 
Banco Santander Bank of America Exxon Mobil Corp. Allstate Nordea Bank Marsh & McLennan  Exxon Mobil Corp. BASF SE 










Appendix 90 Systemic Vulnerable Companies Ranked by DiDe 
2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2009 Q1 2009 Q2 
Radian Group  Radian Group  Radian Group  Radian Group  Radian Group  Radian Group  Lincoln National  AIG 
MGIC  MBIA MBIA MBIA AIG Old Mutual Plc AIG Radian Group  
MBIA Capital One  MGIC  MGIC  MBIA MBIA Old Mutual Plc MBIA 
KBC Bank MGIC  Capital One  Capital One  Morgan Stanley Lincoln National  Radian Group  Old Mutual Plc 
Capital One  Morgan Stanley Unum Group Morgan Stanley MGIC  MGIC  MBIA MGIC  
Unum Group American Express Aegon N.V. Lincoln National  MetLife The Hartford  MGIC Lincoln National 
Morgan Stanley AXA Morgan Stanley American Express Goldman Sachs Prudential Plc The Hartford  The Hartford  
ING Group KBC Bank Lincoln National  Unum Group Capital One  MetLife MetLife MetLife 
CNA Financial  Citigroup  American Express AIG American Express Aegon N.V. Legal & General Citigroup  
The Home Depot CNA Financial  Old Mutual Plc AXA Aegon N.V. AIG American Express Legal & General 
Goldman Sachs The Home Depot Citigroup  Aegon N.V. The Hartford  Morgan Stanley Citigroup Inc. CNA Financial  
American Express Unum Group MetLife Citigroup Inc. Citigroup Inc. Legal & General Prudential Plc Unum Group 
Deutsche Bank Allianz SE AXA MetLife Lincoln National  CNA Financial  Aegon N.V. Prudential Plc 
AXA Lincoln National  ING Group Deutsche Bank UBS AG BMW Unum Group KBC Bank 
Banco Santander Goldman Sachs The Hartford  Goldman Sachs Barclays American Express Aviva Plc American Express 
JPMorgan Chase & 
Co. Aegon N.V. The Home Depot Old Mutual Plc RBS Unum Group Morgan Stanley Aegon N.V. 
Commerzbank AG Deutsche Bank Goldman Sachs CNA Financial  Macquarie Group Goldman Sachs Bank of America Bank of America 
American Financial  ING Group AIG The Hartford  Old Mutual Plc AXA CNA Financial  Morgan Stanley 
Lincoln National  Banco Santander Aviva Plc Aviva Plc Deutsche Bank ICICI Bank Capital One  Aviva Plc 











Appendix 91 Risky Companies Ranked by LRMES 
2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2009 Q1 2009 Q2 
Radian Group  Radian Group  MBIA MBIA MGIC  Lincoln National  Lincoln National  Capital One  
Macquarie Group MGIC  Radian Group MGIC  Radian Group  Morgan Stanley Citigroup Inc. The Hartford  
MGIC  Capital One  RBS Radian Group  AIG Radian Group  The Hartford  MGIC  
Prudential Plc Morgan Stanley Old Mutual Plc Morgan Stanley MBIA MGIC Bank of America Radian Group  
Cathay Financial  MBIA Commerzbank AG AIG Bank of America Citigroup  RBS Lincoln National  
Old Mutual Plc RBS MGIC  Citigroup  Citigroup  Unum Group MBIA MBIA 
MBIA Barclays Barclays Capital One  Capital One  Bank of America MGIC  Bank of America 
Legal & General Goldman Sachs Macquarie Group American Express JPMorgan Chase & Co. The Hartford  Lloyds Banking  Wells Fargo & Co. 
Barclays Prudential Plc Credit Suisse  Bank of America Wells Fargo & Co. Capital One  MetLife KBC Bank 
Standard Chartered Old Mutual Plc Aviva Plc JPMorgan Chase & Co. Morgan Stanley AIG Wells Fargo & Co. CNA Financial  
Morgan Stanley Citigroup  Credit Agricole Wells Fargo & Co. American Express MBIA Aegon N.V. American Express 
Societe Generale AIG Standard Chartered Commerzbank AG Lincoln National  Prudential Plc Radian Group  MetLife 
American Express American Express Capital One  Macquarie Group Goldman Sachs Allstate Barclays Aegon N.V. 
AXA Standard Chartered AXA Goldman Sachs The Hartford  ING Group ING Group AIG 
BNP Paribas JPMorgan Chase & Co. ING Group RBS RBS MetLife Morgan Stanley ING Group 
Goldman Sachs Wells Fargo & Co. Societe Generale Cisco Systems Inc. MetLife CNA Financial  Unum Group JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
Commerzbank AG Lloyds Banking  Citigroup  Lincoln National  Barclays Aegon N.V. Capital One  RBS 
RBS Aviva Plc Aegon N.V. CNA Financial  Prudential Plc American Financial  JPMorgan Chase & Co. Unum Group 
Lincoln National  The Hartford  Prudential Plc Prudential Plc Credit Agricole Credit Suisse  Aviva Plc Barclays 










Appendix 92 Risky Companies Ranked by SRISK 
2007 Q3 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2009 Q1 2009 Q2 
UBS AG RBS RBS RBS RBS RBS RBS BNP Paribas 
RBS UBS AG Deutsche Bank UBS AG Barclays Barclays BNP Paribas RBS 
Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank UBS AG Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank Deutsche Bank 
Barclays Barclays Barclays Barclays UBS AG UBS AG Barclays Barclays 
BNP Paribas BNP Paribas BNP Paribas BNP Paribas BNP Paribas BNP Paribas UBS AG Credit Agricole 
Credit Agricole Credit Agricole Credit Agricole Credit Agricole Credit Agricole HSBC Holdings Credit Agricole UBS AG 
ING Group ING Group ING Group ING Group JPMorgan Chase & Co. Credit Agricole Bank of America Bank of America 
Societe Generale Societe Generale Citigroup  Citigroup  HSBC Holdings JPMorgan Chase & Co. HSBC Holdings Citigroup Inc. 
Morgan Stanley Citigroup  HSBC Holdings Societe Generale ING Group ING Group JPMorgan Chase & Co. JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
Allianz SE HSBC Holdings Societe Generale UniCredit Citigroup  Citigroup  ING Group ING Group 
Citigroup Inc. Morgan Stanley Allianz SE JPMorgan Chase & Co. Bank of America Bank of America Citigroup Inc. HSBC Holdings 
Commerzbank AG Commerzbank AG UniCredit Commerzbank AG Societe Generale Societe Generale Societe Generale Lloyds Banking  
UniCredit Goldman Sachs Morgan Stanley Allianz SE UniCredit UniCredit Commerzbank AG Societe Generale 
Credit Suisse  UniCredit JPMorgan Chase & Co. Morgan Stanley Allianz SE Banco Santander UniCredit Commerzbank AG 
Goldman Sachs Allianz SE Credit Suisse Group Credit Suisse Group Credit Suisse Group Allianz SE Banco Santander Banco Santander 
HSBC  Credit Suisse  Commerzbank AG HSBC Holdings AIG Wells Fargo & Co. Wells Fargo & Co. UniCredit 
AXA JPMorgan Chase & Co. Goldman Sachs Goldman Sachs Goldman Sachs Credit Suisse  Lloyds Banking  Wells Fargo & Co. 
Banco Santander Legal & General AXA Bank of America Morgan Stanley Commerzbank AG Credit Suisse  AIG 
Legal & General Aviva Plc Bank of America AXA Banco Santander AXA Goldman Sachs AXA 






Appendix 93 Descriptive Statistics of the Minimmum and Maximum Values of the Risk Indicators 
 Mean Median St.Dev. Min Max 
MinEqtRet -1.075651 -0.8633423 0.805088 -4.268334 -0.066888 
MaxCDSRet 2.850908 2.74232 0.8126044 0.6607586 5.557914 
Volatility 0.0155139 0.0149376 0.004645 0.0073336 0.0345387 
VaR 0.0187648 0.01884 0.004556 0.0090638 0.0317672 
ES 0.0279652 0.0274321 0.0073041 0.0132762 0.0506984 
Beta 1.318694 1.315466 0.3402607 0.6187819 2.093292 
CDSs 29.66045 22.65 22.42113 6.5 111.5 
Z-Score 12.75689 14.69881 79.00055 -399.2046 208.2068 ∆"#$%&'SI 0.0985912 0.0766215 0.0856824 0.0309204 0.7033127 ∆"#$%&'SV 0.2527629 0.2270877 0.1267785 0.0718466 0.7033127 ∆"#()$SI 0.0120475 0.0117987 0.0036991 0.0038408 0.0215971 ∆"#()$SV 0.0114477 0.0107966 0.0039687 0.0029806 0.0215971 
CDSIRFMaxSI 0.2758542 0.2646182 0.1413099 0.0975904 0.8343668 
CDSIRFMaxSV 0.2747782 0.2314391 0.1400703 0.1189904 0.8343668 
CDSIRFPrdSI 14.88542 14 3.846721 6 28 
CDSIRFPrdSV 16.22917 16.5 3.579118 8 28 
EqtIRFMaxSI 0.3806522 0.3579854 0.1412729 0.0818937 0.7224195 
EqtIRFMaxSV 0.3828441 0.3634718 0.1386458 0.1279673 0.7224195 
EqtIRFPrdSI 6.864583 7 1.833144 4 12 
EqtIRFPrdSV 6.927083 7 1.778496 5 12 
CDSGrangerSI 24.34375 24.5 11.43478 3 51 
CDSGrangerSV 24.34733 23 12.54955 2 56 
EqtGrangerSI 19 10.5 21.00476 1 85 
EqtGrangerSV 17 14.5 11.56947 2 62 
DiDeSI 0.0734229 0.0747267 0.0213249 0.0226266 0.1191687 
DiDeSV 0.0771887 0.0687291 0.0319125 0.0296214 0.2122227 
LRMES 0.2686578 0.264214 0.0732988 0.0802664 0.4265388 
SRISK -18292.75 -7821.45 67731 -282150.8 189039.4 
MinEqtRet (MaxCDSRet) denotes the actual minimum equity returns (maximum CDS returns) during the period from 2007 
Q3 to 2008 Q4. Risk measures are their maximum or minimum values during the period of 2006 Q1 to 2007Q2. VaR is the 
95th percentile. CDSs is the CDS spread. the suffix of “SI” of the systemic risk measures means the systemic importance of 
the firms. the suffix of “SV” of the systemic risk measures means the systemic vulnerability of the firms. “~IRFMax~” refers 
to the IRF results based on the maximum values of the impulse response plots. “~IRFPrd~”refers to the IRF results based on 

















Appendix 94 Descriptive Statistics of the Mean Values of the Risk Indicators 
     Mean      Median      St.Dev.      Min      Max 
MeanEqtRet -0.2441237 -0.1685951 0.2570528 -1.646437 0.1210556 
MeanCDSRet 1.740717 1.774005 0.6058145 -0.0037083 3.307681 
Volatility 0.0119488 0.0117509 0.0028537 0.0063416 0.0211063 
VaR 0.0187648 0.01884 0.004556 0.0090638 0.0317672 
ES 0.0279652 0.0274321 0.0073041 0.0132762 0.0506984 
Beta 1.000825 1.035391 0.3000251 0.239558 1.708932 
CDSs 17.06761 13.9041 12.54685 3.729487 71.94615 
Z-Score 55.1685 38.70661 59.88045 -53.33549 261.6606 ∆"#$%&'SI 0.0424798 0.0382638 0.0258665 0.0076891 0.2003157 ∆"#$%&'SV 0.0424798 0.0435086 0.011541 0.0107654 0.0723652 ∆"#()$SI 0.0049737 0.0051252 0.0017481 0.0001701 0.0091253 ∆"#()$SV 0.0049737 0.0048783 0.0018274 0.0001844 0.0093494 
CDSIRFMaxSI 0.1387652 0.1319925 0.0447349 0.0695428 0.3456557 
CDSIRFMaxSV 0.129276 0.1215543 0.0306545 0.0758633 0.2017168 
CDSIRFPrdSI 8.817537 8.261364 1.896597 5.666667 17.41379 
CDSIRFPrdSV 9.149281 8.891007 2.038382 5.78125 17.85714 
EqtIRFMaxSI 0.2202912 0.223471 0.0728327 0.0500689 0.4274089 
EqtIRFMaxSV 0.2087527 0.212859 0.0591054 0.0487931 0.38824 
EqtIRFPrdSI 4.781257 4.666667 0.5387617 3.5 7 
EqtIRFPrdSV 4.787825 4.741667 0.4255683 4.071429 6.5 
CDSGrangerSI 24.34375 24.5 11.43478 3 51 
CDSGrangerSV 24.34733 23 12.54955 2 56 
EqtGrangerSI 19 10.5 21.00476 1 85 
EqtGrangerSV 17 14.5 11.56947 2 62 
DiDeSI 0.0664752 0.0688748 0.0193871 0.0215377 0.1050504 
DiDeSV 0.0664752 0.0629012 0.024803 0.0214567 0.1808162 
LRMES 0.2686578 0.264214 0.0732988 0.0802664 0.4265388 
SRISK -18292.75 -7821.45 67731 -282150.8 189039.4 
MeanEqtRet (MeanCDSRet) denotes the actual mean equity returns (mean CDS returns) during the period from 2007 Q3 to 
2008 Q4. Risk measures are their mean values during the period of 2006 Q1 to 2007Q2. VaR is the 95th percentile. CDSs is 
the CDS spread. the suffix of “SI” of the systemic risk measures means the systemic importance of the firms. the suffix of 
“SV” of the systemic risk measures means the systemic vulnerability of the firms. “~IRFMax~” refers to the IRF results based 
on the maximum values of the impulse response plots. “~IRFPrd~”refers to the IRF results based on the lasting periods in the 

















Appendix 95 Rank Correlation Matrix of the Minimum and Maximum Values of the Variables 
 MinEqtRet MaxCDSRet MaxLeverage Size Illiquidity Volatility VaR 
MinEqtRet 1       
MaxCDSRet -0.5295 1      
 0.000***       
MaxLeverage -0.6605 0.3958 1     
 0.000*** 0.000***      
MaxMV 0.2972 -0.0364 -0.236 1    
 0.003*** 0.7247 0.021**     
Illiquidity -0.5484 0.4633 0.2809 -0.2695 1   
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.006*** 0.008***    
Volatility -0.3018 0.0608 0.2643 -0.4349 0.0888 1  
 0.003*** 0.5564 0.009*** 0.000*** 0.3897   
VaR -0.2785 0.1173 0.3162 -0.4135 0.0119 0.8913 1 
 0.006*** 0.2552 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.9081 0.000***  
ES -0.3232 0.0893 0.3025 -0.4004 0.0719 0.9359 0.8916 
 0.001*** 0.3871 0.0027 0.0001 0.4862 0 0 
Beta -0.4387 0.1916 0.4193 -0.2032 -0.0131 0.5522 0.6243 
 0.000*** 0.061* 0.000*** 0.047** 0.8994 0.000*** 0.000*** 
CDSs -0.1335 -0.2607 -0.0456 -0.5389 0.0363 0.3441 0.2385 
 0.1947 0.010** 0.659 0.000*** 0.7251 0.001*** 0.019** 
Z-Score 0.2087 -0.0092 -0.2479 0.4144 -0.0479 -0.2641 -0.2478 
 0.041** 0.9288 0.015** 0.000*** 0.6432 0.009*** 0.015** ∆"#$%&'SI 0.265 -0.1738 -0.1747 0.4091 -0.1318 -0.2501 -0.1712 
 0.009*** 0.090* 0.089* 0.000*** 0.2004 0.014** 0.095* ∆"#$%&'SV -0.2443 0.2652 0.3916 0.3304 0.0306 0.0589 0.0849 
 0.016** 0.009*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.7675 0.5688 0.411 ∆"#()$SI -0.517 0.3948 0.6592 -0.0993 0.0433 0.2891 0.4478 
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.3359 0.6755 0.004*** 0.000*** ∆"#()$SV -0.5207 0.346 0.6896 -0.2431 0.0667 0.6135 0.7173 
 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.017** 0.5182 0.000*** 0.000*** 
CDSIRFMaxSI -0.4463 0.2528 0.5319 -0.0795 0.0757 0.1102 0.127 
 0.000*** 0.013** 0.000*** 0.4415 0.4637 0.2852 0.2175 
CDSIRFMaxSV -0.4795 0.2241 0.5094 -0.0855 0.1106 0.0265 0.0632 
 0.000*** 0.028** 0.000*** 0.4077 0.2832 0.7979 0.541 
CDSIRFPrdSI 0.0689 -0.0699 0.0027 0.0849 -0.0067 0.0897 0.0696 
 0.5047 0.4984 0.9795 0.4107 0.9484 0.3849 0.5002 
CDSIRFPrdSV -0.1633 0.1782 0.0303 -0.0798 0.1741 -0.056 -0.0192 
 0.1119 0.082* 0.7697 0.4395 0.090* 0.5877 0.853 
EqtIRFMaxSI -0.3492 0.2367 0.565 -0.0922 0.1048 0.1827 0.2879 
 0.001*** 0.020** 0.000*** 0.3717 0.3097 0.075* 0.004*** 
EqtIRFMaxSV -0.2939 0.1466 0.5165 0.1365 -0.1053 -0.1624 -0.0267 
 0.004*** 0.1542 0.000*** 0.1849 0.3071 0.1138 0.7963 
EqtIRFPrdSI 0.0152 0.0025 0.0024 -0.0198 0.1736 0.1362 0.0727 
 0.883 0.9804 0.9816 0.8485 0.091* 0.1859 0.4816 
EqtIRFPrdSV -0.0481 -0.0668 0.1186 -0.0281 0.1002 -0.1047 -0.1362 
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 0.6415 0.5176 0.2498 0.7859 0.3311 0.3102 0.1858 
CDSGrangerSI -0.2204 0.2421 0.4653 0.0052 0.155 -0.0224 0.0859 
 0.031** 0.018** 0.000*** 0.9599 0.1317 0.8286 0.4054 
CDSGrangerSV -0.414 0.1497 0.3767 -0.0786 0.0094 -0.0374 -0.0438 
 0.000*** 0.1454 0.000*** 0.4464 0.9273 0.7172 0.6719 
EqtGrangerSI -0.2262 0.3386 0.408 -0.1666 0.3397 0.4275 0.4662 
 0.027** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.1048 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
EqtGrangerSV 0.0599 -0.138 -0.1934 0.2655 -0.2274 -0.4367 -0.436 
 0.5622 0.18 0.059* 0.009*** 0.026** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
DiDeSI -0.1486 0.1827 0.3096 0.4453 -0.0069 -0.3918 -0.3296 
 0.1484 0.075* 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.9465 0.000*** 0.001*** 
DiDeSV -0.4278 -0.1278 0.3294 -0.411 0.1068 0.1328 0.0754 
 0.000*** 0.2148 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.3003 0.1971 0.465 
LRMES -0.516 0.3048 0.678 -0.1936 0.0835 0.5959 0.7202 
 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.059* 0.4186 0.000*** 0.000*** 
SRISK -0.6563 0.271 0.9079 -0.3952 0.2832 0.4039 0.4182 
 0.000*** 0.008*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
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 ES Beta CDSs Z-Score ∆"#$%&'SI ∆"#$%&'SV ∆"#()$SI 
ES 1       
Beta 0.578 1      
 0.000***       
CDSs 0.2567 0.1326 1     
 0.012** 0.1977      
Z-Score -0.2324 -0.2229 -0.3261 1    
 0.023** 0.029** 0.001***     ∆"#$%&'SI -0.1778 -0.1532 -0.4081 0.35 1   
 0.083* 0.1362 0.000*** 0.001***    ∆"#$%&'SV 0.0626 0.1198 -0.3446 0.1866 0.1268 1  
 0.5444 0.2452 0.001*** 0.069* 0.2184   ∆"#()$SI 0.3009 0.5527 -0.1309 -0.1416 -0.066 0.3754 1 
 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.2038 0.1686 0.523 0.000***  ∆"#()$SV 0.6291 0.7349 -0.029 -0.2143 -0.102 0.3144 0.7823 
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.7791 0.036** 0.3225 0.002*** 0.000*** 
CDSIRFMaxSI 0.0809 0.2744 0.095 -0.2022 -0.377 0.0904 0.4716 
 0.4335 0.007*** 0.3573 0.048** 0.000*** 0.3813 0.000*** 
CDSIRFMaxSV 0.0339 0.2624 0.0637 -0.2388 -0.465 0.0841 0.4193 
 0.743 0.010*** 0.5373 0.019** 0.000*** 0.415 0.000*** 
CDSIRFPrdSI 0.1032 -0.0471 -0.3256 0.0878 0.3071 0.1258 -0.1094 
 0.3171 0.6489 0.001*** 0.3949 0.002*** 0.2221 0.2885 
CDSIRFPrdSV -0.0627 0.189 -0.1459 0.0153 0.1609 -0.0094 0.0516 
 0.5437 0.065* 0.1561 0.882 0.1174 0.9272 0.6176 
EqtIRFMaxSI 0.1848 0.3769 -0.2158 -0.2819 0.0108 0.2881 0.5636 
 0.071* 0.000*** 0.035** 0.005*** 0.9171 0.004*** 0.000*** 
EqtIRFMaxSV -0.0899 0.358 -0.3089 -0.0603 0.0732 0.2734 0.5157 
 0.3838 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.5593 0.4785 0.007*** 0.000*** 
EqtIRFPrdSI 0.0825 -0.1803 -0.0441 0.0162 -0.0206 0.0597 -0.0558 
 0.4243 0.079* 0.6698 0.8754 0.8418 0.5632 0.5894 
EqtIRFPrdSV -0.1313 -0.1869 0.0561 0.0308 -0.0731 0.0492 -0.0268 
 0.2022 0.068* 0.5871 0.7655 0.4788 0.6343 0.7952 
CDSGrangerSI 0.0009 0.1256 -0.3628 -0.0626 0.007 0.1313 0.2887 
 0.9932 0.2226 0.000*** 0.5446 0.9458 0.2023 0.004*** 
CDSGrangerSV -0.0295 0.2011 0.2376 -0.2941 -0.4397 -0.0262 0.2499 
 0.7756 0.049** 0.020** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.8003 0.014** 
EqtGrangerSI 0.4033 0.0687 -0.1786 0.0134 0.0639 0.3021 0.384 
 0.000*** 0.5059 0.082* 0.8966 0.5361 0.003*** 0.000*** 
EqtGrangerSV -0.4227 0.0069 0.0354 0.0329 0.0204 -0.1724 -0.1544 
 0.000*** 0.9471 0.7318 0.7506 0.8439 0.093* 0.1331 
DiDeSI -0.3124 0.1175 -0.465 0.1038 0.3919 0.4047 0.2736 
 0.002*** 0.2541 0.000*** 0.3141 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.007*** 
DiDeSV 0.1087 0.3663 0.6589 -0.408 -0.4846 -0.1828 0.1949 
 0.2919 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.075* 0.057* 
LRMES 0.6248 0.7971 -0.0158 -0.1905 -0.1182 0.3531 0.7223 
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.8785 0.063* 0.2513 0.000*** 0.000*** 
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SRISK 0.4266 0.479 0.0287 -0.292 -0.1524 0.3046 0.6529 
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.7816 0.004*** 0.1381 0.003*** 0.000*** 
       (continued) 
 
        
 ∆"#()$SV CDSIRFMaxSI CDSIRFMaxSV CDSIRFPrdSI CDSIRFPrdSV EqtIRFMaxSI EqtIRFMaxSV ∆"#()$SV 1       
CDSIRFMaxSI 0.4008 1      
 0.000***       
CDSIRFMaxSV 0.334 0.7112 1     
 0.001*** 0.000***      
CDSIRFPrdSI -0.0237 -0.278 -0.3543 1    
 0.8185 0.006*** 0.000***     
CDSIRFPrdSV 0.076 -0.0418 0.0777 0.1946 1   
 0.4619 0.6862 0.4515 0.057*    
EqtIRFMaxSI 0.535 0.3028 0.2786 0.1353 0.0694 1  
 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.1888 0.5017   
EqtIRFMaxSV 0.3924 0.416 0.4524 -0.0512 0.1233 0.5018 1 
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.6201 0.2314 0.000***  
EqtIRFPrdSI -0.0731 0.101 0.0497 -0.0011 -0.0383 0.0249 -0.1099 
 0.479 0.3274 0.6303 0.9918 0.7111 0.8097 0.2864 
EqtIRFPrdSV -0.0862 0.1247 0.0408 0.006 0.0575 -0.0058 0.0737 
 0.4039 0.226 0.6928 0.9536 0.5779 0.9553 0.4756 
CDSGrangerSI 0.2684 0.3306 0.269 0.2708 0.0834 0.3805 0.342 
 0.008*** 0.001*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.419 0.000*** 0.001*** 
CDSGrangerSV 0.1793 0.6148 0.7805 -0.3068 0.0991 0.2047 0.3357 
 0.081* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.3366 0.045** 0.001*** 
EqtGrangerSI 0.4263 0.1386 0.0342 0.128 -0.1696 0.3758 -0.0217 
 0.000*** 0.178 0.7406 0.214 0.099* 0.000*** 0.8341 
EqtGrangerSV -0.3301 -0.0179 0.0695 -0.1865 0.2142 -0.1183 0.295 
 0.001*** 0.8622 0.5008 0.069* 0.036** 0.251 0.004*** 
DiDeSI 0.15 0.1036 0.1684 0.2158 0.2063 0.3103 0.5472 
 0.1445 0.3151 0.1009 0.035** 0.044** 0.002*** 0.000*** 
DiDeSV 0.2215 0.3714 0.4528 -0.2501 0.0048 0.1604 0.2382 
 0.030** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.014** 0.9633 0.1186 0.020** 
LRMES 0.8926 0.3106 0.3395 0.0199 0.0992 0.5928 0.4231 
 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.8476 0.3363 0.000*** 0.000*** 
SRISK 0.7059 0.5025 0.5066 0.0269 0.0727 0.5392 0.4565 
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.7946 0.4814 0.000*** 0.000*** 

















 EqtIRFPrdSI EqtIRFPrdSV CDSGrangerSI CDSGrangerSV EqtGrangerSI EqtGrangerSV DiDeSI 
EqtIRFPrdSI 1       
EqtIRFPrdSV 0.1445 1      
 0.1603       
CDSGrangerSI 0.1121 -0.0079 1     
 0.2768 0.9388      
CDSGrangerSV -0.0672 0.0665 0.1497 1    
 0.5153 0.5197 0.1455     
EqtGrangerSI 0.4478 -0.0412 0.2978 -0.1698 1   
 0.000*** 0.6899 0.003*** 0.098*    
EqtGrangerSV -0.3571 0.0021 -0.1088 0.1183 -0.6835 1  
 0.000*** 0.9838 0.2912 0.2508 0.000***   
DiDeSI -0.1248 0.1392 0.3233 0.0457 -0.0854 0.2273 1 
 0.2258 0.1763 0.001*** 0.6586 0.4081 0.026**  
DiDeSV -0.167 0.12 -0.0369 0.4973 -0.265 0.1851 -0.0365 
 0.1039 0.2442 0.7213 0.000*** 0.009*** 0.071* 0.7238 
LRMES -0.0568 -0.107 0.3343 0.2087 0.4014 -0.2515 0.2084 
 0.5823 0.2995 0.001*** 0.041** 0.000*** 0.013** 0.042** 
SRISK 0.0288 0.0567 0.3838 0.3474 0.4217 -0.2668 0.2579 
 0.7806 0.583 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.009*** 0.011** 
       (continued) 
 
        
 DiDeSV LRMES SRISK     
DiDeSV 1       
LRMES 0.2502 1      
 0.014**       
SRISK 0.3899 0.7029 1     
 0.000*** 0.000***      
MinEqtRet (MaxCDSRet) denotes the actual minimum equity returns (maximum CDS returns) during the period from 2007 
Q3 to 2008 Q4. Risk measures are their maximum or minimum values during the period of 2006 Q1 to 2007Q2. VaR is the 
95th percentile. CDSs is the CDS spread. the suffix of “SI” of the systemic risk measures means the systemic importance of the 
firms. the suffix of “SV” of the systemic risk measures means the systemic vulnerability of the firms. ~IRFMax~ refers to 
the IRF results based on the maximum values of the impulse response plots. ~IRFPrd~refers to the IRF results based on 















Appendix 96 Rank Correlation Matrix of the Mean Values of the Variables 
 MeanEqtRet MeanCDSRet MeanLeverage Size Illiquidity Volatility VaR 
MeanEqtRet 1       
MeanCDSRet -0.5421 1      
 0.000***       
MeanLeverage -0.6124 0.451 1     
 0.000*** 0.000***      
MeanMV 0.2189 -0.0417 -0.2319 1    
 0.032** 0.6865 0.023**     
Illiquidity -0.4851 0.4666 0.2787 -0.2846 1   
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.006*** 0.005***    
Volatility -0.2343 0.1157 0.2889 -0.4583 0.0811 1  
 0.022** 0.2618 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.4323   
VaR -0.2291 0.1404 0.3054 -0.4203 0.0119 0.9426 1 
 0.025** 0.1726 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.9081 0.000***  
ES -0.2691 0.1034 0.2868 -0.4058 0.0719 0.9449 0.8916 
 0.008 0.3159 0.0046 0 0.4862 0 0 
Beta -0.4867 0.2056 0.5776 -0.1743 0.0172 0.5369 0.5731 
 0.000*** 0.044** 0.000*** 0.089* 0.8677 0.000*** 0.000*** 
CDSs -0.059 -0.2705 -0.0308 -0.5813 0.0363 0.2953 0.2408 
 0.5682 0.008*** 0.7656 0.000*** 0.7258 0.004*** 0.018** 
Z-Score 0.2444 -0.0997 -0.3667 0.2718 -0.0168 -0.221 -0.2393 
 0.016** 0.3338 0.000*** 0.007*** 0.8711 0.030** 0.019** ∆"#$%&'SI 0.0637 0.0184 0.0109 0.3849 -0.0449 -0.1484 -0.0964 
 0.5372 0.8589 0.9157 0.000*** 0.6641 0.149 0.35 ∆"#$%&'SV -0.4027 0.6901 0.5776 0.0799 0.2728 0.1316 0.1505 
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.439 0.007*** 0.2013 0.1432 ∆"#()$SI -0.4055 0.1886 0.6036 0.0698 -0.0451 -0.0028 0.1494 
 0.000*** 0.066* 0.000*** 0.4991 0.6628 0.9788 0.1462 ∆"#()$SV -0.4578 0.1643 0.6509 -0.1869 -0.0077 0.4681 0.5071 
 0.000*** 0.1098 0.000*** 0.068* 0.9409 0.000*** 0.000*** 
CDSIRFMaxSI -0.5104 0.3029 0.523 -0.0874 0.1214 0.0969 0.1131 
 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.3974 0.2388 0.3479 0.2726 
CDSIRFMaxSV -0.4963 0.4167 0.6273 -0.0883 0.1671 0.0904 0.1362 
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.3922 0.1037 0.3811 0.1859 
CDSIRFPrdSI 0.1379 -0.0666 -0.1316 0.0083 0.0164 0.0045 0.0171 
 0.1802 0.5194 0.2012 0.9364 0.8741 0.965 0.8683 
CDSIRFPrdSV 0.0196 0.1427 -0.0378 0.0914 0.1397 -0.0488 -0.0182 
 0.8497 0.1656 0.7144 0.3759 0.1746 0.6368 0.8601 
EqtIRFMaxSI -0.3923 0.2022 0.5264 -0.1034 0.1311 0.2177 0.2561 
 0.000*** 0.048** 0.000*** 0.3162 0.2028 0.033** 0.012** 
EqtIRFMaxSV -0.2441 0.0817 0.482 0.1408 -0.0655 -0.1864 -0.1136 
 0.017** 0.4285 0.000*** 0.1712 0.5259 0.069* 0.2704 
EqtIRFPrdSI 0.2995 -0.1764 -0.3427 0.1527 -0.0913 -0.2298 -0.2001 
 0.003*** 0.086* 0.001*** 0.1375 0.3764 0.024** 0.051* 
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EqtIRFPrdSV -0.0408 0.1507 0.169 -0.1502 0.2301 0.0425 0.0763 
 0.693 0.1427 0.100* 0.1442 0.024** 0.6813 0.46 
CDSGrangerSI -0.1451 0.3026 0.4681 -0.0072 0.155 0.0416 0.0859 
 0.1585 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.9442 0.1317 0.6876 0.4054 
CDSGrangerSV -0.4019 0.2004 0.3731 -0.0809 0.0094 -0.0251 -0.0438 
 0.000*** 0.050* 0.000*** 0.4332 0.9273 0.8082 0.6719 
EqtGrangerSI -0.2576 0.4213 0.4107 -0.1745 0.3397 0.4124 0.4662 
 0.011** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.089* 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
EqtGrangerSV 0.0807 -0.2152 -0.1887 0.2716 -0.2274 -0.43 -0.436 
 0.4346 0.035** 0.066* 0.007*** 0.026** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
DiDeSI -0.175 0.2276 0.3498 0.4325 0.0106 -0.3631 -0.3226 
 0.088* 0.026** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.9183 0.000*** 0.001*** 
DiDeSV -0.3485 -0.1453 0.3601 -0.4034 0.0861 0.1113 0.1073 
 0.001*** 0.1578 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.4041 0.2803 0.2979 
LRMES -0.4597 0.3062 0.6757 -0.1987 0.0835 0.6639 0.7202 
 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.052* 0.4186 0.000*** 0.000*** 
SRISK -0.6039 0.3257 0.9068 -0.3987 0.2832 0.419 0.4182 
 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 

















































 ES Beta CDSs Z-Score ∆"#$%&'SI ∆"#$%&'SV ∆"#()$SI 
ES 1       
Beta 0.5113 1      
 0.000***       
CDSs 0.2618 0.0963 1     
 0.010** 0.3507      
Z-Score -0.213 -0.3796 -0.1575 1    
 0.037** 0.000*** 0.1255     ∆"#$%&'SI -0.1328 0.0212 -0.6179 0.1779 1   
 0.1972 0.8373 0.000*** 0.083*    ∆"#$%&'SV 0.1095 0.3154 -0.3388 -0.1583 0.0432 1  
 0.2884 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.1234 0.6759   ∆"#()$SI 0.0044 0.6757 -0.2178 -0.3459 0.2091 0.3365 1 
 0.9664 0.000*** 0.033** 0.001*** 0.041** 0.001***  ∆"#()$SV 0.4594 0.893 0.0188 -0.4444 0.0488 0.3114 0.8073 
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.856 0.000*** 0.6365 0.002*** 0.000*** 
CDSIRFMaxSI 0.057 0.3852 0.1494 -0.331 -0.2763 0.31 0.4015 
 0.5814 0.000*** 0.1463 0.001*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 
CDSIRFMaxSV 0.089 0.4464 -0.0526 -0.3427 -0.1859 0.3959 0.5376 
 0.3883 0.000*** 0.6105 0.001*** 0.070* 0.000*** 0.000*** 
CDSIRFPrdSI 0.0525 -0.138 -0.2871 0.0805 0.465 -0.1191 -0.0924 
 0.6117 0.1798 0.005*** 0.4358 0.000*** 0.2477 0.3708 
CDSIRFPrdSV -0.0222 -0.0091 -0.4062 0.0603 0.5931 0.0641 0.0571 
 0.8299 0.9295 0.000*** 0.5594 0.000*** 0.5352 0.5808 
EqtIRFMaxSI 0.1801 0.5654 -0.0534 -0.4161 0.0905 0.3823 0.6537 
 0.079* 0.000*** 0.6052 0.000*** 0.3807 0.000*** 0.000*** 
EqtIRFMaxSV -0.187 0.506 -0.1871 -0.1904 0.1163 0.2282 0.7805 
 0.068* 0.000*** 0.068* 0.063* 0.2592 0.025** 0.000*** 
EqtIRFPrdSI -0.185 -0.2965 0.0314 0.1806 -0.0218 -0.2274 -0.2591 
 0.071* 0.003*** 0.7612 0.078* 0.8332 0.026** 0.011** 
EqtIRFPrdSV 0.0654 -0.1776 0.0079 -0.0314 -0.1255 0.1503 -0.1062 
 0.5266 0.083* 0.9388 0.7617 0.2231 0.1437 0.3032 
CDSGrangerSI 0.0009 0.2574 -0.3426 -0.1822 0.219 0.4354 0.4318 
 0.9932 0.011** 0.001*** 0.076* 0.032** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
CDSGrangerSV -0.0295 0.2845 0.2715 -0.2741 -0.3943 0.1298 0.3436 
 0.7756 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.000*** 0.2074 0.001*** 
EqtGrangerSI 0.4033 0.1239 -0.1897 -0.0686 0.1635 0.4133 0.1011 
 0.000*** 0.229 0.064* 0.5069 0.1115 0.000*** 0.3268 
EqtGrangerSV -0.4527 0.0214 0.0425 -0.0482 -0.0244 -0.2103 0.0843 
 0.000*** 0.8359 0.6812 0.6407 0.8135 0.040** 0.4139 
DiDeSI -0.3251 0.2828 -0.6646 -0.1373 0.4511 0.3607 0.5783 
 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.000*** 0.1822 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
DiDeSV 0.1206 0.4981 0.6515 -0.3627 -0.3996 -0.0638 0.4111 
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 0.242 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.5367 0.000*** 
LRMES 0.6248 0.8904 0.0154 -0.3107 0.0782 0.41 0.6346 
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.8817 0.002*** 0.4487 0.000*** 0.000*** 
SRISK 0.4266 0.6357 0.0539 -0.421 0.0222 0.4565 0.5701 
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.602 0.000*** 0.8298 0.000*** 0.000*** 
       (continued) 
 
        
 ∆"#()$SV CDSIRFMaxSI CDSIRFMaxSV CDSIRFPrdSI CDSIRFPrdSV EqtIRFMaxSI EqtIRFMaxSV ∆"#()$SV 1       
CDSIRFMaxSI 0.4268 1      
 0.000***       
CDSIRFMaxSV 0.5247 0.6942 1     
 0.000*** 0.000***      
CDSIRFPrdSI -0.1095 -0.3493 -0.3167 1    
 0.2881 0.001*** 0.002***     
CDSIRFPrdSV -0.0253 -0.3336 -0.1838 0.7628 1   
 0.8065 0.001*** 0.073* 0.000***    
EqtIRFMaxSI 0.6831 0.3932 0.4825 -0.0665 0.067 1  
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.52 0.5166   
EqtIRFMaxSV 0.587 0.3343 0.491 -0.1919 -0.0114 0.5099 1 
 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.061* 0.9123 0.000***  
EqtIRFPrdSI -0.3064 -0.1307 -0.2409 0.0418 0.0151 -0.2907 -0.1779 
 0.002*** 0.2042 0.018** 0.6862 0.8837 0.004*** 0.083* 
EqtIRFPrdSV -0.1472 0.0982 0.0825 -0.0166 0.0177 0.0003 -0.1027 
 0.1524 0.3411 0.4242 0.8721 0.8644 0.9977 0.3195 
CDSGrangerSI 0.3697 0.2311 0.4633 -0.1063 0.102 0.2761 0.3233 
 0.000*** 0.024** 0.000*** 0.3025 0.3229 0.007*** 0.001*** 
CDSGrangerSV 0.3213 0.6318 0.7268 -0.45 -0.3899 0.2988 0.3476 
 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 
EqtGrangerSI 0.1429 0.0852 0.14 0.097 0.1774 0.1887 -0.188 
 0.1648 0.4093 0.1737 0.3471 0.084* 0.066* 0.067* 
EqtGrangerSV -0.0578 0.0515 -0.0565 -0.2159 -0.0882 -0.0588 0.4113 
 0.576 0.618 0.5847 0.035** 0.393 0.5691 0.000*** 
DiDeSI 0.355 0.1624 0.3471 0.0814 0.2597 0.3127 0.5847 
 0.000*** 0.114 0.001*** 0.4307 0.011** 0.002*** 0.000*** 
DiDeSV 0.5229 0.4973 0.3444 -0.313 -0.3589 0.3821 0.371 
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
LRMES 0.8394 0.3312 0.441 -0.0842 0.0378 0.5883 0.386 
 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.4148 0.7144 0.000*** 0.000*** 
SRISK 0.6958 0.5093 0.6082 -0.0409 -0.0088 0.5088 0.4115 
SRISK 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.6921 0.9318 0.000*** 0.000*** 















 EqtIRFPrdSI EqtIRFPrdSV CDSGrangerSI CDSGrangerSV EqtGrangerSI EqtGrangerSV DiDeSI 
EqtIRFPrdSI 1       
EqtIRFPrdSV 0.1778 1      
 0.083*       
CDSGrangerSI -0.1925 0.0331 1     
 0.060* 0.7491      
CDSGrangerSV -0.1647 0.0548 0.1497 1    
 0.1087 0.5958 0.1455     
EqtGrangerSI -0.1247 0.2669 0.2978 -0.1698 1   
 0.2262 0.009*** 0.003*** 0.098*    
EqtGrangerSV 0.083 -0.2827 -0.1088 0.1183 -0.6835 1  
 0.4213 0.005*** 0.2912 0.2508 0.000***   
DiDeSI -0.1115 -0.0121 0.4303 0.1296 -0.1068 0.2316 1 
 0.2794 0.9071 0.000*** 0.2081 0.3003 0.023**  
DiDeSV -0.1042 -0.0186 0.0197 0.5003 -0.2408 0.1755 0.0066 
 0.3122 0.8572 0.8489 0.000*** 0.018** 0.087* 0.9493 
LRMES -0.3483 -0.0135 0.3343 0.2087 0.4014 -0.2515 0.2249 
 0.001*** 0.8961 0.001*** 0.041** 0.000*** 0.013** 0.028** 
SRISK -0.3512 0.0994 0.3838 0.3474 0.4217 -0.2668 0.2714 
 0.001*** 0.3353 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
       (continued) 
 
        
 DiDeSV LRMES SRISK     
DiDeSV 1       
LRMES 0.3047 1      
 0.003***       
SRISK 0.4276 0.7029 1     
 0.000*** 0.000***      
MeanEqtRet (MeanCDSRet) denotes the actual mean equity returns (mean CDS returns) during the period from 2007 Q3 to 
2008 Q4. Risk measures are their mean values during the period of 2006 Q1 to 2007Q2. VaR is the 95th percentile. CDSs is 
the CDS spread. the suffix of “SI” of the systemic risk measures means the systemic importance of the firms. the suffix of “SV” 
of the systemic risk measures means the systemic vulnerability of the firms. ~IRFMax~ refers to the IRF results based on 
the maximum values of the impulse response plots. ~IRFPrd~refers to the IRF results based on the lasting periods in the 
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